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ABSTRACT 
Sustainable Disaster Recovery of Historic Buildings, the Case of San Francisco after 
Loma Prieta Earthquake. (May 2006) 
Fatima M. Al-Nammari, B.S.; M.A. University of Jordan 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Michael K. Lindell 
    Prof. David G. Woodcock 
 
 
Recovery from disaster is a challenging period for any community. Long-term 
recovery is important, especially in relation to the built heritage, but it is among the least 
explored phases of disaster. Identifying past problems is needed to reduce future 
recovery complications. 
This study investigates the long-term recovery of public and Non-Government 
Organizations (NGO) owned historic buildings after an earthquake in the light of chosen 
sustainability variables. It examines San Francisco after the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake as a case study and analyzes time needs, community participation, and 
maintenance of historic character, to identify whether historic buildings faced special 
issues and the variables involved. The study uses different methods. It statistically 
compares data for a sample of public and NGO owned buildings in San Francisco and 
then analyzes the dynamics of recovery for three buildings that faced delays.  
The study has found that historic buildings faced delays in recovery but such 
delays were sometimes the results of major rehabilitation projects, thus having long-term 
benefits. There are many variables in the recovery process that delay historic buildings 
and can be addressed to reduce future delays, which are mostly results of the context, 
process, and players. Time needs for the recovery of buildings are affected by their 
function, damage level, and status. Also, the sustainability of the process needs to be 
addressed, mainly in terms of the way historic buildings are valued, and the degree to 
which such valuation allows them to be part of the heritage of the community at large.  
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of sustainability has become an important part of any study that 
tackles resource management, whether it is business, economic, tourism, cultural, or 
disaster recovery.  Sustainability identifies three notions as vital - environment, economy 
and community - and they are to be considered in any management process so that none 
of them is forfeited. This includes heritage and historic buildings’ management efforts 
(Daher, 2000; Giddings, 2000; Lefevre, 2000; Rothrok, 2000; Hardy and Beeton, 2001; 
Al-Nammari, 2003) and recovery efforts (Berke and Beatley, 1997; Mileti, 1999; 
NHRAIC, 2001).  
Sustainability has many sides. Its social facet calls for social equity, justice, and 
equilibrium in distribution of resources. Its environmental facet calls for sound strategies 
that avoid environment and resource depletion. Its cultural facet calls for maintaining 
cultural resources for future generations and reducing losses due to carelessness, 
damage, or disasters (Giddings, Hopwood, & O’Brien, 2002). Therefore, the concept of 
sustainability provides a backbone for evaluating both disaster recovery and historic 
preservation. It links the goals of recovery, hazard reduction, preservation, heritage 
management, development, and other social and environmental goals.  
Literature divides the post-disaster period into four main stages: 1) Emergency 
(response) period; 2) Restoration (short term recovery) period; 3) Reconstruction I (long-
term recovery) period; and 4) Reconstruction II (commemorative period) (Haas, Kates, 
and Bowden, 1978; Berke and Beatley, 1997). The recovery phase itself has been 
referred to using many terms (Quarantelli, 1999) but, for the purpose of this research 
recovery is defined as the time needed to repair a building after an earthquake1.  
 
_____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Disasters.  
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Recovery is the least investigated phase of the four phases of disaster: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (Berke and Beatley, 1997; Quarantelli, 1999; 
Lindell and Prater; 2003). Moreover, within the body of research, long-term recovery  
has been neglected as the focus is usually on the response and short-term recovery 
phases (Haas et al., 1978; Geipel, 1982; 1991). Improving the management of disaster 
recovery requires taking into account the long term effects on community resources and 
adopting sustainable approaches (Berke and Beatley, 1997; NHRAIC, 2001). Such goals 
need to be informed through systematic research. 
Disasters have physical, social, psychological, sociodemographic, 
socioeconomic, and political impacts, in addition to many indirect impacts (cf. Lindell 
and Prater 2003). Economically, the cost of disasters is constantly escalating; Hurricane 
Andrew, Northridge Earthquake, Kobe Earthquake, and other disasters afterwards have 
cost billions of dollars. (Mileti, 1999; Tierney, Lindell, and Perry, 2001). Hurricane 
Katrina is estimated to cost $200 billion (Murray and VandeHei, September 21, 2005).  
Studies about the effects of the Loma Prieta earthquake say that about 1 % of the 
historic buildings in the Bay area were damaged, about 11.25 % of the total damage is in 
historic buildings, amounting to 350 million dollars, and that the cost of public historic 
buildings was large (ARG, 1990).  This indicates that an investigation into the recovery 
of historic buildings is important, not only due to the effects of earthquakes on the built 
heritage, but also because of the high costs that seem to be associated with it. 
Time is an issue that is critical after disasters. People need to go back to their 
original pre-disaster life as soon as possible, which creates stress for city managers and 
staff (Wilson, 1991). Research to improve time needs have usually focused on mitigation 
and better preparedness. Yet, it is also important to understand the dynamics of the 
recovery process and how that can be improved in the light of recommendations of 
sustainability.   
The Loma Prieta earthquake was the major impetus to the increased interest in 
the disaster management of historic buildings, probably due to the rich architecture of 
the Bay Area cities (Merritt, 1990; CPF, 1999). The effects of the earthquake have been 
   
 
  3
 
investigated and the importance of preparedness for the next earthquake has been 
emphasized, especially for historic buildings. However, no studies have tackled the long-
term recovery of the historic buildings in a systematic investigation. Thus, this study 
focuses on San Francisco as a case to investigate chosen sustainability aspects of the 
long-term recovery of historic buildings. The study aims at identifying whether historic 
buildings perform differently than non-historic buildings in term of the time needed for 
recovery, and then investigates the dynamics of the recovery for chosen historic 
buildings in the light of sustainability principles. 
Consequently, this research is significant as an investigation into an otherwise 
neglected area of study. It helps bridge two fields of study that overlap during the 
recovery phase. Such an investigation is also a means for improving our understanding 
of the disaster recovery of the built heritage in particular, so that the results of the study 
would help in improving the sustainability of recovery. Its findings are relevant to 
owners, stewards of the built heritage, cities, and other public agencies involved in the 
recovery process. It also has policy consequences for the different levels of governments 
involved. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Sustainable development was initiated as a concept in the 1970s, and was 
identified as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Bank, 1999). The concept 
was adopted in to several UN conferences, especially in relation to the developing world. 
Agenda 21 identified several principles for sustainability that call for social equity, 
maintaining resources, community development, and participation (WTTC, 2002). The 
concept of sustainability has three notions as vital: environment, economy, and 
community. These three notions interact with each other throughout the process of 
human development. Thus, sustainable development has been identified to revolve 
around four standpoints (Giddings et al., 2002): 
1. Futurity (inter-generational equity), 
2. Social justice (intra-generational equity), 
3. Procedural equity (social equality, community participation), and 
4. Geographical equity and biodiversity. 
Within that framework, heritage management and disaster recovery are essential 
practices that fall under the umbrella of sustainability. The following literature reviews 
what sustainability means in each field, with regard to the post-disaster recovery of the 
built heritage. 
Sustainable Heritage Management 
Among the early concepts of sustainable heritage management was that 
promoted by the Council of Europe in the Congress of European Architectural Heritage 
(1975) which is called” integrated heritage conservation”. It emphasized that all areas in 
historic centers are part of the architectural heritage and should not be allowed to fall 
under the threat of neglect, demolition, excessive traffic and incompatible new 
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construction. It maintained that the social structure of such centers is important and that 
its rehabilitation would not encourage gentrification. It also fostered the responsibility of 
local authorities emphasizing citizen participation and legislative and financial 
management that would support saving such heritage (Council of Europe, 1975). A 
significant aspect of this concept was citizen participation in making decisions about 
their heritage.  
Many international charters foster concepts of sustainable heritage management, 
sometimes without mentioning that specific term (cf. ICOMOS, 1982, 1987; 1999; 2000; 
Australian-ICOMOS, 1998; WTTC, 2002). Notions of maintaining local values associated 
with that heritage by encouraging community participation are stressed in these 
declarations. 
Consequently, sustainable approaches in cultural management aim at maintaining 
the cultural value of a place for future generations. But identifying value and the proper 
methods for the management of a cultural resource requires community participation to 
maintain local values and prevent the alienation of the community from its heritage. 
Sustainable heritage management requires a comprehensive view that incorporates, 
among other things, the economic validity of preservation, the maintenance of 
community values and the preservation of the environment (Daher, 1999; 2000; 
Serageldin, Ephim and Martin-Brown, 2001; Al-Nammari, 2003). Sustainability in the 
management of heritage is important in terms of utilizing and safeguarding heritage 
assets for future generations, maintaining a social balance, providing employment, 
encouraging community participation, tourism management, and environmental 
conservation (Pickard, 2001:6). These principles are significant, but of interest for this 
investigation is public participation as a tool for maintaining community values, and 
safeguarding the built heritage as an asset for future generations. 
Preservation2 is defined by the Australian International Committee of 
Monuments and Sites (Australian- ICOMOS 1999: article 1.4) as a process of looking 
after a place to retain its cultural significance. Preservation is thus an act of management 
and international charters have stressed that cultural resources should be preserved so 
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that their tangible and intangible values are maintained and passed to future generations 
(cf. ICOMOS 1982; 1987; 1999, 2000). The essence of preservation, thus, lies in the 
maintenance of such values.  
Pickard and de Thyse (2001) note that sustainability indicators have not yet been 
developed for heritage management, nevertheless it is possible to generate general 
principles that can guide the management of heritage sites towards sustainability. They 
suggest the following: 1) Respecting community life and improving its quality through 
the preservation of the cultural heritage. 2) Maintaining identity, diversity, and vitality. 
3) Minimizing the diminution of heritage assets that are non-renewable. 4) Changing the 
attitude and perception of all actors and players in the community through facilitating 
stakeholder dialogue. 5) Encouraging community involvement and empowerment 
through participatory processes. 4) Providing policies that integrate sustainable 
development with heritage conservation; and 5) defining the capacity by which the 
historic center can permit change. Such principles help in providing guidance for 
heritage preservation projects, including post-disaster heritage preservation. 
On the other hand, the disaster recovery period poses special challenges for 
historic buildings. Spennemann and Look (1998), and others (Jones, 1986; Fielden, 
1987; 1994; Merritt, 1990; Nelson, 1991; Look, Wong and Augustus, 1997) have 
identified the main issues in post-disaster management of a historic building. Some of 
the points that are problematic include maintaining historic character and integrity of 
fabric3 both of which are critical for the preservation of the built heritage for future 
generations. Time pressures in disaster response and recovery lead to decisions that 
damage both these aspects thus causing losses in the built heritage (Fielden, 1987; 
Nelson, 1991; Craigo, 1998; Donaldson, 1998). Thus, research is needed to investigate 
whether historic buildings face special challenges after disaster and how such challenges 
develop, especially in regard to participation and maintaining of historic character. 
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Sustainable Disaster Recovery 
Sustainable disaster recovery requires taking in to account the long-term effects 
on community resources and adopting sustainable approaches (Berke and Beatley, 1997; 
NHRAIC, 2001). Berke and Beatley (1997) provide several recommendations for 
achieving sustainable recovery. Although they focused on the Caribbean after a 
hurricane, their recommendations apply to natural disasters in general. Their suggestions 
include: promoting bottom-up recovery, avoiding political hindrances, making disaster 
plans relevant, achieving fair and equitable recovery, establishing inter-organizational 
coordination, using resources wisely, and including sustainable mitigation. 
Available literature contends that achieving sustainable recovery requires 
attention to issues such as mitigation, local resources (including cultural), funding, time 
needed, bureaucracy, and community participation (Haas et al., 1978; Alexander, 1989; 
Merritt, 1990; Mader, 1994; NHRAIC, 2001). To achieve sustainable recovery for 
historic buildings, planning is critical since it helps in preparation and avoidance of 
problems. Such planning needs to be informed through systematic research, which is 
lacking. 
The stance taken by this study in regard to sustainability falls under the notion of 
holistic sustainability (figure 1).  This study recognizes sustainability as an umbrella that 
should cover all decisions in the built environment. Within this view, sustainability of 
the built environment is concerned with managing all aspects in the built environment. 
But what differentiate the management of the built heritage from the management of 
other buildings is the special meanings and values for historic buildings, which sets them 
aside. This requires special care in decisions affecting them, consequently decisions 
about them takes into account not only the functional, economic, developmental, and 
aesthetic values they have, but also their social and cultural value as well. This relates to 
what Sokrin (2001) points out, in that Preservation is “always an investigation into a 
system of beliefs and desires” (Sokrin, 2001, 59). This requires decision makers to know 
what such heritage means for the people, thus citizen participation is emphasized.  
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Figure 1 The theoretical framework of the study. 
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Although it took place in an underdeveloped part of China, the reconstruction of 
Lijian is interesting as the main principles of sustainability were planned to be 
implemented. The project is a good example of merging disaster recovery and heritage 
management. The World Bank developed the plans, and the publication does not go into 
the details of the implementation or the challenges faced. However, the study lists 
several lessons learned about heritage conservation in post-earthquake reconstruction 
that provide good general principles (Ebbe and Hankey, 2000; Read and Ebbe, 2001): 1-
Administrative management and coordination between government departments, 
especially in regard to historic proprieties. 2- Community involvement in the process by 
setting goals, strategies, and policies for the identification and management of cultural 
heritage. This should be associated with outreach programs that educate the public about 
the value and significance of their heritage. 3- Upgrading historic neighborhoods to 
provide a better quality of life and safety. It is important to use historic buildings so that 
they have a vital role in the lives of their communities. This would support their 
maintenance and provide for benefits for the community through rehabilitation. 4- 
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Proper tourism planning and heritage management that balances the effects of tourism. 
And 5- planning for the future of the site should be done in light of the community needs 
and the preservation of cultural values while providing for economic and regional 
development.  
Recommendations of sustainable recovery in literature are varied depending on 
the perspective taken by the researchers (Haas et al., 1978; Berke, Kartez, and Wenger, 
1993; USDE, 1994; Ebbe and Hankey, 2000; NHRAIC, 2001). Nonetheless, they have 
been grouped into six main categories (NHRAIC, 2001):  
1. Enhancing the quality of life. This is achieved by providing all community 
members equal opportunities for education, health, employment, affordable 
housing, sound environmental management, and encouragement of civic 
evolvement. This objective also achieves environmental maintenance through 
historic preservation. 
2. Upholding environmental quality. This includes all acts of conservation and 
preservation of natural resources, the built heritage, management of open spaces, 
and pollution prevention. 
3. Encouraging public participation in decision-making through active involvement.  
4. Supporting economic sustainability. This is achieved by decisions that generate 
economic development by attracting and retaining the workforce and preserving 
the environment (both natural and cultural) through sound management policies 
that do not consume such resources. An important part is accountability for 
effects on environment and society due to economic investments.   
5. Confirming social equity by taking special attention to social groups that are 
usually marginalized. These include new immigrants, underprivileged 
households, the elderly, and individuals with special needs.   
6. Building disaster resilience by supporting sound land use management, 
mitigation, and preparedness. 
Based on the above literature, there are common goals between sustainable 
disaster recovery and sustainable heritage management. This should help in post disaster 
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situations as it builds common objectives. This study will not investigate all these points, 
but it will focus on community participation and cultural continuity (through maintaining 
historic character and fabric), as they have been identified in the literature (Jones, 1986; 
Fielden, 1987; Merritt, 1990; Nelson, 1991; Fratessa, 1994; Mader, 1994; Look, et al., 
1997; Spennemann and Look, 1998).   
Recovery of Historic Buildings 
Available literature on recovery of historic buildings can be identified in two 
groups. The first group, done under the umbrella of general  disaster recovery (Haas et 
al., 1978; Geipel, 1982; 1991; Berke, Kartez and Wenger, 1993; Bolin and Stanford, 
1994; Fratessa, 1994; Mader, 1994; Berke, 1995; Berke  and Beatley, 1997; Comerio, 
1998a; Rubin, Saperstein and Barbee, 1985; Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle, and Smith, 
1998), sometimes mentions historic buildings as one aspect of a planner’s perspective of 
the recovery process (Alexander, 1989; NHRAIC, 2001; Schwab et al., 1998). The 
second group consists of studies done by preservationists (Jones, 1986; Fielden, 1987; 
Merritt, 1990; Eadie, 1991; Nelson, 1991; Kariotis, 1998; Katchka, 1998; Spennemann 
and Look, 1998; Blair-Tyler and Kristiansson,1999; CPF, 1999; Estes, 2000). This work 
is usually focused on issues of cultural continuity, preservation of integrity, historic 
character and other issues pertaining to preservationists and groups interested in 
heritage. Both groups of studies contend that there is a lack of research on recovery, and 
particularly on long-term recovery. Moreover, both agree that the recovery of historic 
buildings is the least investigated. 
.The earliest work to address disaster recovery of historic buildings was that of 
Fielden (1987), which focused on earthquake hazard management. Nelson (1991) 
provided a good study of the different stages of disaster by using the short-term recovery 
after the Loma Prieta earthquake in California to point out to the main difficulties of the 
process. Spennemann and Look (1998) provide an overview into the effects of disasters 
on historic buildings and sites. The California Preservation Foundation published more 
studies that tackle the immediate response to earthquakes and the challenges that faced 
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historic buildings in the aftermath of Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes (Merritt, 
1990; Eichenfield, 1996; Kariotis, Krakower and Roselund, 1991; CPF, 1999). 
Several studies have indicated that historic buildings face complications in 
recovery (cf. Jones, 1986; Fielden, 1987; 1994; Merritt, 1990; Eadie, 1991; Nelson, 
1991; Look, 1997; Craigo, 1998; Kariotis, 1998; Spennemann and Look, 1998; Blair-
Tyler and Kristiansson, 1999; Look and Spennemann, 2000; 2001). Therefore, 
investigating the recovery of historic buildings as it compares to non-historic buildings is 
important to identify whether historic buildings are different and why. This is essential 
for achieving successful disaster recovery: fewer complications mean a shorter recovery 
time (Haas et al., 1978; Wu and Lindell, 2004). 
Main Variables of the Study 
Based on the review above, certain variables have been identified. Community 
participation, maintenance of cultural values, and the timely repair of historic buildings 
are important aspects of the sustainable recovery and management of the built heritage. 
Participation 
Participatory approaches to decision making are essential for sustainable 
recovery, sustainable development, sustainable heritage management, and sustainable 
governance. Public participation provides for a better-informed general public, 
legitimate plans, and a reduction of conflict among stakeholders (Berke, et al., 1993; 
Bass, Dalal-Clayton, and Pretty, 1995; NHRAIC, 2001; Hague and Jenkins, 2005; Haus, 
Heinelt, and Murray,  2005). 
Community participation in heritage management provides input by the 
community that is relevant to their viewpoints and needs. They participate with 
information that would help make the project better in addressing a wide variety of 
issues, allow for discussion of their values and beliefs, thus making the project of benefit 
to a larger sector of the community. Participation provides the community with a sense 
of ownership. Through participation, benefits of the project can be maximized 
(Grimwade and Carter, 2000; Hardy and Beeton, 2001).  
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Through participation the project would not be based on the needs or values of a 
particular group, which may be any group in power or the cultural elite of the 
community. Decisions about the site, its use, and its meaning as heritage would be 
representative of all community groups. This not only would prevent power monopoly 
and the use of heritage for the benefit of specific groups, but also present a wider 
spectrum of the community opinions. When all community groups participate effectively 
in the development of the preservation plans, alienation of any particular group from 
their heritage or depriving them the benefits would be reduced. 
Research has shown that participatory projects in cultural resources management 
can lead to better results for preservation projects and communities, since it makes 
stakeholders into partners. That benefit, however, depends on the level of empowerment 
provided for the participants and their role in the process. Some participatory processes 
provide the public with a chance to obtain information, or comment on it, while other 
processes would make them partners and decision makers (Dalal-Clayton and Pretty, 
1995; Grimwade and Carter, 2000; Al-Nammari, 2003)  
Moreover, international charters stress the importance of community 
participation, especially for minorities and minority groups. For heritage management, 
participation aims at the presentation of all meanings and values preventing the 
marginalization of groups as much as possible. However, it is important to view 
participation as a process and not a end. It is the process of participation that 
differentiates the outcome (Al-Nammari, 2003). A heritage resource will have different 
values for different groups and participation is one conduit that elicits the building’s 
meaning to all groups. Participation is a process that gives decisions about heritage 
legitimacy (Pickard and de Thyse, 2001; de La Torre, 2005).  
Participation is integral to the heritage conservation process. Sorkin points out 
that “the self-identities of societies that preserve are bound up not simply with the 
appearances of the structures they produce but with the process by which they agree on 
what is to be saved, what modified, and what destroyed” (Sorkin, 2001, 59). Different 
communities have several ways to managing their heritage. In the US, there are several 
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laws that organize management of cultural heritage. The National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) is considered the umbrella for management of natural and cultural 
resources. An important law is the National Historic Preservation Act and its Section 
106, which draws a specific a process for federal undertakings (see Appendix A). Other 
cultural resources laws are the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 
the Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act, among many other acts and executive orders 
(cf. King, 1998; 2000; 2002). States have their own laws for protection and regulation of 
cultural resources. In California, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is 
the main umbrella for cultural resource preservation. Locally, each jurisdiction will 
develop laws pertaining to their community.  
In a series of studies on the preservation of historic centers in Europe, 
participation was a central theme in the management of such heritage (Pickard, 2001). 
Participatory approaches to cultural heritage management are encouraged in the USA as 
well (King, 1998; ACHP, 2002). Literature clearly pushes for community participation, 
yet, more studies are needed to investigate the laws and processes that exist and how 
they can be improved, especially in post disaster situations. 
Historic Character and Integrity of Fabric 
Among the main challenges facing historic preservation after disaster is the 
maintenance of the historic character in spite of the repair work and code upgrades, 
especially if such repairs are extensive in nature. This becomes critical when the damage 
is severe and requires extensive interventions (Spennemann and Look, 1998).  
International charters have stressed the importance of maintaining the historic 
character of buildings and places of heritage value for future generations. The Burra 
Charter points out the importance of the character and fabric of place . It states that 
“cultural significance means "aesthetic, historic, scientific or social value for past, 
present or future generations"” and states that significance helps in the identification of 
the value of place. “The places that are likely to be of significance are those which help 
an understanding of the past or enrich the present, and which will be of value to future 
generations” (Australian-ICOMOS, 1998, article 2.1). 
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Historic fabric is important in conservation. The significance of the place is 
related to its integrity of fabric (National Parks Service, n.d.; Australian-ICOMOS, 1998; 
La Torre, 2005). Most conservation guidelines have a form of requirement for fabric and 
character conservation. In the USA, the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards stress the 
integrity of fabric and historic character for the purpose of listing a property on the 
National Register (National Parks Service, n.d.). In Canada, the federal heritage building 
review code of practice points out the importance of preserving the character-defining 
elements, patterns, and relationships in primary areas of heritage value (Parks Canada, 
2005). In Europe, Both the Granada and Malta conventions (Council of Europe, 1985; 
1995) recommended that additions to historic contexts would not be permitted unless it 
shows compatibility to the existing in terms of volume, scale, form, materials, and 
quality of design. Those safeguards would be taken to protect views, vistas, settings, and 
historic street layouts. They required that control measures, sanctions, and coercive 
measures would be made to protect the historic character and fabric.  
Time 
Time is an important aspect in the post-disaster period. Time is particularly 
important in housing recovery, as recovery passes through several stages and is usually 
challenged in terms of financing and management (Wu and Lindell, 2004). In general, 
city managers and staff try to return life to its normal pace as quickly as possible 
(Wilson, 1991; Eichenfield, 1996).  After Hurricane Hugo, the Charleston Board of 
Architectural Review speeded up its review process in order to hasten the recovery, and 
according to Nelson (1991), this was done without compromising its standards. The 
action of speeding review process is often taken by cities after disasters to help in 
speeding the recovery of the community as time is a critical factor and a quick return to 
normal life functions is desirable (ARG, 1990). Conversely, time needed for recovery 
provides insights as to whether recovery faced complications, especially if done on a 
comparative basis. 
The seminal study of long term recovery by Haas et al. (1978) divided the 
process into four stages. Although that has been critiqued as providing a linear 
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representation of a process that is more complicated (Rubin et al., 1985), the timeline of 
recovery is one way for evaluating the success of recovery (Wu and Lindell, 2004). 
According to Nelson (1991), historic buildings are expected to have been restored in the 
first five years. No research has so far attempted to investigate the differences between 
historic and non-historic buildings in terms of time needed for recovery, or to see which 
functions require more time. Such research would identify each community’s priorities 
and help identify where to expect delays in future disasters. 
Literature following points out several complications that create delays after 
disasters. Delays in recovery start during the response stage, during which decisions 
would impact long-tem recovery. Delays for some public buildings happened due to 
disagreements over damage estimates, the cost of repairs, and the level of expected 
performance (Mader, 1994). Oaks (1990) points out that tagging of buildings was one 
source of delays for several reasons. There were complications during tagging due to 
hazardous materials (i.e. asbestos), aftershocks, liability, language barriers, and 
landowner-tenant disputes. Repairs were delayed in some cases due to complications in 
damage assessments. San Francisco had an emergency permitting process in place, 
which helped their Bureau of Building Inspection face the thousands of requests for 
inspections after the earthquake of 1989 (Oaks, 1990; ARG, 1990). 
(Oaks, 1990) identifies the stages of recovery for a privately owned building after 
an earthquake: 1) evaluation (ATC I4, ATC II), both done by the city and county; 2) 
further evaluation (ATC III) is done and paid for by the owner; 3) based on ATC III, a 
decision is made on the cost-benefit of repair and retrofit, or demolition; 4) preparing 
architectural and engineering drawings; 5) getting proper permits (emergency permit 
process) and finally; 6) getting construction firms. 
For publicly owned buildings, the process is a little different, as the city would 
evaluate its own buildings, thus the three stages of ATC are simpler. Also, obtaining the 
proper permits depends on who the owner is; the city may or may not require its own 
buildings to go through the same permitting process as private buildings.   
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For public buildings, there are standard time limits for recovery, which depends 
on the function of the building. According to the California Seismic Safety Commission 
(1991), which identifies the policy on acceptable levels of safety in state buildings based 
on their function and construction, the maximum time needed to resume functionality of 
buildings after an earthquake is : 
1. Immediately fully functional without disruption. This is for nuclear facilities and 
buildings with hazardous materials if there is a risk of release. 
2. Within hours after the earthquake:  for hospitals and essential services, with 
minimal acceptable earthquake performance. These buildings should need 
minimal repairs and such repairs should be mainly non-structural.  
3. Within days to months. Buildings with hazardous materials can take this long if 
there is no risk for release of hazardous materials. Also recommended for this 
category are nursing homes, prisons, public schools, but this time limit is not the 
maximum allowable for them. 
4. Years of repair are considered a maximum recommended time for nursing 
homes, prisons, and public schools.   
5. For unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings that are not historic, it is acceptable 
to delay functionality for unlimited time. Offices, universities, research, courts 
and other non-historic buildings are included. For historic buildings, however, 
the Seismic Safety Commission allowed unlimited maximum time provided that 
it is not due to excessive damage and that the buildings are following code. This 
last point is of interest as it indicates that historic buildings, and certain buildings 
that have specific construction (i.e. URM), are expected to take longer time by 
default.  
The table is clear on what is not acceptable: it is not acceptable for 1) hospitals 
and essential services to take days or months, and 2) for public schools, nursing homes, 
prisons, to take unlimited time (California Seismic Safety Commission. 1991) 
The table is interesting for two points: 1) All historic buildings are compiled as 
one category, regardless of their function (i.e. if they are hospitals, emergency centers, 
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prisons, or else), and 2) historic buildings are placed as buildings that take the longest 
time.  Interestingly, the table states that for historic buildings, the long time should not 
be due to extensive damage. This requirements means that delays in historic buildings 
should be for reasons other the damage level. The table requires that historic buildings 
be in compliance with the State Historical Building Code and that damage be repairable. 
This requirement is in need of investigation to see if historic buildings do take longer 
time, and if that is related to damage level or other reasons. 
The investigation of time to recovery requires taking into account several 
variables. These variables are the function of building, damage level, construction type, 
age of building, and the cost of the recovery. 
Function of Building 
The functional use of a building will lead to specific requirements for its 
architectural and structural design, thus its future seismic behavior. The pattern of 
occupancy and the specific use of the spaces translate to space proportions, construction 
methods, and materials. This in turn affects how the structure behaves during an 
earthquake. As such, different building uses will require different strengthening schemes 
in relation to the structural type and construction materials. Also, code requirements vary 
with the criticality of the occupancy level of the building.  Buildings that are occupied 
by large numbers of people at the same time are not similar to buildings that are used by 
a limited number of people. Likewise, buildings that house critical functions, such as fire 
stations, are expected to remain functional during emergencies and after earthquakes.  
Functions after a disaster can be categorized as follow: 
1. Important for the community’s return to normal everyday life: residential, 
commercial, business, and schools. 
   2. Important for the city’s emergency response and recovery management: public 
offices, emergency respondents, and health care. 
   3. Important for both: utility and infrastructure. 
Literature indicating the influence of function on repair and recovery is scattered.  In 
most instances, functions are referenced through discussions of mitigation or 
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strengthening requirements. The needs of buildings are acknowledged to be different. 
Literature discussing mitigation has identified schools, homes, hospitals, emergency and 
health care, as a discrete group of structures that require special attention. This was done 
while providing guidelines for such buildings for mitigation purposes. Research has for a 
long time identified their distinction in seismic performance and strength needs, yet it 
has not yet investigated whether their recovery is different as well.  
1-Residential  
The recovery of housing is essential as the effect of the disaster on the lives of 
people is heavily related to its effect on their homes (FEMA 152). The timely recovery 
of housing is an important indicator of recovery (Wu and Lindell, 2004). Comerio 
(1998a) discusses how the housing sector is essential for the recovery process, and she 
points out frustrations with multi-family dwellings in particular. Disasters impact low-
income individuals more severely than higher income individuals so the rapid recovery 
of public housing and downtown hotels and apartments is important (Bolin and Bolton, 
1986; Comerio, 1998a; Phillips, 1998). 
Elderly housing is critical as well, since that sector of the community usually 
lacks affordable housing and often would use single-room-occupancy hotels (Phillips, 
1998). Housing tenants of downtown apartments and hotels are mostly low income 
individuals and do not afford the costs of repairs. And as tenants, they are affected by 
any increase in the rent that the owner might consider to facilitate such repairs. Research 
identifies such groups as socially marginal with limited participation in society. 
Residents of such housing have several characteristics that make them more vulnerable 
(Bolin and Bolton, 1986; Phillips, 1998). 
Phillips (1998) contends that earthquakes such as Loma Prieta affect the 
homeless population because it causes serious damage to housing. It makes affordable 
housing more remote as the damaged units would decrease the number of affordable 
housing. This is in addition to the “marginally homeless” who live in doubled-up or 
tripled-up housing and who may also lose their affordable homes, creating more 
homelessness.  
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A lot of literature talks about the significance of hastening the recovery of 
housing, especially for low income and elderly groups that reside in downtown 
apartment buildings and hotels. No literature has attempted to see how long such 
buildings take to recover in comparison to other functions. 
2- Schools  
Literature points out that school buildings deserve special seismic standards for 
safety because they house children, a vulnerable and important group of the society, and 
because of their importance for post-disaster housing as shelters (FEMA 149). 
Not only are schools special because of their inhabitants, but also because the 
spaces they incorporate are complex and diverse. There contain small and large halls 
with different structural systems. In addition to that, their closure for long periods after 
earthquakes would have serous long-term effects on the community as the education of a 
generation would be seriously affected. Taking into account that repairs after 
earthquakes are challenging, closure for long periods might be unavoidable should there 
be serious damage. Thus, any delay in school functionality should be avoided 
(FEMA149). 
Within schools, there are certain spaces with special functions that may increase 
cost and recovery time. The library, information resources centers (or places with 
stacked materials), kitchen areas, science laboratories, industrial and vocational areas 
have higher risk and require extra attention to mitigation and compensation for damage 
during recovery. Moreover, school buildings are expensive as they are designed for 
specific functions with special spaces so replacing them is economically unfeasible. 
From an economic viability perspective, the objective is to maintain their functionality 
for the community for a long time.  
For the purpose of facilitating the analysis, all educational facilities were 
collapsed in one group. Therefore, schools, colleges, universities, and day care centers 
were all one category. 
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3- Cultural facilities 
Libraries, archives, and museums contain significant objects and materials that 
could sustain damage and repairing them adds to the cost and time of recovery. Some 
disasters might inflict long-term damages on the contents of the museum or library, such 
as hurricanes and floods (Jones, 1986; Nelson, 1991). Cultural facilities are also reported 
in terms of recovery cost. The elaborate detailing and the special requirements to 
maintain their historic character make such buildings of high cost (Couret, 1998; Wyland 
Sept. 2, 2001). 
4- Infrastructure 
The loss of infrastructure is among the most important effects of disasters that 
cities try to limit. Power, gas, water, sewer, and communication lines are essential to 
restoring normal life functions and their absence creates hardships not only for the 
community but also for city personnel trying to respond to the emergency (Wilson, 
1991; Schwab et al., 1998). 
For facilities that are drastically damaged, usually temporary replacements are 
provided until a permanent facility is constructed, as transportation and infrastructure are 
essential for restoring normal community functions. Restoration of infrastructure 
services is among the basic functions that a post-disaster plan should have (Schwab et 
al., 1998). 
Restoring infrastructure services is essential not only for helping people feel that 
normal life functions are back, but also for pragmatic reasons too. Most importantly, 
economic recovery has been linked to the recovery of utilities and infrastructure 
(Schwab et al., 1998). The importance of infrastructure has been cited through their 
economic impact. According to Brady and Perkins (1998), the economic losses from the 
damages of the Loma Prieta earthquake are minimal when compared to the losses in 
retail and selected manufacturing activities, totaling about $5.9 billion. The gross GRP 
lost in Loma Prieta was between $181 to 725 million, but San Francisco experienced the 
greatest loss in retail activity for the fourth quarter after the earthquake, which was due 
to the disproportionately high damages in transportation and power facilities. They 
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conclude that this indicates the importance of transportation and infrastructure facilities 
in maintaining economic activity. This also provides a glimpse of what could happen, 
should there be a major failure in these systems in a future earthquake.  
5- Hospitals 
The high cost of evacuating patients and finding alternative buildings, the 
importance of safety of such vulnerable occupancy, and the criticality of the services 
provided by health care facilities require that they be among the earliest to recover after 
and earthquake.  
Hospitals and health care facilities are among the important functions in the 
response period and as such they should not suffer high damage nor should they be out 
of service for extended period of time (California Seismic Commission, 1991). 
Hospitals, similar to schools, have special legislation requiring their strengthening (the 
California Field Act for schools and the California Hospital Act) (Mader, 1994). 
6- Emergency  
Emergency functions are police and fire stations and related service buildings 
that are imperative during emergencies. These buildings house the first responders and 
their functionality should not be impaired (California Seismic Commission, 1991; 
Schwab, et al., 1998). 
7- Public office buildings 
Literature discuss office buildings in terms of their importance after disasters. 
Public offices that are non-emergency management departments need to remain 
functional after the earthquake as city staff and officials will need to use such spaces. 
Their lack of functionality hinders recovery efforts and creates complications. City or 
state staff will have to find alternative places to work and serve the public, thus 
maintaining the functionality of public buildings after a disaster is important. This was 
one of the main lessons learned during the response for Loma Prieta Earthquake as many 
state buildings lost their functionality, even though they were retrofitted for life safety 
(Fratessa, 1994). No literature is available to investigate if public office buildings do 
recover early.  
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One of the functions that are important after disaster is the Building Department, 
as they decide on the safety of buildings and their repair needs. They also monitor the 
code enforcement. Similarly, the Planning Department and the Department of Public 
Works start working as early as possible to facilitate the city’s reconstruction and return 
to normality. Of significance are also the Health Department, media relations, and all 
other public service positions (Schwab et al., 1998). 
Damage Level 
Damage levels are significant for assessing the time needed to recovery as it 
affects the extent of the needed repairs. The damage level depends on:  
1. The earthquake: intensity, duration, and epicenter location; 
2. The site: type of soils and geology.  
3. The building: quality of construction, materials, inspection, maintenance, and 
design (FEMA 149; Kariotis et al.,1991). 
High damage leads to decisions to demolish; examples are Santa Cruz Pacific 
Garden Mall and Odd Fellows Hall, as feasibility of repairs becomes an issue (Kariotis 
et al., 1991).  
Construction Type 
The design and construction of a building affects the earthquake damage among 
other factors. The structural system of a building determines how it responds to 
earthquake forces and stresses. Shear walls, moment resisting frames and frames with 
diagonal braces usually resist earthquakes well with diaphragms connecting roof and 
floors (FEMA 149). Construction materials work hand in hand with the structural 
systems. Load bearing masonry and steel frames are systems of both materials and 
structural systems.  
In most cases, well-constructed and designed buildings will suffer less damage 
(Fratessa, 1994). This in turn relates to the time and cost needed for repairs. 
Some earthquake damages are related to certain types of construction:  
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1. In wood frame buildings, the damages in the building itself will not be significant 
but the cripple walls (the walls that raise it off the grade and create a void under 
it), often failed. Also, old wood frame buildings are not well anchored to the 
ground and they bounce off their foundations. Wood frame residential structures 
suffered the most losses in the Loma Prieta earthquake in the Bay area (Fratessa, 
1994). 
2. Unreinforced masonry buildings identified as a major vulnerability among 
historic buildings. Called URM buildings, they may have a steel-frame structure 
or have a bearing walls construction. In steel-frame structures walls might 
collapse, including interior walls. In addition, unreinforced masonry infill walls 
may crumble, leaving the structure standing while the wall falls due to lack of 
proper anchor to the structural framework (Fratessa, 1994). 
3. Large concrete frame building may have their slabs collapse in what Nelson 
called a “pancake” failure (Nelson, 1991). Older concrete structures did not have 
sufficient reinforcement and connections so they did not resist strong shaking 
(Kariotis et al., 1991; Nelson, 1991; NRC, 1994). Precast concrete elements, 
reinforced conventionally or prestressed had serious failures in some earthquakes 
due to lack of strong connections, preventing them from functioning 
monolithically. In addition, in-situ reinforced concrete behaved in different ways 
depending on the type of the structural systems and the quality of the details. 
Important factors are the shear walls and the size of openings. Similarly, in 
moment resisting frames the detailing was critical (FEMA 149). 
  
Construction materials are reported to have been a challenge for repairs after the 
Loma Prieta earthquake, as certain materials faced delays due to lack of 
immediate availability. Most residential buildings use wood, with predominantly 
interior finish of gypsum board (ARG, 1990). But commercial buildings and 
institutional buildings were mostly URM or stone building. Wood did not face 
any shortages in 1990, when ARG was reporting. But they did report hardship in 
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obtaining certain materials, such as terracotta and original sandstone. Such 
materials are used for large buildings of commercial or public use. They had a 
long lead time for manufacturing of the pieces, in addition to the extra cost in 
making and handling them. In some cases, there are delays of up to a year and 
many projects were considering replacement materials (ARG, 1990). 
In general, the performance of buildings is categorized according to their 
construction: 
1. URM buildings have functioned poorly in earthquakes. 
2. Steel and wood frame can perform relatively well as they allow for deformation 
before failing, but they perform badly if their connections are inadequate. 
3. Reinforced concrete performs better than other construction. 
4. A combination of materials (i.e. concrete and masonry with reinforcement) 
would only function well if the reinforcement was properly designed, fabricated 
and constructed (FEMA 149). 
 
San Francisco City has identified 2,100 URM buildings in a survey in 1991. 
There are about 2,000 URM residential and commercial buildings in San Francisco. 
Usually brick, but they also contain terra cotta, stone, and concrete blocks. The majority 
are multi-use with at least one business in the building. Two-thirds of the URM 
buildings were built before 1912, half of them have architectural or historic significance 
(Nothenburg, 1994).   
Building materials are important, but what really matters is the quality of 
construction, detailing, design, and execution-unless the construction material has 
inherent problem such as URM buildings. Details such as the type of mortar, 
connections, and execution quality also has major effects (FEMA 153).  
Age of Building 
The time at which a building was constructed influences its strength and ability 
to resist earthquake stresses. This is because codes developed through time gradually 
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requiring better reinforcement and higher performance. The Long Beach earthquake of 
1933 led to several changes in codes. It required reinforcement on new construction in 
order to resist earthquakes, it also prohibited constructing URM buildings. But nothing 
was done to reinforce existing buildings until 1981, when ordinances requiring non-
historic buildings’ reinforcement started to be implemented. In 1983, The Coalinga 
earthquake showed the importance of strengthening all URM buildings leading to many 
demolitions in the central business district, which had a severe economic impact on the 
city (Kariotis at al., 1991).  
The level of maintenance of a building is also relevant. This is especially 
important for historic buildings, as the fabric may suffer deterioration through time. The 
effects of weathering can only be limited through continuous maintenance, which may 
not be available for all buildings (Spennemann and Look, 1998; Fratessa, 1994).  
Cost 
High cost is an issue that can complicate the recovery process. Finding funding 
sources to cover high repair or strengthening cost can take time and effort (Wyland, 
Sept. 2, 2001). Local city decision makers are faced with funding issues in disasters 
especially since such sudden unexpected high costs are hard to cover. On the individual 
level, cost makes a difference between keeping and repairing the building or 
demolishing it (Blair-Tyler and Kristiansson, 1999).  
Cost is important for both the public sector and the private sector (Blair-Tyler 
and Kristiansson, 1999). An important source of high cost is Unreinforced Masonry 
(URM) buildings as they need retrofitting, which is especially costly if the building is 
historic (cf. Look, 1991). 
The cost of code upgrading for historic buildings has been identified as 
problematic since it is expensive (Merritt, 1990; Mader, 1994; Spennemann and Look, 
1998). A major objective of long-term recovery is to make historic buildings less 
vulnerable, so structural mitigation has been incorporated into building codes. In 
California, adherence to such codes is required and the problems of mitigation with 
minimal cost has been cited (Fratessa, 1994; Mader, 1994). Also, some literature 
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indicates that historic buildings have high cost not only due to structural mitigation, but 
also due to the ornamentation and historic elements that give character to the building 
but require special expertise. 
The above literature points out three main points: 
1. Sustainability should be the main guide for both disaster recovery and historic 
preservation; however, no systematic investigation has been done to investigate 
that aspect (figure 1). 
2. Time for recovery is an indicator of successful recovery; however, historic 
buildings seem to take longer time to recover. Also, no systematic investigation 
has been done to investigate that. 
3. Community participation, and the maintaining of historic character and integrity 
of fabric, are pointed out to be important issues of the sustainable disaster 
recovery and sustainable heritage management, however, there are no systematic 
investigations of these aspects within the framework of recovery and historic 
preservation at the same time.  
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CHAPTER III 
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
Objective, Hypothesis and Operational Questions 
The objective of this study is to investigate the sustainability of long-term 
recovery of public and NGO owned historic buildings after an earthquake. The study 
explores the difference between historic and non-historic buildings in their time needs, 
and then investigates the dynamics of the recovery for delayed historic buildings in the 
light of recommendation for sustainability, focusing on community participation and 
maintaining of historic character. The study identifies the variables that affected the 
recovery in order to guide future pre- and post-incident recovery planning for historic 
buildings.  
In consequence, the study investigates the following questions and hypotheses: 
1) Did the recovery of historic buildings require more time than non-historic 
buildings? If so, what were the historic buildings that required more time? 
a) Time required for recovery of historic buildings is longer than time 
required for recovery of non-historic buildings.   
This hypothesis is based on the above literature (Merritt, 1990; Kariotis et 
al., 1991; Nelson, 1991; Mader, 1994; Eichenfield, 1996; Schwab et al., 1998; 
Spennemann and Look, 1998), which indicates that historic buildings face extra 
issues due to their special nature. 
b) Time of recovery for buildings, both historic and non-historic, will 
vary according to the importance of their functions to restoring 
normal life back in the city. 
a. Emergency Functions, such as fire stations and 
health care, will be the first to recover.  
b. Art facilities such as museums and theaters will 
be among the last. 
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This hypothesis is based on the above literature (Seismic Safety 
Commission, 1991) on time recommendations that indicate that the seismic 
performance of buildings is based on their function. Certain functions usually 
have priority for recovery as they perform critical services that are needed in 
emergencies (Schwab et al., 1998). Nonetheless, residential buildings are also 
assumed to be among the early buildings to recover (Wu and Lindell, 2004). 
2) For buildings that faced delays, what are the variables that affected the 
recovery? What were the dynamics of the process? 
a) The variables affecting the process will be mainly related to the 
historic status of the building. 
This hypothesis builds on the findings of the previous questions and 
investigates the process and its dynamics for chosen delayed buildings.  
3) How did the key issues of sustainable recovery for historic buildings play in 
the recovery period, specifically in regard to historic character and 
community participation? And how can the recovery of historic buildings be 
more sustainable? 
a) Historic character and public participation are two principles that 
are built in the existing laws and process and need improvement. 
These questions and hypothesis are based on the literature mentioned 
above which identified the issues of participation and historic character as critical 
to the preservation and recovery of historic buildings (Fielden, 1987; Merritt, 
1990; Nelson, 1991; Mader, 1994; Look, Wong and Augustus, 1997; Schwab et 
al.,1998; Spennemann and Look, 1998; NHRAIC, 2001; Hague and Jenkins, 
2005).  
General Research Design 
Since the objective of this research is to investigate the sustainability of recovery 
in regard to specific variables, the inquiry is mainly about a process. As such, the focus 
of the analysis will be on the dynamics of the process and its outcome. This leads to 
conducting investigation using two methods. The first method uses statistical analysis of 
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a few variables on a large number of cases to identify broad patterns in the data. The 
second method carefully examines three cases to understand why the broad patterns 
emerged. Case studies are helpful in that goal, as they can use different analysis 
approaches (Yin, 2003). The combination of methods is intended to help the study as the 
investigation proceeds. This has a developmental purpose, with the first phase used to 
inform the second (Creswell, 1994).   
Yin points out that the use of case study methods is needed when the research 
aims at investigating a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin, 2003). He points out that it is for situations when the study is inquiring 
about the “why” or “how” of a situation over which the researcher has little or no 
control. This principle applies to this inquiry. The contemporary phenomenon is 
earthquake recovery process. That process is part of a context that, as yet, cannot be 
isolated for study purposes. Also, the investigator has no control over the events, thus the 
case study approach would be most suitable.  
The case study for this investigation is San Francisco recovery after the 1989 
earthquake, which had its epicenter in Loma Prieta. The earthquake struck on October 
17, 1989 at 5:04 p.m. leaving 62 people killed, 3757 injured and a total of $5 to $7 
billion in direct costs (California Seismic Safety Commission, 1991). The 1989 Loma 
Prieta earthquake was the largest earthquake to strike California since 1952 and the most 
devastating to hit the San Francisco Bay Area since 1906 (Tierney, 1994). 
San Francisco was selected since it has many buildings of historic and 
architectural significance. According to the Planning Department, there are more than 
10,000 historic buildings and buildings of architectural significance in the city (San 
Francisco Planning Department Help Desk, Personal communication, July 2003). Also, 
the 1989 earthquake initiated research in emergency management for historic buildings 
that provided a good background material for this research. The geographic context of 
the city, being semi-isolated, helps in defining the boundaries of the study. The relative 
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proximity of the site, as an example for an earthquake-affected city, was also a variable 
in the choice.  
The investigation of the case study was done through two field visits: 
1. The first field visit was done in the summer of 2003 for two weeks. The 
objective was to investigate the possible data sources and provide background 
investigation of the city and the recovery process. The primary data sources were 
identified as: 1) FEMA, which provided a copy in digital format of the data they had 
about buildings’ recovery funding after Loma Prieta (discussed below). They also had 
hardcopy files for all correspondence for each building, to be requested later in the 
research. 2) The City of San Francisco’s public access computer available in the 
Planning Department, which contained Assessors’ data about buildings in the city, in 
addition to planning and building permit data. This database contained most of the data 
about the individual buildings. 3) The SHPO had files containing all correspondence 
about the historic buildings regarding Section 106 process, thus providing an additional 
source, even though FEMA files would contain the same information. That field visit 
resulted with some of the data for Phase I and II. 
2. A second field visit was done in the spring of 2005 and lasted for about three 
months. This visit was intended to provide more data for the analysis. However, several 
changes had happened within the previous two years that had a negative impact on the 
study: 
a. All data about public buildings in the public access database was removed. 
This was a decision done in relation to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since the intended 
service in the department is for private property owners, this data about public buildings 
was not relevant to them. 
b. FEMA became part of the Department of Homeland Security, which subjected 
it to new regulations and thus, they were no longer subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act. The data files that FEMA had, which are significant sources of 
information about the dynamics of the recovery process, are no longer available for 
researchers. It is only possible to obtain such data with special permit, which also 
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requires the researcher to pay for the photocopies and the time spent in preparing the 
copies. This amounted for hundreds of dollars for each case study, which was not 
practical for this study.  
c. The same FEMA files should be available with the City or State, as applicants. 
But neither had access to their files. In both cases the reply was that the files have been 
moved to deep storage and no one knew how to find them.   
Therefore, this study had to use other sources of data, which are discussed below 
under each phase. Most data collection was done in the field through street walks and 
site visits to buildings, visits to the SHPO’s offices, the Planning Department, and City 
Hall. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PHASE I 
 
This phase uses statistical methods to determine whether historic buildings 
needed more time than non-historic buildings to recover, and if the function of building 
has an effect on the needed time.  
Data Sources  
The main source of the data was the database that FEMA developed for the 
Loma Prieta records. The database has all public and NGO-owned buildings in San 
Francisco that obtained funding for recovery after the earthquake. Once an eligible 
applicant submitted an application, they were led through a process of evaluating the 
damage, and assessing its eligibility (figure 2). This resulted in a Damage Survey Report 
(DSR), which contained detailed information of the damage assessment and the required 
repairs and their cost.  Such DSRs were then filed in a computer database. Not all of the 
information from the original DSR was obtained, as it contained sheets of repair 
calculations and detailed cost estimates. The data that was obtained form FEMA 
contains lists of the worksite number, DSR number, Date of DSR, name of applicant, 
name of building, location of building (mail address), short description of repairs 
approved, cost, and comments about the application (i.e if the building is historic), other 
related DSRs, or requirements for the owner to get the approved monies.  Each project 
would normally have two DSRs, the first one at time of first application, the second at 
the time of closing out. Sometimes the project would have one DSR, when it was small 
and the applicant had finished most of the work by the time of application. If the project 
takes a long time, though, the project (worksite) would have many DSRs, documenting 
any changes in cost, repairs scope, new approvals or additions. The database can be 
assumed to contain the entire population of public and NGO buildings in San Francisco, 
as FEMA is the major source of recovery funding. This database does not have 
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information on age of building, floor area, or construction. These variables were 
obtained mainly from records in the Department of Planning and the Department of 
Building Inspection in the City of San Francisco, in addition to other sources discussed 
below.  
The raw data is organized by DSR, so a new list was created that was organized 
by project, or worksite5. As such, all DSRs for each worksite were combined. The first 
and last dates and the total cost were identified for each. Many DSRs and worksites were 
not related to this research, such as sewer lines, open parks, sidewalks, roads, and so on. 
Such worksites were deleted from the analysis list. Also removed were DSRs identifying 
costs that are not related to architecture, such as professional services or costs of food 
supplies, gas, communication, transportation, etc.  
Most worksites had only one building, but some contained several small 
buildings. Buildings on campuses were given different worksite numbers and thus they 
were treated as separate worksites.  If a worksite contained a minimum of one historic 
building, it was labeled historic since it would have to go through Section 106 process 
(see Appendix A).   
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Figure 2 Simplified FEMA application process for a typical project. 
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Sample  
e data taken from FEMA represent the entire population of public and NGO 
buildings that received funding after Loma Prieta. Simple random sampling was used to 
generat
ple was used for both historic and non-historic projects.  A 
simple random
Table 1 esearch design 
sites  562 
Th
e two main groups: historic and non-historic. Random numbers were generated 
using Excel. The number of worksites in the population frame was 562, and the number 
of non-historic worksites in the population frame was 429 (see table 1). Since the two 
groups are not equal, around 80% of historic buildings were chosen as a sample, while 
about 50% of non-historic buildings were chosen. The total number of projects in the 
sample was 318. 
To keep the proportion of building functions in the sample similar to that in the 
population, a stratified sam
 sample was taken from each stratum. 
 
 
R
Total population for all work
 Historic  Non-historic 
Total population 133 429 
Sample # (%) 107 (80.5%) 211 (49.2%) 
Functions Sample Population Sample Population 
- College 14 (82.3%) 17 79 40 (50.6%) 
- Cultural 31 (81.6%) 38 32 (47.7%) 67 
- Emergency 8 (80%) 10 21 (50.0%) 42 
- Health 8 (80%) 10 11 (50%) 22 
- Multi 11 (78.6%) 14 15 (50%) 30 
- Office 7 (77.7 %) ) 9 20 (51.2% 39 
- Residential ) 12 (80%) 15 37 (49.3% 75 
- Infrastructure  16 (80%) 20 35 (50.7%) 69 
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Measures 
FEMA records do not contain complete information on when a building became 
usable again. This information was not available from any single source as it is not 
clearly documented. FEMA data show the time span that was needed for a project to 
finish the funding process. For some projects, that is when the building was usable again. 
For others it was less, as the project needed further work afterwards. Usually, the last 
portion of the funding is given after the last of the approved repairs has been done, 
unless there is an alternative project6. As such, the FEMA data is used as an indicator of 
recovery. Since obtaining funding is the initial phase of recovery (see figure 2), it is 
assumed that the time needed to finish the funding process is indicator of the overall 
time needed for recovery. The more time needed to obtain the funding, the more time 
needed for recovery.  
Dependent Variable 
Time to recovery is a continuous variable that was measured as the number of 
days needed to finish the FEMA process and obtain the funding. The time variable 
should not be understood as the time needed to finish the repairs but rather as the time 
needed to obtain all funding, which sometimes corresponds to the time needed for 
construction, but not always. This variable does indicate the complexity and the issues 
that faced the recovery of the building, as FEMA funding an essential phase for public 
and NGO buildings. 
Independent Variables 
There were two independent variables: 
• Function is a nominal categorical variable defined by the planned use of the 
building after the earthquake. It identifies the use intended for the building as 
described in the FEMA database. The number of categories was derived based on 
the literature review above. The functions that the literature identified were 
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established first, then other similar functions were collapsed with it in order to 
limit the number of categories. As such, eight functions were identified: 
1. Infrastructure: includes water plants, sewage plants, power plants, bus 
stations, warehouses, piers, the airport, subways, etc. 
2. School: contains all educational uses such as university, college, K-12 school, 
and daycare centers. 
3. Residential: all apartment buildings, dormitories, hotels, and public housing 
projects. 
4. Offices. 
5. Multi-use: any worksite that has more than one use.  
6. Health: includes hospitals, clinics, health centers, drug abuse centers, etc. 
7. Emergency: police and fire stations. 
8. Cultural: museums, recreation centers, community centers, pools, theaters, 
libraries, and any building housing functions that serves the community in 
any social or cultural way and does not fall under the seven function 
categories identified above. This contained the largest group of buildings. It 
is important to note that none of the categories contain religious buildings, as 
they are not eligible for repair funding, however, there are buildings owned 
by religious organizations that are used for schools, community centers, or 
other uses. 
 
• Status of building is a dichotomous variable, 1) historic, 2) non-historic. This was 
identified based on information within the database taken from FEMA7 . All 
buildings that underwent the Section 106 review were identified as historic, the 
rest were identified as non-historic.  
Control Variables 
The analysis was statistically controlled for building construction type, floor 
area, and damage level. The analysis of historic buildings was controlled for age of 
building.  
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• The floor area is the total square foot area of all floors of the buildings. It was 
difficult to obtain and presented many limitations. The floor area of a building is 
important as it affects the cost and time for any repair project.  Large projects 
would naturally have higher cost and longer time, thus, any comparison would 
not be informative unless it was controlled for area. FEMA database did not have 
the floor area of buildings, and the City of San Francisco did not have all the 
square foot area needed, as most public buildings are not on their database. Thus, 
the data were taken from several sources (table 2):  
A. The database in the City Assessor’s office had floor area mainly for private 
property. However, it contained some information on buildings owned by NGOs 
and some publicly owned buildings. 
B. When the floor area of the building was not found in the Assessors data, the 
Sanborn map for that block was obtained (from the Department of Planning 
database) and the area was calculated based on measurements from that map 
multiplied by the number of floors. 
C. When the Sanborn maps were not available, the area was calculated from aerial 
photos of the site printed from the web GIS of San Francisco. Such aerial photos 
did not include information on the number of floors for the building, so the site 
was visited to identify the number of floors. This, clearly, has many limitations. 
D. For buildings that are of complicated nature, such as theaters, the opera house, 
and museums, a web search was done for the official websites of such buildings 
and for pages of professionals who worked on the project, and in some cases the 
total floor area was found on such pages.  For most such buildings, however, no 
floor area was available unless it was historic. 
E. Some buildings, such as some libraries, some public housing units, and some 
public hospitals, had floor area data available on the internet. This was used if the 
information was on the webpage of a public agency responsible for managing the 
building. 
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The accuracy of such different sources is variable. For example, the accuracy of 
measurement from aerial photos is limited, as the scale is in miles and the resolution is 
relatively low. Similar limitations appeared when measuring from the Sanborn maps 
since they were printed from the city’s Planning Department public access computer. 
The originals were scanned into the computer and the scales were wavy in many of the 
print-outs, in addition to their small scale.    
There were many cases that remained without the floor areas. This occurred 
when no Sanborn map was found and the aerial photo was not helpful due to lack of 
clarity.  Or when the address was not found, the address in now empty, the building was 
changed, a visit to the site was not possible due to location issues or time shortages, or 
the building plan was too complicated and a measure of the area was not possible. Also, 
it is possible that some buildings had expanded thus making the available data in the 
databases not representative of the situation that existed during the recovery period. But 
since the study period is a total of 10-11 years, it is not expected that many building have 
undergone enlargements within the past four years. So, it is assumed that any changes 
that took place are not significant or that they are minimal. 
 
 
Table 2  Distribution of sources of data. 
  
Asses-
sors’  
Planning 
Survey 
Sanborn 
Maps 
Aerial 
Photo 
Website FEMA 
Area 29.2% - 20.8% 40.6% 9.4% - 
Construction 42% - - - - 58% Historic 
Age 37.8% 12.2% 5.6% - 44.4% - 
Area 21% - 29.3% 49.7% - - 
Construction 52.7% - - - - 47.3% 
None 
Historic 
Age 69.6% - 8.7% - 21.7% - 
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• Damage level was measured as a categorical variable based on the damage 
description available in the FEMA database. Three main levels of damage were 
generated from damage description on the FEMA DSRs. 
There are different studies investigating seismic damages of historic buildings 
after earthquake (cf. Fielden, 1987; 1994; Croci, 1998). For Loma Prieta, damage 
patterns were investigated through several publications (cf. Kariotis et al., 1991, Look, 
1991; Lew, 1990) providing overview and general conclusions on the patterns of 
damage.  
According to ARG (1990), 363 buildings were tagged in San Francisco. The 
accessibility status of a building (green, yellow, or red tags) changed with time. 
Communications with the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection revealed 
that they lost the complete list of yellow-tagged buildings, but they provided a list of 
red-tagged buildings that contained 50 buildings. Checking the list against building 
permits showed that it was a list of demolished buildings only. Other resources have 
reported more than 200 buildings being red-tagged in San Francisco (Fratessa, 1994), 
which indicates that the list of red-tagged buildings is lost too. Therefore, this research 
had to develop its own scale for damage level measurement.  Based on the damage 
description in the FEMA data, three main categories were identified: 
1. Minor damage: damage only to non-structural elements (plaster cracks, 
damage in windows, doors, parapets, etc.).   
2. Medium damage: damage to structural elements (cracks in beams, walls, and 
columns).  Also damage to contents of buildings when mentioned, such as 
replacement of tens of book shelves, furniture, and tools. 
3. Significant damage: damage explicitly described as significant, major, severe, 
considerable, serious, or that the building was red-tagged. Damage of 
structural elements with very large area or length (cracks in beams, walls, and 
ceilings, each of several hundred feet or square feet in addition to damages in 
non-structural elements). In addition to severe damages in contents requiring 
replacement or repair of large amounts of items such as thousands of 
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damaged books, hundreds of book shelves, furniture, machinery, tools and so 
on.  
There were buildings with damage levels that could be either 1 or 2, but were not 
described in sufficient details to make a categorization. Such a damage level was 
identified as 1.5. Similarly, damage levels that are either 2 or 3 were given 2.5. These 
two levels are not intermediate level of damage, but are levels of damage that can be 
either category. When the damage level was completely unclear, this variable was left 
missing.  
• Construction type was taken directly from the Assessor’s database in the City of 
San Francisco. This variable was measured by the city in four categories: 
A. Structural steel-fire proofed. 
B. Reinforced concrete- fire resistant. 
C. Masonry or concrete. 
D. Wood frame. 
E.  Multiple construction. This is an additional category that the researcher added 
to include some worksites that had multiple construction methods, such as 
piers, which had reinforced concrete platforms and steel sheds. 
This variable was initially missing for most of the buildings, so the FEMA 
database was used as a source through their description of damage as it sometimes 
reflected the type of construction. This reduced the percentage of missing data to 14.8%- 
see table 3. 
• Age of buildings was defined as the age of the building at the time of the 
earthquake (1989-year of construction). The year of construction for buildings 
was obtained from the City Assessor’s database. The database did not have such 
information for all buildings, and it contained an error as most buildings were 
given 1900 as a date of construction. Consequently, the internet was searched to 
obtain information for most of the historic buildings. Similar data were not 
available for non-historic buildings.  This resulted in a lot of missing data 
regarding age of building among non-historic buildings in particular. Therefore, 
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since this variable is important mainly for historic buildings, it was only used in 
the analysis of historic buildings. 
 
 
Table 3 Missing data. 
VARIABLE MISSING DATA (%) HISTORIC  NON-HISTORIC 
Damage level 6 (1.9%) 2 (1.9%) 6 (2.8%) 
Construction type 47 (14.8%) 7 (6.5%) 40 (19%) 
Floor area 41 (12.9%) 11 (10.3%) 30 (14.2%) 
Age 129 (40.6%) 17 (15.9%) 112 (53%) 
 
 
Procedure 
Once all the data was obtained from the different sources, they were added to the 
projects table. As explained above, a list of projects (worksites) was created from the 
original FEMA database. Also, to that table were added the new variables: construction 
type, floor area, damage level, function, and status. The new table was organized to 
contain: project number (worksite number), address (mailing), name of project (as taken 
from FEMA database), recovery time (in days), floor area (square foot), function, status, 
construction type, cost, building age, and damage level.  
The status of building was coded as (1) for historic, and (2) for non-historic. The 
functions received codes 1 to 8, representing infrastructure (1), school (2), residential 
(3), offices (4), multi-use (5), health (6), emergency (7), and cultural (8). The damage 
level was coded (1) to (5), with (1) being the least damaged and (5) being the most 
damaged. The construction type was coded so that structural steel was (1), reinforced 
concrete (2), masonry or concrete (3), wood frame (4), and multiple construction as (5).  
All missing data were left as empty cells. This list was used for hypothesis testing. 
Another table was developed to facilitate analysis of correlations. Each of the 
categorical variables was expanded to several variables. So, “status” was replaced by 
   
 
  43
 
two variables, historic status, coded (1) for historic and (0) for non-historic, and non-
historic status, coded (1) for non-historic and (0) for historic. All the construction types 
and functions were coded so that each became a 0/1 variable. This allowed for a 
correlation table to be developed. All tables were created in Microsoft Excel and then 
moved to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. 
Analysis 
First, the data were explored through a table containing simple correlations 
among all variables. The table used Spearman’s rho and Peterson correlations to 
investigate the possible relations among all the variables. This helped in identifying the 
specific variables that will be explored in the hypothesis and helped in understanding the 
relationships between all variables. 
1) Did the recovery of historic buildings require more time than non-historic 
buildings? If so, what were the historic buildings that required more time? 
b) Time required for recovery of historic buildings is longer than time 
required for recovery of non-historic buildings.   
The analysis of this hypothesis used a simple random sample from the 
population of public and NGO owned historic and non-historic buildings that 
obtained FEMA funding. The analysis used t-test for comparing means, without 
taking into account any confounding variables. The t-test provided a direct 
comparison of the means of the two groups. 
c) Time of recovery for buildings, both historic and non-historic, will 
vary according to the importance of their functions to restoring 
normal life back in the city. 
a. Emergency Functions, such as fire stations and 
health care, will be the first to recover.  
b. Art facilities such as museums and theaters will 
be among the last. 
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The analysis of this hypothesis used the same sample of projects above. 
The analysis used ANOVA tests for multiple comparisons of means to see if the 
means for all functions are equal. Then, for ranking the functions according to 
their mean, post hoc tests were used (Least Significant Difference and Scheffe 
tests). 
Then a factorial model was used, in order to take the effect of other 
variables into account. It allowed for statistical control of the covariates. The 
model allowed for testing the effects of the covariates on the time needed for 
recovery.  
Results 
The correlation table (table 4) suggested several relationships between variables. 
The table shows that: 
1. Unsurprisingly, historic buildings tend to be older; also, most cultural 
buildings are older (mainly since most of them are historic). Health care 
facilities are newer, so are residential buildings. Also, the table shows that 
older buildings have smaller area. 
2. Most construction materials do not have a significant correlation to damage, 
except wood frame, which is negatively correlated to damage, and reinforced 
concrete, which is positively correlated to damage. The last point was 
surprising as it is against what is known of reinforced concrete seismic 
behavior. It could be explained in the way damage assessment was made and 
its relation to area. The damage assessment, which was based on the damage 
description in the FEMA database, took into consideration both the area of 
damage and the damage to the contents of the buildings. Since, as shown by 
the correlation table, the area is positively correlated to damage and most 
reinforced concrete buildings have large area, then there would be a positive 
correlation of reinforced concrete to damage. This is may be because the 
correlation is not controlled for area. Similarly, most wood frame buildings 
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have less area, probably due to the fact that they are mostly residential. This 
would also affect the correlation and may be the reason for having a negative 
correlation to damage. However, sine wood frame construction is also 
negatively correlated to cost and time, this leads to affirming that it is 
negatively correlated to damage.  
3. Most functions do not have a significant relationship to damage. However, 
infrastructure, offices, and colleges have positive correlation to damage. That 
may be due to the effect of area, both offices and infrastructure facilities have 
larger areas. College (which includes all schools and educational facilities), 
however, have less area but contain furniture elements which could have 
increased the damage level.  
4. Status of buildings, as historic, has a significant positive correlation to time, 
cost, and damage level.  
5. Time, cost, and damage have a highly significant positive correlation with 
each other.  
6. Construction materials have a significant effect on cost, except for masonry 
and concrete buildings. However, the same construction types have 
significant correlations to area, thus the correlation could be an effect of the 
area variable.  
7. Floor area is has a significant correlation to damage level and cost, but not to 
time according to the Spearman rank order correlation (rho).  
8. Some interesting findings of the table are that there is a significant negative 
correlation of wood frame construction with damage, time, and cost.  Also, 
multi-construction, which is mostly infrastructure, is positively correlated to 
cost, and time. This also may be a result of infrastructure having larger area, 
mainly because piers had large areas. 
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Table 4 Simple correlation table. Pearson’s correlation at the bottom left corner and Spearman’s rho at the upper right. 
  N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Building’s age 189 55.05 26.34 1.00 0.03 -0.04 0.22** -0.20** -0.02 -0.22** 0.48** -0.01 -0.17* -0.04 0.12 -0.16* 0.04 0.24** -0.06 0.08 0.13 0.13 
2 
Multi-
constructio
n 
21 2408 1241.9 0.08 1.00 -0.18** -0.17** -0.17** -0.10 0.28** 0.21** 0.52** -0.13* -0.08 0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15* -0.11 0.10 0.25** 0.34**
3 Wood Frame 77 350 749.7 -0.04 -0.18** 1.00 -0.38** -0.38** -0.22** -0.38** -0.04 -0.25** 0.26** -0.11 -0.13* 0.00 -0.04 0.18** 0.02 -0.36** -0.39** -0.25**
4 Masonry or Conc. 71 637 1103.1 0.17* -0.17** -0.38** 1.00 -0.36** -0.21** -0.13 0.08 -0.17** 0.01 0.10 0.12* -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.05 
5 R. concrete 72 1002 1327.4 -0.17* -0.17** -0.38** -0.36** 1.00 -0.21** 0.25** -0.17** 0.03 -0.13* 0.10 -0.09 0.14* 0.09 -0.13* 0.08 0.21** 0.13* 0.05 
6 Structural Steel 30 1088 1366.6 -0.02 -0.10 -0.22** -0.21** -0.21** 1.00 0.14* 0.00 0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.02 0.16** 0.07 
7 Area (ft.sqr.) 277 162240.93 1435775.04 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 0.14* -0.02 1.00 0.10 0.25** -0.06 0.09 0.20** -0.02 -0.28** -0.15* -0.01 0.40** 0.46** 0.28**
8 Historic 107 1428 143.6 0.55** 0.21** -0.04 0.08 -0.17** 0.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.16** -0.07 0.24** 0.34** 0.36**
9 Infrastructure 51 396 821.6 0.02 0.52 -0.25 -0.17 0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 -0.19 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 -0.20 0.12 0.21 0.23 
10 Residential 49 439 351.7 -0.22 -0.13 0.26 0.01 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.19 1.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.21 -0.19 -0.09 -0.21 -0.34 
11 Office 27 887 1316.6 -0.05 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.10 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 1.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.14 0.16 0.05 0.03 
12 Multi-use 26 1390 1668.95 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.12 -0.09 0.10 0.00 0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 1.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 0.11 0.13 0.06 
13 Health 19 818 1160.5 -0.14 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.14 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 1.00 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 0.04 0.02 -0.01 
14 Emergency 29 177 478.58 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 1.00 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 0.16 
15 Cultural 63 1533 1437.9 0.29 -0.15 0.18 -0.04 -0.13 0.11 -0.04 0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 1.00 -0.22 -0.04 0.00 0.07 
16 College 54 804 1241 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.22 1.00 -0.12 -0.08 -0.16 
17 Damage 310 2.50 1.36 0.10 0.10 -0.36 0.09 0.20 0.02 -0.04 0.25 0.13 -0.10 0.17 0.10 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 1.00 0.64 0.43 
18 Cost ($) 318 373476.82 1679687.76 0.16 0.23 -0.38 0.00 0.12 0.17 -0.02 0.36 0.19 -0.22 0.06 0.15 0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 0.66 1.00 0.63 
19 Time (days) 318 775.96 1195.36 0.17 0.35 -0.26 -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.35 0.24 -0.32 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.05 -0.15 0.46 0.64 1.00 
Note: Sample sizes are from 189 to 318 depending on missing data.      * p< .05    ** p< .01; Cost and time variables transformed twice 
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It is important to note that damage levels and construction materials were 
estimated based on descriptions in the FEMA database, so any bias in the description is 
passed to the assessment. The construction materials, in particular, is prone to bias as it 
is based on the damage description, thus non damaged elements were not motioned. This 
may affect the categorization of building construction type due to lack of sufficient data. 
Still, the findings of the correlation table indicate that in the most part, the data is 
indicating recovery behavior, which needs to be controlled for some variables. The 
hypothesis testing below investigated that aspect. 
Figure (3) shows the timeline of recovery, the lines represent the count of DSRs 
in each year. The timeline shows how historic buildings were less progressing compared 
to non-historic buildings. By 1990, only 50% of the DSRs for historic buildings were 
done, while 75% of the DSRs for non-historic buildings were completed. Historic 
buildings are not 75% completed until 1993, three years after non-historic buildings. 
Historic buildings’ DSRs catch up with non-historic buildings by 1997, where historic 
DSRs are 83.3% done, and non-historic DSRs are 88.5 done.  
The peaks on the graph correspond to deadlines by FEMA. The first deadline 
(April 1990) was for emergency work. Next, effort progressed on permanent repair 
work. Finally there was a push for finishing all projects by 1999 (email, David Gardener, 
FEMA, 2003). Only five projects remained after 1999, and all were historic. The 
timeline is for funding progress, thus it should only be considered an indicator of the 
progress of recovery. Yet, it is an important indicator as funding is a major part of the 
recovery process for public buildings. 
Comparing the timeline to those shown by Wu and Lindell (2004: figures 1 and 
2). Their study shows timelines for private housing recovery based on building permits 
in two earthquakes, 1994 Northridge in Los Angeles and 1999 Chichi in Taichung. The 
Chichi timeline shows a shallow curve while the Northridge time line, like that of Loma 
Prieta, shows a high peak during the first two years after the earthquake. Although the 
Wu and Lindell graphs are for a different kind of buildings (i.e. private housing), it is 
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interesting that both timelines show more work done at the early stages of the recovery. 
This is different from the recovery timeline for the Chichi earthquake where work was 
distributed over the entire recovery period. Wu and Lindell point out that pre-earthquake 
planning had an effect on the fast progress of recovery work. This suggests that, for the 
timeline of historic buildings vs non-historic, changes to improve the speed of recovery 
require pre-earthquake planning, so that most of the recovery work can be done in the 
early two years after the incident. The timeline of historic buildings indicate more work 
after 1990 (figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Timeline of recovery DSRs for all projects in San Francisco. 
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A variable that may have affected the recovery process in general is the 
economic context. Eadie (1998) points out that the Loma Prieta recovery of Watsonville 
and Santa Cruz was delayed due to the economic recession in California and local 
market factors. San Francisco was affected by a national recession from 1989 until 
around 1994 that would have affected the recovery process. The economy started 
improving around 1994 and it reached its height in 2000 (San Francisco Government, 
2004).  This could help in explaining the slow progress of recovery work in the mid 
1990s, however, the timeline is mainly for public buildings and the effects of market 
factors would be limited as their funding came mostly from FEMA in addition to public 
bonds.    
An interesting comparison of the timeline is with the timeline suggested by Haas 
et al., (1978) which shows four main stages of recovery as consecutive. Emergency work 
is followed by restoration work, then reconstruction and finally commemorative work. 
Although their graph showed four peaks, the timeline for this study indicates that the 
process of recovery has some of these stages overlapping. Figures (4) and (5) show the 
timeline for non-historic and historic buildings respectively. They are coded to represent 
the category of work as indicated by FEMA (FEMA 323) categorization system.  
A. Emergency work (debris removal and immediate threats to life).  
B. Emergency protective measures and permanent restorations (taking 
measures to protect lives or repair facilities in general). 
C. Road systems (road and pavements repair and replacement). 
D. Water control facilities (levees, dams, channels, natural streams, and 
other water works). 
E. Buildings and Equipment (restoration work to pre-earthquake design 
according to certain criteria and some types of equipment). 
F. Utilities (electrical and sewer systems). 
G. Parks, recreation, and other (beaches, grass, trees, and park contents). 
The graphs show that the emergency functions (categories A, B) were finished 
within the first two years, but the applications for permanent work started at the same 
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time (1989) and continued until 1999, with few exceptions. This shows that for public 
and NGO buildings, the restoration phase does not come after the emergency phase, but 
coincides with it and continues after it.  The timeline of this study does not show any of 
the work in the commemorative phase, as that would not be funded by FEMA. The 
timelines show three peaks: 
1. The first peak is for emergency and repair applications and work. 
2. The second peak in figure (4) is mainly related to one project that had several 
DSRs. However, in figure (5) there are several projects that are part of the 
second peak and they are delayed repairs, which supports the hypothesis that 
historic status affects time needs for recovery. 
3. The third peak is all reimbursement DSRs for projects that started earlier. 
Those three peaks should not be confused with the peaks that Haas et al. 
(1978) talks about, as all of these peaks in figures (4) and (5) are repair and 
emergency work only, but Haas et al.’s four peaks contain reconstruction and 
commemorative work. These peaks correspond to FEMA deadlines, and the 
last two peaks represent DSR submissions for ongoing repair work. The 
graphs indicate that the repair phase continues for up to 10 years after the 
earthquake, even if only as paperwork and submissions.   
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Figure 4 Timeline of recovery by work category for non-historic buildings. 
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Figure 5 Timeline of recovery by work category for historic buildings. 
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The analysis above supports the choice of the variables that are examined in the 
hypotheses. The results below further explore the relationships between the variables 
statistically. 
Hypotheses Testing 
1. Time required for recovery of historic buildings is longer than time required for 
recovery of non-historic buildings.   
There were 107 historic and 211 non-historic projects.  The distribution of 
time data (in days), was tested and found to be not normally distributed (positively 
skewed).  A logarithmic transformation (log 10) improved the Q-Q plot but the 
Shapiro-Wilk test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielded p=.000 and p=.000 for 
all historic and non-historic projects. Thus the data was transformed again using the 
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same logarithmic transformation. After the second transformation the normal Q-Q 
plot showed significant improvement, but many outliers still affected the normality 
test. The Shapiro-Wilk test yielded p=.003 and p=.000, but the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test yielded p=.012 and p=.000, for non-historic and historic respectively (df=318). 
Since the Q-Q plot showed an acceptably normal distribution, the results are 
considered to be acceptable for the use of the t-test (Newton and Rudestam, 1999). 
Testing for the equality of variance suggested that it is homogeneous, 
Levene’s test for equality of variance was F= 1.87, p=0.171. The comparison of the 
two means was done using a one-tailed t-test, t316 (7.20), p=.000. Thus, the null 
hypothesis was rejected.  This result indicates that, within a 95% confidence interval, 
the mean time needed for historic buildings (M= 1428.70 days) is larger than the 
mean for time needed for non-historic buildings (M= 454.18 days). 
This does not take into account covariates such as construction type, 
building area, or damage, which will be taken into account below. 
Since the raw data do not satisfy the normality or homoscedasticity 
conditions. A nonparametric test was done. The two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test gave p=.000, which also rejects the null hypothesis and supports the 
hypothesis that funding time for historic buildings is larger than funding time for 
non-historic building. 
4. Time of recovery for buildings, both historic and non-historic, will vary 
according to the importance of their functions to restoring normal life back in 
the city. 
a) Emergency Functions, such as fire stations and health care , will be 
the first to recover.  
b) Art facilities such as museums and theaters will be among the last. 
The hypothesis was partly supported because emergency worksites (M= 176.96) 
are among the earliest in finishing the funding process and recovery, and cultural 
worksites (M= 1532.98) are among the last.  However, contrary to the hypothesis, 
healthcare facilities (M= 818.55) were shown to be among the last worksites to finish the 
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funding process. An ANOVA was done with post-hoc tests. Levene’s test of variance 
homogeneity for the time variable done above had p=.000, indicating that the variance is 
heteroscedasticity. Also, the normality test (above) indicated that this variable is not 
normally distributed.  Since the normality Q-Q plots show a conservatively normal plot, 
the ANOVA is used to rank these variables. The ANOVA produced a test statistic of 
Fdf1, df2= 9.38, df1=7, df2=310, p=.000, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the means 
for the different functions were equal. 
The post-hoc tests utilized LSD and Scheffe tests. According to Sheffe test, there 
are significant differences between time needs of emergency functions on one hand and 
health, residential, and cultural on the other, with the first being the least in time needs 
and the latter being the highest in time needs. The ranking for the mean time needs from 
lowest to highest is: emergency, infrastructure, office, multi-use, schools, health, 
residential, and cultural. The first five are not significantly different from each other, nor 
are the last six significantly different from each other. The LSD test indicated somewhat 
different results. Only emergency and cultural worksites are significantly different from 
the other functions, with the residential worksites being not significantly different from 
cultural worksites, and all the rest of the functions not significantly different from each 
other. The ranking in LSD is, from lowest to highest: emergency, infrastructure, multi-
use, office, health, school, residential, and cultural. In both tests, emergency and 
infrastructure functions required the least time needs, while cultural and residential 
functions required the most time needs. The rest of the functions seem to be not 
significantly different from each other. It is alarming that health facilities are not among 
the earliest to recover, but rather lie somewhat in the middle (table 5).    
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    Table 5  Mean time to recovery in days, by building function. 
Function  Emergency 
 
Infrastructure 
 
Offices 
 
Multi-
use 
 
Schools 
 
Health 
 
Residential 
 
Cultural 
Mean 
time to 
recovery 
176.96 396.37 887.16 1390.11 804.05 818.55 439.38 1532.98 
Standard 
Deviation 
(S.D) 
478.57 821.59 1316.57 1668.95 1241 1160.48 351.71 1437.87 
 
 
 
In order to statistically control for the effects of the covariates8, a factorial 
analysis was done. Factors were status (historic/ non-historic), construction type and 
function. The covariates were floor area and damage level. Damage level was treated as 
continuous, even though it is categorical, as the categories indicate a direction (more 
damage or less damage). The model was specified in different ways until the residual 
was normally distributed. The best model was achieved using the second log 
transformation of time.  
The model significantly explains the variance in time to recovery (R2 =.655). 
This model showed that the effects of all of the variables were significant except floor 
area. Also, the model shows that the interaction of status of building (historic/ non-
historic) and its function are significant, as is the interaction of status of buildings and its 
construction (figures 6 and 7). However, the interaction of function and construction is 
not significant, nor is the interaction of the three factors: status, function, and 
construction (table 6). (This model uses the time variable that was transformed once, not 
twice, although both have similar results).  
The interaction between function and status of building (figure 6) shows the great 
variance in time needs for different functions in historic buildings, compared to on-
historic buildings. It also shows that all historic buildings have more time needs than 
non-historic buildings, except for Health care facilities and residential buildings. This 
finding is interesting. A re-examination of the data shows that there were only eight 
   
 
  56
 
historic buildings and 11 non-historic buildings in the sample for health care buildings. 
The sample of residential buildings is larger (table 4), yet the percentage of historic 
buildings in that sample is small (only 12 samples), thus for both cases, the number of 
historic buildings in the sample was small, which may had an effect o the result.   
 
 
 
Figure 6 Time to recovery funding (transformed) for historic and non-historic buildings with different 
functions. 
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Figure 7 Time to recovery funding (transformed) for different construction materials with different 
functions.  
Non-estimable means are not plotted
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      Table 6 Model of tests of between-subjects effects.  
      Dependent variable: time (by days-transformed). 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 71.90 52 1.38 6.48 .00 
Intercept 95.45 1 95.45 446.10 .00 
AREA .28 1 .28 1.33 .25 
DAMAGE 11.07 1 11.07 51.84 .00 
STATUS 1.89 1 1.89 8.86 .00 
FUNCTION 4.04 7 .58 2.70 .01 
CONSTRUCTION 3.88 4 .97 4.54 .00 
STATUS * FUNCTION 4.69 7 .67 3.14 .00 
STATUS * CONSTRUCTION 2.61 4 .65 3.06 .02 
FUNCTION * 
CONSTRUCTION 6.18 21 .29 1.38 .14 
STATUS * FUNCTION * 
CONSTRUCTION 1.56 6 .26 1.22 .30 
Error 37.80 177 .21   
Total 1459.10 230    
Corrected Total 109.70 229    
      R 2  = .655 (Adjusted R2 = .554) 
 
 
 
The standardized residual for the model was approximately normally distributed 
with the two tests yielding conflicting results. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality 
yielded a p =.123, but the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielded p=.019. But since the Q-Q 
normality plot of the residual is normal, the residual is treated as normally distributed. 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances yielded F=1.804 (p=.003), indicating 
heteroscedasticity. 
To account for age as a possible covariate, and since it relates to historic 
buildings only. A separate analysis was done for historic buildings (table 7).  A better 
test of normality for standardized residuals was achieved when the model tested main 
effects only, as the Levene’s test of homogeneity yielded F=1.208, df1=17, df2=55, 
p=.29, thus accepting the null hypothesis that the error variances are equal. The Shapiro-
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Wilk test yielded p=.656 and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielded p=.200, thus 
indicating that the standardized residuals are normally distributed. The results of the 
factorial analysis show that construction type, age, and area have no effect on recovery 
time for historic buildings, while function does have an effect.  
 
 
 
      Table 7 Model of tests of between-subjects effects. 
      Dependent variable: time (by days) –for historic buildings. 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 24.52 14 1.75 7.77 .00 
Intercept 6.81 1 6.81 30.22 .00 
CONSTRUCTION 1.77 4 .44 1.96 .11 
FUNCTION 5.09 7 .73 3.22 .01 
AGE .15 1 .15 .65 .42 
AREA .14 1 .14 .63 .43 
DAMAGE 7.78 1 7.78 34.50 .00 
Error 13.07 58 .23     
Total 593.12 73       
Corrected Total 37.59 72       
       R ² = .652 (Adjusted R² = .568) 
 
 
Summary of Findings for Phase I 
Status 
The results show that funding time needed by historic buildings was longer than 
funding time needed by non-historic buildings. Based on the analysis above, that time 
was affected by variables related to the building, mainly its function and construction.  
The correlation table shows that the status of the building is significantly 
correlated to some other variables as well. Historic buildings, naturally, are older. 
However, while the Spearman’s rho did not show a significant relation between historic 
status and age, time needs are affected by age according to Pearson’s correlation. The 
factorial analysis showed that age does not have an effect on time needs for historic 
buildings. It is possible that the Pearson’s correlation is affected by the many missing 
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age data for non-historic buildings, which prevented using that variable in the factorial 
analysis that included non-historic data.  
Also, table (4) show that there is no significant correlation between historic 
building status and types of construction, however, two types of construction showed 
significant correlation to historic status. On the one hand, there is a positive correlation 
between historic buildings and multi-construction, mainly due to the many historic piers 
in San Francisco which all received a multi-construction category. On the other hand, 
there is a negative correlation between historic buildings and reinforced concrete, since 
most reinforced concrete buildings are not historic. There was no significant correlation 
between historic buildings and masonry or concrete construction, which is interesting, 
even though the relation between them is positive. This may be because there are 
masonry or concrete buildings which do not have a “historic” status, even though they 
maybe older. Such buildings maybe significant on the local level, but they were not 
treated as historic by FEMA because they are not eligible for the National Register.  
Since there is no significant relationship between historic status and time needs 
based on construction types, age, or area, then the delays in funding time are due to 
reasons that is not related to the historic fabric itself. This is explained by the significant 
relation between function and time needs for historic buildings. The delays are mainly 
due to aspects of function type. Function type affects code requirements; as such 
requirements are based on the use of the building.  Also, function type affects the 
significance of the building for the community and the priority given to its repair. This 
indicates that funding delays are based on issues with the process itself and not the 
building. Such issues seem to be facing historic buildings in particular, thus the 
significant relationship between status and time.  
Construction 
Time needs for buildings in general are significantly affected by construction; 
however, time needs for historic buildings alone are not significantly affected by 
construction. Construction types, according to table (4), are partly related to time needs. 
Wood frame construction and multi-construction are the only two types that have a 
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significant correlation to time and only multi-construction is correlated to historic 
buildings. This explains why construction type was not significant for historic buildings.  
According to table (4), multi-construction buildings have larger area (due to the 
piers), it is mostly historic, and has higher cost and time.  
The factorial analysis (table 6) also shows that time needs are affected by the 
interaction between status and construction type. Certain construction types may need 
more time depending on their status: historic or not historic. This may be due to the 
significant correlation of multi-construction buildings and historic infrastructure, 
especially piers, since multi-construction take longer time to recover.  
Wood frame has less area than other buildings, probably due to the fact that most 
wood frame buildings are residential. Wood frame construction is also associated with 
cultural buildings, such as community centers, which is also smaller in area. Wood 
frame has less damage levels and less time and cost needs. This may be related to the 
fact that it is mostly residential and damage estimate did not include furniture repair. 
Masonry or concrete are highly correlated to the age of the building as older 
buildings are more likely to be from masonry. Most infrastructure buildings are not of 
masonry or concrete unlike most multi-use buildings. This is because most multi-use 
buildings are downtown buildings that have commercial use on the first floor and 
residential use in the upper floors. These buildings are usually brick masonry. 
Interestingly, masonry or concrete is not significantly correlated with damage, time, or 
cost. This is important as it shows that masonry or concrete buildings do not necessarily 
need more time or cost. Yet, buildings of historic status do need higher time and cost. As 
mentioned above, there are masonry buildings that are not of historic status, thus they do 
not take longer time to recover. This also provides direction that time needs are process 
related and not building related, especially since the time understudy is time to attain 
FEMA funding.  
Reinforced concrete is mostly used in newer buildings (less age), and non-
historic buildings. Reinforced concrete buildings tend to be of larger area. Reinforced 
concrete is predominately used in health care buildings, and it is not significantly used in 
   
 
  62
 
residential or cultural buildings, both of which mainly use wood frame construction. The 
damage and cost related to reinforced concrete is higher as it also includes large areas 
and contents of building, however, it does not require more time to recover indicating 
that repairs may not be a significant part of their recovery, or that since they are mostly 
non-historic, the process of funding is simpler.  
Structural steel is also associated with buildings of large area. This also explains 
the correlation to high cost. It does not, however, have any significant correlation to time 
or damage level, indicating that structural steel buildings are not different than other 
buildings in the damage level or time needs. 
The analysis did not attempt to rank recovery time by construction; however, 
future research can investigate the differences of time needs according to construction 
type. Damage level is significantly correlated with two types of construction, but 
damage level may not be the only variable affecting time needs.  Also, it was not 
possible to investigate the interactive effect of construction type, age, and damage, due 
to the data limitations. This can be addressed in future research as well. 
Age 
The factorial analysis (table 7) showed that age has no relation to the time need 
of historic buildings. Data limitations did not allow for analysis of age for all buildings.  
Still table (4) shows that buildings of older age have smaller area, tend to be historic. 
Also, most cultural buildings are older, but most health facilities and residential 
buildings are newer buildings. Older buildings are of masonry and concrete, but of 
reinforced concrete buildings. Age was not shown to be significantly related to time, 
cost, or damage level in the Spearman’s rho, but was of significant correlation to cost 
and time in the Pearson correlation. the significance is at an edge point and that may be 
due to the significant missing data especially for non-historic buildings. 
Area 
Interestingly, floor area did not have a significant effect on the time needs. This 
is because this time variable represents time needed to process funding applications with 
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FEMA. That processing is different from construction work and is based on bureaucratic 
processes (figure 2). It entails meetings, applications, cost estimates, bills, and approvals. 
This result indicates that the time needed to finish such a process has nothing to do with 
the size of the building, but it relates more to the issues that face the building (such as 
code requirements and strengthening needs). 
Damage Level 
Shown to be of significant effect on time needs for all buildings, especially for 
historic buildings. Less damage levels are associated with wood frame construction, 
while higher damage levels are associated with reinforced concrete, but the latter is due 
to the fact that buildings of larger area have more damage and most reinforced concrete 
buildings have large area. Historic buildings in general, infrastructure facilities, and 
offices have higher damage levels, the latter two may be affected by damages to their 
contents which were part of the damage assessment. Colleges, schools and educational 
facilities have less damage, yet higher cost and time needs.  
Cost 
Cost has been shown to increase with damage, time, and historic status. Also, 
higher cost is associated with larger areas, multi-construction, reinforced concrete, and 
infrastructure, all of which are associated with large areas as well.  
Less cost is associated with residential buildings and wood frame (which is 
mainly used for residential buildings).  
Cost may increase with building age, but there is a significant correlation to most 
construction materials. Wood frame cost less, multi-construction, reinforced concrete, 
and structural steel cost more (probably due to large building areas). Masonry or 
concrete do not have any significant relation to cost. 
Function 
The results of the statistical analyses show some positive and negative aspects of 
recovery time requirements. It is positive that emergency functions and infrastructure 
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facilities take less time. On the other hand, historic health care facilities are important as 
well and they should not take a long time to recover.  There are three groups of buildings 
in recovery time needs: 
1. Least time: emergency buildings and infrastructure facilities. 
2. Intermediate time: offices, multi-use buildings, health care, and schools. 
3. Most time: residential and cultural buildings. 
Recovery time was shown to be influenced by construction type, damage level, 
status of building: historic or non-historic, and function of building, but not floor area.  
It is important to note that some of the covariates might influence each other. 
Function affects structure and materials. Cultural buildings have large spans (theaters, 
community centers, recreational centers) while office spaces and residential facilities 
have smaller spans. Schools have multiple types of spaces. Construction type also varies 
with function; large spans require steel frame or reinforced concrete, unlike residential 
buildings, which mostly use wood frame.  
 
Infrastructure 
For infrastructure, the analysis was about buildings, not the utility lines 
themselves. These are buildings serving power, transportation, water, and other 
infrastructure sections. Their fast recovery does not necessarily mean a speed in the 
service itself, but it indicates repair speed compared to other buildings. The correlation 
table (table 4) shows that such buildings were mostly of multi-construction, and faced 
delays mainly due to the high damage and area. When such covariates were controlled, 
the analysis showed fast recovery indicating less procedural complications. 
 
Residential 
Residential buildings have been found to be among the latest to recover, 
however, historic residential buildings were shown to recover before non-historic 
buildings. This result may be a result of the sample size, since there are only 12 historic 
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residential projects compared to 37 non-historic projects, with 58% of the historic 
building sample made of wood frame, which needs less time for recovery.   
The time delays indicated in the analysis can just be funding process delays, not 
delays in functionality. However, the recovery delays of residential buildings have been 
cited by research. Most of the residential buildings on the analysis list are downtown 
hotels, apartment buildings, and public housing projects. As such, many of these 
buildings are used for limited income residents. Research about Loma Prieta in the Bay 
area points out that most low income population live in older, seismically weak 
buildings that were severely damaged in the 1989 earthquake increasing the homeless 
population after the response stage. In 1993 many of the damaged residential buildings 
were still empty, mostly due to the high cost of strengthening. Homeless advocates are 
against seismic strengthening as it increases the rents, thus making such houses beyond 
the reach of the underprivileged. On the other hand, regulators push for seismic retrofit 
for safety concerns. Some owners chose to demolish rather than mitigate (NRC, 1994). 
Two years after the earthquake none of the red-tagged or yellow-tagged residential 
hotels (single occupancy rooms), multi unit brick buildings (more than 13000 units) had 
begun repairs (Comerio, 1998b). These buildings were left empty and fenced. In the 
light of such complications for housing recovery, it is important that public housing and 
housing owned by NGOs have less recovery time.  
Also, San Francisco has a high percentage of its inhabitants living in multi-
family buildings (Comerio, 1998b). In San Francisco there were 360 red-tagged 
buildings, one third of them was residential and two thirds of the red-tagged and yellow-
tagged buildings were for low and moderate-income people (Comerio, 1998b). Taking 
into account that San Francisco has a serious homelessness problem, housing recovery 
should be further investigated to identify ways for reducing delays.  
According to Brady and Perkins (1998), the total damage in Loma Prieta was 
$2.7-2.9 billion, out of which there were $1.32 billion in home damage, and $9.2 billion 
in uninhabitable housing units. This indicates the importance of quick housing recovery.  
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Office 
Offices are shown to take intermediate time, when controlling other variables. 
Fratessa (1994) contends that public office buildings should not have any delays in 
functionality. This suggests that office buildings should be among the buildings that 
receive pre-earthquake recovery planning, so that their recovery time is reduced to 
minimal. Fratessa stressed the importance of strengthening such buildings to facilitate 
recovery management. Public office buildings are shown by the correlation table to 
suffer high damage. Since such buildings are newer non-historic facilities, this indicates 
that their contents had influence on damage level. Thus, reducing recovery cost and time 
for offices would entail addressing their contents through proper securing of furniture. 
 
Multi-use 
Mostly of masonry or concrete construction, the results show that such buildings 
are intermediate in their time needs.  Multi-use buildings are mainly buildings that have 
commercial first floor and residential upper floors, yet other buildings of more than one 
use are categorized within it as well. Table (4) shows that such buildings have higher 
cost, yet there is not indication that its related to damage. The high cost could be a result 
of outliers, as there are two projects that have extremely high cost of more than $5 
million. It also may be due to large area of these buildings, as indicated by the 
Spearman’s rho correlation (table 4). 
 
Health 
The analysis showed that health care facilities in general take longer time to 
recovery. Some professionals pointed out that health care facilities have extra work 
involved because there are more codes related to them, thus more permits and approvals. 
The data show that historic health care buildings recovered faster than non-historic 
buildings, this can be explained by a closer look at the sample. The sample size is one 
reason, as historic health care buildings are 8 while non-historic are 11. Also, 50% of 
historic healthcare buildings (the sample of 8) are smaller buildings of less than 7,000 
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square feet in area (i.e clinics) compared to larger health care facilities (mostly hospitals) 
in the non-historic sample.  
 
Emergency 
As mentioned above, emergency facilities should be among the earliest to 
recover. The results have supported that as shown by the ranking.  However, table (4) 
show emergency facilities to face delays, which is a result of correlation without 
controlling for other variables. This indicates that they face delays due to some of the 
variables. Yet their relation to damage and cost in not significant nor positive. Also, the 
mean time of recovery for this function is is 2 years, therefore, the correlation table’s 
significant time correlation may be due to other variables. 
 
Cultural 
Theaters and arts buildings are challenging due to architectural and artistic 
special treatments. These include elaborate details that are difficult to replace in kind, 
complex structural systems when theaters and large galleries are involved, and many 
ornaments of symbolic nature, gold inlays, marble, and painted decorations. They are 
challenging when considering structural retrofit and repair without damage to artwork or 
special finishes, and with minimal intervention to areas of special significance. Most of 
these buildings in San Francisco are historic, as indicated by the correlation table. 
However, the table also shows that they are mostly wood frame thus indicating less 
damage levels. Also, when looking at table (4), it shows that they do not face delays. 
Delays are only apparent when controlling other variables. So the delay is mainly due to 
their historic status. As historic buildings, repairs would require specific professional 
work, such as a historical report including a detailed study of the building, it history, 
finishes, and significance areas. Also, in-situ explorations and tests for materials might 
be needed. All that would be done before the preliminary design.. Moreover, many 
professionals have indicated that such places of large occupancy face delays because 
they have more code requirements for safety, accessibility and so on. 
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Colleges 
School recovery does not indicate significant delays, which is a positive 
outcome. This might be due to the limited damage suffered by schools in San Francisco. 
Fratessa (1994) reports that public schools survived well with minimal damage after 
Loma Prieta due to the performance code. Tobin (1994) also points out that public 
school buildings performed well in the earthquake even when they were constructed 
according to older codes that are not adequate anymore. This was probably due to plan 
checking by engineers and thorough inspection of the buildings as they were built. The 
California Field Act to protect schools and the California Hospital Act to protect 
hospitals resulted in successful mitigation efforts. However, research indicates that there 
is still a need for local governments to provide incentives (NRC, 1994). Nevertheless, 
historic hospitals faced delays, as many were not up to code and required upgrading 
during repairs. 
The simple correlation table shows that time, cost, and damage level are 
positively correlated. This is important as it suggests that time delays lead to increasing 
cost, and vise versa, thus the significance of finding ways for reducing time. High cost 
would lead to delays when such cost is contested between the applicant and FEMA. 
High damage leads to more time needs and more costs in repairs and in design work. 
This indicates the need to address the recovery of historic buildings in a way that would 
reduce delays, thus saving cost. Since the cost of recovery for disaster has been 
escalating over the past years, reducing time delays can be a factor in reducing such 
costs. As more disasters happen each year, the effect of such a variable can be 
significant. 
Understanding why historic buildings required more time in their funding 
process requires further analysis of case studies, which is done in Phase II. It can be 
deduced from the available literature that because there was no pre-incident recovery 
planning there was some confusion over historic buildings. Some owners tried to 
demolish them, others tried to repair them in ways that did not meet acceptable standards 
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for historic buildings (Spennemann and Look, 1998). Some professionals were of the 
opinion that code requirements cause delays for historic buildings, as repairs sometimes 
triggered such codes based on the scope of needed repairs, which in turn in based on the 
damage level. Upgrades to code require more time in design and approvals, thus the 
delays. 
Time needs are significant because, as indicated by the correlation table, time 
and cost are positively correlated. As such, extra time will lead to extra cost. This also 
works vice versa. This is a significant indicator to the importance of investigating why 
historic buildings take longer and how that can be changed. 
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CHAPTER V 
PHASE II 
Methods  
This phase provides an in-depth investigation of the recovery of historic 
buildings by analyzing selected cases in detail.  Case studies are intended to allow for 
collection of detailed information that will build a better understanding of a situation or 
an event that has not been investigated before (Creswell, 1994). They are chosen to find 
out what is common to all cases, what is particular to each case, and what is similar or 
different to others. The use of case studies is considered the best strategy when asking 
questions such as “how” or “why” (Creswell, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Since 
this study investigates how the recovery process commenced for historic buildings, what 
variables affected it, and how chosen sustainability variables played in it, a case study 
approach would best serve these objectives.  
An important limitation of case studies is that they can be affected by the bias of 
the researcher (Yin, 2003) therefore two approaches were adopted. First: I developed a 
journal in which all ideas and thoughts about the case studies were recorded. This helped 
the study develop alternative explanations for the developments in the cases, so that all 
possibilities were visited. Second: the analysis results and narratives were shown to 
individuals involved in the recovery process for each of the cases. In order to include 
diverse voices and limit bias, the cases were emailed to some of the involved players like 
the owner, historic preservation consultant, architect, structural engineer, SHPO, LAPB, 
and FEMA. The names of the groups involved were taken from the correspondence 
documents, and in some cases the individuals involved were identified.  
Three historic projects (worksites) were chosen for this phase and were selected 
based on the time of recovery (i.e., recovery after 1995). The three buildings are 
investigated on the individual level and on the comparative level.  
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Also, the initial research design required selecting three historic buildings that 
recovered early in the process (pre 1995) in order to provide parallel comparisons to the 
three buildings that faced delays. The intention was to compare the two groups in regard 
to the variables under study. As mentioned above, the City, the State, and the SHPO had 
removed all projects to deep storage, and none of the buildings that had an early 
recovery (pre 1995) were found. Also, no documents could be obtained from FEMA. 
Thus, the study had to use only the data available.    
Using multiple methods for data gathering and analysis is common in case 
studies as it allows for verifying data and establishing validity (Yin, 2003). Therefore, 
this study uses two main sources of data:  
1. Records and documents available from SHPO. These documents helped in 
providing a detailed view of the decisions, the problems, and the solutions as 
they developed over time. These records are diverse in themselves, they 
include letters, agreements, memorandums, and reports made regarding the 
recovery of the building. Also, there were minutes of meetings, 
documentations of public hearings, public comments, and professional 
reports. Such documents helped in identifying what issues occurred during 
the process and how they were handled. In themselves, they provided a 
varied source that helped in getting different perspectives on the process.  
2. Newspaper clips, covering the period 1989 to 2002. Such clips provided 
another perspective on the process. 
3. A supplementary source of data was short questions with individuals 
involved in the projects. This helped clarify some points. Later, some of these 
individuals reviewed the narrative and case analysis. 
This approach has some limitations. Newspapers do not necessarily present facts 
about the project but present the writer’s perception of the situation. But since several 
articles were used, in different time periods, by different individuals, this provided more 
perspectives. That information was checked against what is available from the DSRs and 
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from the SHPO documents. The subsequent interviews helped in expanding the 
understanding of the situation. 
A positive of this method is that it allowed a view that is based on multiple 
perspectives: the SHPO document contained letters of correspondence between all 
interested groups until the Section 106 review was done, in two chosen projects this 
corresponds with the time the project was going. In addition to that, the documents 
include memos between members of the SHPO office or emails between FEMA, the 
OES, and SHPO. Both of which provide insight into the discussions that were happening 
between these managing groups. It reflects their perspective on what was happening 
outside the formal letters. In addition to that, the documents contained minutes of related 
public hearings and meetings, which provided insight into the perspectives of different 
groups involved. 
Analysis 
The analysis of the data was done in several steps: 
1. Creating matrixes. Three matrixes were used, a chronological matrix (see 
Appendix B) and a variable/project matrix (Appendix C). The creation of these matrixes 
involved categorical, descriptive, and analytic coding as described by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) and Richards (2005).  
The time ordered matrix was created first, it contained descriptive information of 
the documents, but also in contained an analytical part that included identification of the 
stage of project and type of function being performed, in addition to identification of the 
main issues in that document. This provided a series of developments for the project. 
The finished product led to an identification of the main stages and a sequence of 
functions done in them, in addition to the main issues faced in them. The topics covered 
in the correspondences were considered issues, also, public comments and complaints, in 
addition to whatever the meeting minutes identified as issues. This matrix helped in 
developing the narrative of the dynamics of project development. 
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The second matrix was created for variables for each project. The matrix 
contained variables developed as the coding progressed. This helped in identifying the 
main variables, and also helped in developing the analysis of participation and historic 
character issues.  
All identified issues for the three projects were listed in a third matrix (Appendix 
D). The objective was to compare the three projects in terms of these issues. As the lists 
of issues were being compiled, they were being grouped, and thus more general 
categories emerged.  
2.  Recording reflections and insights. As coding was being done, reflections on 
the progress of work and sources of issues were documented. This served as a source for 
the comments of the dynamics of the recovery. It also helped in investigating alternate 
explanations.  
The Case Studies 
The following provides an overview of the development of three projects, with 
the results identifying the issues that were faced in each. This is followed by a discussion 
of the two main sustainability variables under investigation (participation and historic 
character). Finally, a comparison between the issues faced by the three projects is done 
with regard to the issues that were faced in order to generate better understanding of how 
such issues play. 
Since the data available for the projects was not equal in terms of coverage and 
depth, the analysis depended on what was available through the different sources cited 
above. As mentioned earlier, the choice of the cases (table 8) came as a result of data 
availability. 
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Table 8 The chosen case studies. 
 OWNER FUNCTION DAMAGE 
DSR TIME 
(FUNDING 
PROCESS) 
PROJECT 
TIME 
(FUNCTIONAL
ITY) 
The Williams 
Building 
Independent 
Public Agency 
Multi-use 
(Office/hotel) Red-tag 1989-2001 1989-2005 
SFUSD 
Administration 
Building 
Independent 
Public Agency 
Multi-use 
(school/ arts) Red-tag 1989-2001 Not finished 
The Geary Theater NGO Cultural Red-tag 1990-2000 1989-1995 
 
 
Case Study 1: The Williams Building 
Built in 1907, the Williams Building is an eight story building of 50,000 square 
foot area. It was mentioned in the survey done by San Francisco Architectural Heritage 
(Heritage), Splendid Survivors (Corbett, 1979) and is listed as eligible for the National 
Register as part of a historic district. The building is one of three remaining downtown 
commercial structures by local San Francisco architect Clinton Day.  
The building is owned by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA). It 
occupies an important corner at the intersection of two streets in downtown San 
Francisco, Mission and 3rd Streets. This is part of the Yerba Buena Center 
Redevelopment Project Area Development. 
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Figure 8 The Williams Building. 
 
 
 
According to the survey done by the Foundation of San Francisco’s Architectural 
Heritage (Heritage), the building is important due to its unique ornamental brickwork 
and its environmental role at an important urban corner in downtown San Francisco. The 
composition contains a three-part vertical block with the end bays differentiated from the 
middles. The building has Renaissance/Baroque ornamentation.  
The building’s construction is steel frame with brick aggregate concrete floor 
slabs and masonry cladding. It is most notable for the distinctive artwork on the east and 
south facades. The earthquake’s damage was described as severe in some sources, 
however, some of the individuals who assessed the damage perceived the damage as not 
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critical. The earthquake left several minor cracks in the building; but there were some 
major cracks in one of the external walls, which gave it a red-tag status. 
The time needed for the building to recover is unclear. At the time of visiting the 
site (spring 2005), it was still undergoing final repair work. Based on the FEMA 
Damage Survey Reports (DSRs), the project started on Oct.1989, and ended on April 
2001. This, of course, identifies the time needed for the funding approvals and process to 
be concluded. The total funding given to the building was $6,876,692 (~$138/ft).  
Stages 9
The investigation of the project revealed the following stages in its development: 
1. 1989-1993: Project initiation  
At the time of the earthquake, the building was not fully occupied. Some 
respondents stated that it was a residential building and others said that it was an office 
building, but all agreed that it was almost empty at the time of the earthquake and that it 
was not well maintained. 
Initially, SFRA wanted to demolish the building based on the red tag status. 
Since some external walls needed shoring, due to serious cracks, the building was 
perceived as a public threat and that was used to support the demolition argument.  
There were several letters concerning the significance of the building, which 
indicates that its significance was not initially clear. The owner perceived the building 
not to be of high significance but historic preservationists provided arguments of its 
importance. Once the building was determined eligible for the National Register, Section 
106 came into play and no demolition funds could be approved until Section 106 was 
complete. The State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) did not concur with the 
demolition, as the building could be repaired. 
Since demolition was not an agreed-upon option, initial repair studies were 
prepared. SFRA’s estimates for repair costs were higher than those expected by the 
SHPO and FEMA. The SHPO’s structural consultant also felt that SFRA was planning 
structural work that was not needed. SFRA responded with a letter from their consultant 
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explaining that they intended to do strengthening work, based on their consultant’s view 
that the building needs seismic strengthening. 
Strengthening the building was a major issue. That involved two questions: 1) is 
strengthening needed, and 2) if so, then what should the level of strengthening be? 
SFRA believed that since the building would not be demolished and would be used, then 
it should have an acceptable level of safety for its inhabitants for future earthquakes. The 
owner’s consultant had a specific level of safety in mind, but the SHPO’s consultant 
believed that the building did not need all the strengthening proposed by SFRA. The 
letters discussing this issue span several years.  
The question of whether the strengthening was needed was introduced on two 
parts. First, SFRA’s consultant believed that the local code required it. This was later 
shown to not be the case. Second, the consultant decided that the building was not strong 
enough. There were several letters and meetings about these issues between the two 
structural consultants. There are no letters available to show the final decision. Yet, at a 
certain point, SFRA decided that it would be better for them to use temporary shoring 
for the building and not to permanently strengthen it, since they were planning to have it 
empty for several years until an investor was found.   
The fact that the building was almost empty at the time of the earthquake 
complicated decision-making. The building did not have a specific use. SFRA, a 
redevelopment agency, was interested in the use of the building for redeveloping the 
area. It is obvious that the site itself was considered of value, being at a downtown 
intersection in an area crowded with high-rise office buildings, cultural institutions, and 
multi-use buildings. Thus, the choice was between finding an investor for an empty lot 
in the downtown area, and finding an investor for an historic building that needs 
earthquake repairs and strengthening in addition to rehabilitation according to specific 
standards. At the time, there was no developer.  
The high cost of the requested temporary strengthening was an issue. Suggesting 
a million dollar scheme that is only temporary and would eventually be removed was not 
initially acceptable to FEMA. SFRA wanted to provide a solution that was not 
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permanent, so that the future developer would do the final work based on its plans for 
the site. The cost implications of these decisions can be profound. FEMA proposed 
spending $27,000 to repair the cracks, while SFRA contended that the building should 
be strengthened at a cost of $1.128 million. The full seismic upgrade of the building 
would cost $6.8 million, which SFRA did not have. Thus, SFRA considered the 
temporary strengthening to be a viable solution. SFRA expected FEMA to fund the 
temporary bracing based on the Stafford Act10 as a mitigation cost.  
 SFRA already knew that the building would not be used immediately as they 
intended it to be part of a redevelopment project, which was planned for 1998. Thus, 
SFRA insisted that the temporary strengthening was better as it could easily be removed. 
But FEMA would not approve the strengthening unless it was proven that it was 
required by codes, and the SHPO would not concur with the demolition, which created 
an impasse.  
The available letters reveal discussions about the cost of strengthening and the 
effects of the temporary shoring on the historic character of the building. The Section 
106 consultation included the SHPO, San Francisco Landmarks Advisory Board 
(LPAB), the Foundation of San Francisco’s Architectural Heritage, FEMA, and the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP).  
In May 1993, The SFRA asked for funding assistance to demolish the Williams 
Building from the state Office of Emergency Services (OES). This intent was not 
conveyed to FEMA nor to the SHPO, in spite of the ongoing Section 106 consultation 
and in spite of a Section 106 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among SFRA, SHPO 
and ACHP dating back to 1984 (Letter from FEMA to OES August 1993). Nonetheless, 
FEMA was informed of that letter and they sent a letter to SFRA pointing out that such a 
demolition would result in losing the already approved repair funding of $651,140 for 
that building. This decision came after the City’s Department of public works addressed 
SFRA about the state of the building as a public hazard.  
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2. 1993-1996: Primary decisions  
In 1993, four years after the earthquake, SFRAs decided to demolish as they had 
originally intended. As a result, in September of 1993, the SHPO withdrew from the 
consultation and the Section 106 had to continue with the ACHP. But FEMA would not 
provide the funds for the demolition because the building is historic and Section 106 
review was not completed yet. With this escalation of the conflict, FEMA sent a letter to 
SFRA that attempted to develop new alternatives, and suggested  SFRA apply to the 
“Hazard Mitigation Fund” to cover the costs of the strengthening. Also, the ACHP 
decided that there was no need for a new or amended MOA as SFRA had more 
alternatives of action under the predisaster MOA. The ACHP recommended that the 
issues between FEMA and owner about the funding be resolved first. Once the funding 
problem was solved, then the ACHP could address the Section 106 compliance. 
Early in 1994 a disaster-specific Section 106 Programmatic Agreement (PA) was 
executed between FEMA and the SHPO, which aimed at reducing the time needed for 
project approval. In part, the PA aims at reducing the number of projects going through 
the full Section 106 process if that process is not required. Such “exempted” projects 
have minimal repair work done in kind, or temporary work that will not affect the 
buildings. The PA was an improvement to the process as it significantly reduced the 
number of projects going to the SHPO by limiting this review to projects that have a 
significant effect on the historic property’s historic character. This PA was not 
developed for the Williams project, but was a general agreement that reduced the 
complexity of the process of funding approval, and therefore had an indirect impact on 
the Williams project. 
In 1994, SFRA submitted plans for the seismic strengthening of the building to 
FEMA. The proposal was to use temporary steel bracing on the inside of certain walls, in 
addition to shear walls on the interior of the building. This plan seems to have been 
prepared after an agreement with FEMA had been reached about the cost of the bracing. 
FEMA determined that, since the proposal was temporary, there was no need for Section 
106 as per the PA with the SHPO. However, the SHPO indicated concern that the 
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proposal was not temporary as it introduced shear walls and bracing inside the building 
in several places. The problem was that the building was severely damaged on one of its 
exterior walls and needed scaffolding and bracing to maintain public safety. This caused 
pressure on SFRA as it not only had to plan for the building’s long-term strengthening, 
but also for the strengthening that was needed immediately to prevent public injury. 
The SHPO urged FEMA and SFRA to reconsider the strengthening option. 
Another, letter from FEMA indicated that the Foundation of San Francisco’s 
Architectural Heritage got involved. They had meetings with SFRA and provided 
proposals for the strengthening that would be less intrusive. The effects of the proposed 
strengthening on the integrity of the fabric were of concern for historic preservationists. 
Letters indicate that SFRA took into consideration some of the suggestions. Yet, 
correspondence in April 1994 indicates FEMA approved the temporary strengthening 
because the building was still a public hazard, studying new alternatives would cost 
SFRA more delays, and there was no legal ground under Section 106 for FEMA to ask 
SFRA to do more studies.   
Nevertheless, a letter from SFRA in June 1994 indicates that they had had 
meetings with San Francisco Heritage, and were investigating the use of steel bracing 
and shear walls on the outside of the building. The letter points out that the cost of the 
suggested scheme would reach more than $6 million, while their initially approved 
scheme would cost $1.544 million. The letter indicates that SFRA studied the alternative 
presented by the preservationists. The letter asked FEMA if that alternative would be 
funded. This was done in conformance with the MOA, which required SFRA to 
investigate feasible options in their work. FEMA pointed out that it would not fund the 
exterior bracing as its funding was based on the bracing being part of permanent 
strengthening. The external bracing would have an effect on the historic character of the 
building so it would have to be subject to Section 106. In turn, that would delay the 
project until that process was over, which could take several months. However, the 
project brief on the website of one of the contractors indicates that the final temporary 
seismic strengthening scheme was a mix of the two proposals: interior steel bracing with 
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exterior shear walls, installed in 1994 (Webcor Builders, n.d.). There is no available 
information on the comparative cost of this choice, but it indicates that  SFRA changed 
their planned retrofit to accommodate some of the changes suggested by historic 
preservationists. 
The Section 106 process became more complicated because SFRA chose an 
“Alternate Project"11 status. As such, the funding needed to repair and temporarily 
strengthen the building would be given to SFRA, who will use part of the funding to 
establish the temporary bracing and use the rest of it for other projects.  SFRA used the 
funds for several other projects: the California Historic Society Project, the Jewish 
Museum Project, and The Japanese American Religious Federation Assisted Living 
Facility. All These projects were also subject to the Section 106 review separately.  
3. 1996- Around 1998: Unresolved  
During this period, work was continued on the building to provide the temporary 
strengthening as planned, but the building was standing empty without use. In a 
publication by the General Accounting Office online (May 1996), the building is 
mentioned as an example of buildings that should not have received funding, as it was 
almost empty at the time of the earthquake. At that time, the building was still braced 
awaiting repair; however, SFRA was negotiating with investors about it. 
4. 1998-2002: Final decisions  
In May 1999, an informational hearing about a proposed project at the Williams 
Building and an empty site next to it was conducted before the LPAB (San Francisco 
Government, May 1999) as part of the Yerba Buena Center Redevelopment Project Area 
Development. The proposed project included the adaptive reuse of the Williams 
Building and a new building that features a tower of up to 430 feet in height containing 
approximately 95 residential units, 410 hotel rooms, a museum/cultural center, and 
associated parking making a total of 750,000 square feet. Known as the St. Regis 
Museum, the tower was constructed and by spring 2005, it was almost finished. The 
Williams Building was still under reconstruction. 
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In this period the final shape of the project took place. Funding from FEMA 
ended 2001, and the “Alternate Project” was approved. In 2004, a publication by the 
city’s Planning Department mentions the Williams Building as an example of the 
downtown hotel construction trends, since it contains 95 luxury rooms to be completed 
in September 2004 (San Francisco Government, 2004). 
In December 2004, a resolution by SFRA online refers to the new Museum of the 
African Diaspora (MoAD), which was planned to occupy the third floor of the Williams 
Building and extend to the neighboring St. Regis Museum Tower. The Museum consists 
of three floors of new construction and one floor inside the historic structure totaling 
20,000 square feet. The MoAD was applying for permits to redesign the floors, 
including the historic building, which was approved. The MoAd would lease the space 
for 99 years. According to the resolution, the Williams Building’s space will be 
redesigned “into a series of smaller learning, educational, and donor spaces” (SFRA, 
2004). 
The available literature online indicates that SFRA required the investor to 
restore the building. The economic viability of restoring the building was challenged 
again, but the investor managed to find a way to incorporate it with the tower proposal.  
SFRA stated that they preferred not to demolish it, due to the agreement with the ACHP 
and FEMA, unless it was proven that repairs are infeasible (Gordon, April 5 1999).  This 
shows how the viability of repairing historic buildings can be contested at every phase of 
the project. It is commendable that SFRA pushed the investor in the direction of 
preserving the building.  
The final work on the project is described on the website of one of the 
contractors: “The retrofit of the building included asbestos abatement and exterior 
restoration including masonry, terra cotta, windows and sheet metal cornice. The 
temporary steel seismic brace frame was removed from the interior of the north and east 
facades and replaced with interior shotcrete walls. Additionally, the existing roof deck 
was removed and the 9th floor deck was converted to a rooftop garden terrace.  
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On the interior of the building, the basement will house the electrical entrance 
for the project. A restaurant will occupy the ground floor with a kitchen on the second 
floor. The 3rd floor will be exhibition space for the Museum of African Diaspora. The 4th 
floor will contain the support areas for the banquet room including offices and public 
restrooms. There will also be a spa and fitness center and administrative offices for the 
hotel operations” (Webcor Builders, n.d.). 
Variables Affecting the Recovery 
Context 
a. Economic challenges of the period.  
i. SFRA wanted to find an investor to redevelop the site and that 
was not immediately possible. 
ii. The need to provide investments for redevelopment of that area. 
b. Administrative: SFRA is a redevelopment agency with powers to manage 
its own property.  They are accustomed to making their own decisions 
about their property. The relationship among the SFRA and the other 
public agencies involved in the recovery process and their jurisdictions is 
worth further investigation. 
c. Regulatory: 
i. The requirements of related laws and codes for the repair of 
historic buildings were not sufficiently clear, especially with 
regard to how they are triggered and if they require seismic 
strengthening. 
ii. The PA allowed for the project to quickly clear the Section 106 
process.  
iii. Section 106 made a difference in preventing demolition. 
d. Technological: technological context reflects the knowledge available to 
professionals about different construction materials and systems. 
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Players  
a. Consultants’ disagreement over professional evaluation. 
b. Perceptions of the other parties; trust and cooperation were missing. 
c. Perceptions of important values. As shown above, the building has 
economic, aesthetic, historic, cultural, developmental, functional, and 
civic values. Each player perceived certain values as more important than 
the other values. 
Process  
a. Clarity of the red tag.  SFRA thought it indicated need to demolish. 
b. FEMA program requirements and SHPO pulling in different directions: 
FEMA wanted the strengthening to be cost-effective whereas the SHPO 
and historic preservationists wanted to use methods that are sensitive to 
the integrity of the building, but increase cost. 
Building 
a. Archaic construction materials left the consultants in disagreement over 
its seismic strength. 
b. The major damage in one of the walls. 
c. Location of building as part of a redevelopment area. 
d. Previous neglect. 
Historic Character and Integrity of Fabric 
The issues of historic character and integrity of fabric were faced in the early part 
of the project. The proposed schemes for strengthening were discussed in terms of their 
effect on the integrity of the building. Since the proposed bracing was temporary, that 
helped in reducing the conflict about it. Still, the historic preservationists worked on 
developing alternatives to strengthening that would reduce impact on the building. 
The main issue with the historic character is in the final product. The 
redevelopment project was processed outside the Section 106 process. The final project, 
   
 
  85
 
the tower with concrete and glass façade, has no relation to the historic character of the 
building. It is obvious that the final project did not take the character of the exiting 
building into account. This raises the question of the appropriateness of such a solution. 
Since the building and the tower are one project, one would hope for a better treatment 
that incorporates some elements from the older building. 
This does not mean the tower should not have happened. What this calls for is a 
more sensitive treatment of that corner, a treatment that would have allowed for the 
historic building to retain an element of its value-which is its effect on the urban space.    
The outcome of the project indicates that the economic values superseded 
cultural and aesthetic values. The building, based on the available data, has historic 
value, for historic preservationists and LPAB, civic value, for the people of the city 
represented by LPAB, economic value, for the developer, developmental value, for the 
SFRA, aesthetic value, for historic preservationists and LPAB, and functional value, for 
the developer. In a redevelopment area, the economic and developmental aspects are 
significant. There are no indications of requirements of SHPO review or public input on 
the final design except through LPAB. The final project was not a federal undertaking, 
thus Section 106 regulations did not apply.  The project was approved by LPAB, and 
there is no documentation available of their discussions.  
Public Participation 
The available documents are not sufficient to draw any conclusions. But there 
were three routes of public participation: 
1. The early SHPO review, which was ended after the PA was signed. 
2. Public hearings before LPAB, which do not have detailed documentation. 
3. The early predisaster MOA, signed in 1984, which required that interested 
parties be allowed to comment on proposed work. This allowed for the 
Foundation of San Francisco Architectural Heritage to become involved and 
provide suggestions. 
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The important note here is that the MOA had requirements that helped in 
maintaining public input, which was helpful. However, the “public” in this case is a 
reference to historic preservationists.  
Case Study 2: The SFUSD Administration Building 
This complex is composed of four buildings occupying a block on the edge of 
Civic Center Historic District. The complex has two addresses: 170 Fell St. and 135 Van 
Ness Ave. The first DSR was in 1989 and the last in 2002. Part of the complex is still 
standing empty and unrepaired seventeen years after the earthquake. 
170 Fell St. 
The building was constructed in 1910 as the Norton Tharp Commercial High 
School on Grove St. between Larkin and Polk Sts., which lies in what is now the Civic 
Center.  It was moved to its current location in 1913 as part of the Civic Center Master 
Plan construction. The move, which was completed in eight months, was 
“unprecedented in scale and still ranks as one of the largest moves in San Francisco if 
not in the nation” (ARG, September 1994:1).  
The building is a three story steel-framed structure with brick infill and 
reinforced concrete slab floors spanning between steel beams and girders. The exterior 
walls are un-reinforced brick masonry while all interior walls are unreinforced hollow 
clay tile construction. The building also has an attic and basement (figure 9). It is 
rectangular in shape (119 by 141 feet) and has a terra cotta trimmed brick parapet above 
roof level extending three feet. 
According to the Historic Structure Report (ARG, September 1994), the building 
is of high significance. It dates to an important time that witnessed reconstruction after 
the 1906 earthquake.  It was designed by a significant San Francisco architect, Newton 
Tharp, whose works are now rare. The report shows how the building represents the 
educational architecture of its time, which does not have many other examples in the 
city. The architect designed the building during his short service as City Architect to 
replace buildings lost in the 1906 earthquake. The architecture of the building represents 
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the philosophies of the 19th century which designed schools “as bastions of classical 
architecture” (ARG, September 1994: 3). 
This building is significant mainly because of the engineering skill in moving to 
its new location in 1913. The building frame was separated from the foundation below 
the first floor. It was elevated onto a system of steel rails that guided it to its present 
location, where the frame was lowered into place, and spliced to provide column 
continuity with foundations (Foster Engineering, 1990:6). 
 
 
 
Figure 9 170 Fell St. Building. 
 
 
 
 
The building is also important because the school was a significant institution in 
the history of education in San Francisco. It was one of three schools in the United States 
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teach commercial high school and few of its type were open to women at the time. It was 
an important educational institution in the city until 1952.  
The building gains higher significance since it is part of a complex of educational 
buildings. The block also contains two other buildings designed by another prominent 
San Francisco architect. Together, they reflect the change that took place in the design of 
educational buildings during the early twentieth century. 
The Page and Turnbull Cultural Resources Evaluation (October 1996b) points to 
the importance of 170 Fell St. for the complex as a whole. It states that the loss of the 
building would affect the value of the complex, as it was the original building that 
shaped the development of the High School of Commerce (Page& Turnbull, October 
1996b, 12-13).  
The building continued to be used as a high school until 1952 when it was closed 
and the building was used for SFUSD administrative offices. This use continued until 
1989 when the earthquake took place. 
 
135 Van Ness Ave. 
Built in 1923-1926 as the High School of Commerce by the architect John Reid, 
Jr., who also helped in the design of the Civic Center. It was built as a three story 
building to complete the block where the Tharp building was placed. This group of 
loosely connected buildings consists of: a one story library, a three story academic 
building, a 1,800-seat auditorium (the Nourse Auditorium), and a two-story gymnasium.  
The buildings form a “J” in plan with 170 Fell St. at the end of the sequence. The 
architect, Reid, intended that the three buildings have Spanish colonial revival style.  
The main entrance of 135 Van Ness Ave. was flanked with stone projections decorated 
with figures representing medieval men of learning (figure 10).  
The academic building has simple interior spaces. The gymnasium has arched 
windows for light and upper balconies at east and west of the space. The second floor 
housed the gym and the first accommodated supporting services. The library has a 
ceiling bordered by ornamented plaster and wood casework at all wall perimeters. The 
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auditorium, on the other hand, was the richest in detailing. It has decorative plaster walls 
and ceiling and ornamental chandeliers. All the buildings have similar material on the 
outside, with stucco and terra cotta ornamentation at entry portals, parapets and stair 
towers. The terra cotta has color glazing in orange, green, and blue. 
 
 
Figure 10  135 Van Ness Ave. Building. 
 
 
 
The 135 Van Ness Ave. Building is significant because it is one of few buildings 
remaining that represent the educational architecture of the early twentieth century. The 
building represents educational concepts that prevailed in California in the 1920s and 
1930s, through its open educational style and Spanish colonial character. The building 
plays an important role in the formation of the urban space for Van Ness Ave and the 
San Francisco Civic Center, which it borders (ARG, November 1993; Page and 
Turnbull, 1996b) 
According to SHPO and FEMA letters and memorandums, both buildings are 
collectively listed as San Francisco City Landmark #140, and both are eligible for the 
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National Register. However, some documents only refer to 135 Van Ness Ave. as 
significant. 
According to the Foster Engineering report (May 1990), the earthquake caused 
serious cracks in the exterior walls of the 170 Fell St. building, and severely damaged 
the parapet and the chimney, which later had to be removed. All interior hollow clay 
walls were severely damaged. The building was red-tagged by the Bureau of Building 
Inspection. The Foster Engineering report found the building hazardous due to loss of 
lateral load bearing strength, which is a finding SFUSD focused on (Irons, August  28, 
2002). Because the building is owned by the SFUSD, the red-tag designation was later 
changed to “secured” shifting the responsibility from the City to SFUSD. No explanation 
was provided, but it allowed for the building to be entered with restrictions. The building 
can not be occupied until that status is changed and it has not changed since the 
earthquake. The City requires that secured buildings comply with the current applicable 
building code.  
The earthquake damage on 135 Van Ness Ave. was less severe. The DSRs 
describe minor damage to drywall partitions; plaster walls, stucco walls, and exterior 
finish. However, there was also major damage to clay tile walls, a concrete roof slab, 
roof beams, and columns in the Gymnasium wing. 
Initially, SFUSD moved its offices out of both buildings, but in 1990 it moved 
back to the 135 Van Ness Ave. Building with FEMA covering the cost. In addition 
FEMA approved the cost for debris removal and emergency protective measures from 
both buildings. 
Stages 
1. (1989-1991) Uncertainty: repair and reuse as offices 
Most of the work in 1989 was for emergency stabilization, removal of hazardous 
brickwork, and damage assessment. Early in 1991, several aftershocks lead to further 
damage in 170 Fell St., so one of the corners had to be stabilized and some brickwork 
removed. According to letters to FEMA in 1990 about the intended repairs, the 
consultant pointed out that the exterior facade will be restored to pre-earthquake 
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conditions and historically significant interior finishes maintained. Removal of chimney 
and parapet, which happened after an aftershock almost destroyed them, and emergency 
stabilization work were not going to prevent the proper reconstruction of the facade to 
pre-earthquake appearance. The consultant understood the importance of maintaining 
historic character (Foster Engineering, letter to SHPO June 21, 1990). Also, the 
consultant mentioned that they planned to do as much in-situ repair as possible to save 
historic fabric, but some parts were severely damaged and had to be reconstructed. More 
letters indicate that, at that point, the consultant and owner did not have a problem with 
the preservation of the building, they were planning to restore the facade to its original 
condition using the State Historic Building Code (SHBC) and the Secretary of the 
Interior Standards (Standards), which clearly indicates that work can commence when 
the consultant is aware of such requirements and follows them.  
During that time, the consultant prepared reports on the feasibility of repairing 
and code upgrading 170 Fell St. as offices, which was found to be feasible (Foster 
Engineering, May 1990). Plans were prepared for the selective demolition of parts of 
170 Fell that were too damaged, and reconstruction according to the Standards and the 
SHBC to pre-earthquake appearance. 
A 1990 DSR, indicates that SFUSD moved back to 135 Van Ness Ave. because 
the Academic building of the complex suffered less damage and was reusable as office 
space by that time whereas there was more work to be done on the Gymnasium and 
Auditorium.  
At this stage, SFUSD thought that they would retain the original use. However, 
as time passed by they seemed uncertain about the course of action. This came about as 
complications were faced through the funding process. Initially they wanted to repair the 
building, but the problem was the scope of repairs. The initial DSR was approved by 
FEMA and the SHPO, with conditions regarding the use of SHBC and the Standards. 
However, SFUSD disagreed with that DSR, as it did not encompass all their needed 
repairs. SFUSD wanted to strengthen the building but FEMA did not allocate funds for 
that. A new DSR was approved in the second quarter of 1991, but until the end of that 
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year SFUSD was stating that the building lost most of its strength to resist earthquakes 
and needed strengthening.  
In the last quarter of 1991, FEMA indicated that the cost of the suggested repair 
work would exceed 50% of the cost of replacing the building, thus FEMA would not 
fund its repair but, instead, would fund its replacement12. This did not mean that SFUSD 
had to demolish the building; it just meant that the funding would be on the basis of 
replacement. That funding amount was less than what SFUSD needed for repairing the 
building to functionality and upgrading it to required code level. At the same time, 
analysis of the seismic upgrades that were required by current building codes showed 
that high cost would be incurred and thus it was deemed not feasible. 
Early in 1991, FEMA transmitted SFUSD’s funding appeal to the SHPO, 
explaining that FEMA would not approve the cost of restoration but replacement, and 
requesting SHPO’s comments as per Section 106 requirements. In the middle of 1991, 
FEMA determined that the entire complex is eligible for the National Register. 
According to FEMA, there was no local standard that required restoration, noting 
that SFUSD can also have it as an Improved Project13. Thus, demolition was proposed to 
SFUSD as a feasible solution. However, the Improved Project status would bring to 
SFUSD less funding than they needed. 
SFUSD was in a position where 170 Fell St. and the Auditorium buildings 
needed upgrading to code in many aspects, but FEMA rejected funding such upgrades or 
repairs. At the same time the SHPO would not consent for them to demolish 170 Fell St. 
as it can be repaired.  
According to SFUSD’s attorney (Letter from Barkley, Attorney at law, to 
Interested Parties, Section 106 Process. Dec 14, 1996), because FEMA funding is based 
on the prior use of the building, SFUSD focused on keeping that function. Thus, all 
repair studies at that time were based on the assumption that the buildings should 
continue to be used as offices. They admit that “large sums of money” were put in these 
studies. This indicates how lack of information by owner can increase expenses and 
create delays.  
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There are no further documents available of that issue, but it can be concluded 
that FEMA was consulting with SFUSD about their options.  
2. Waiting, studies, and reports, 1991-1994 
By the end of 1991, SFUSD requested an “Alternate Project” status. As such, 
they could use the repair money for the construction of two elementary schools. 
Combined, the schools would cost $14+ million to construct. In response to that request, 
FEMA informed SFUSD that the 170 Fell St. was eligible for the National Register, thus 
subject to Section 106 review. Also, the new cost estimates showed that the cost of 
replacement was more than FEMA’s previous estimate. Because it was less than 50%, 
FEMA would not pay for demolition or replacement. The letter did not say what would 
become of 170 Fell St., but letters from subsequent dates indicate an intent to demolish 
it. The buildings at 135 Van Ness Ave. did not seem to be under discussion. The only 
severe damage in that part of the complex was in the gymnasium.  
In 1993 FEMA requested that SFUSD submits a status report commenting on the 
case and cost issues for 170 Fell St., so that FEMA could make a fair funding decision. 
That report was delayed as the position of Facilities Director in SFUSD was vacant for a 
year, and then occupied only briefly (1992-1993).  SFUSD requested time extensions to 
1994.  
In 1995, FEMA approved the SFUSD cost estimates of $9+ million, which 
included repairs, hazardous material abatement, and seismic upgrade to section 104 (f) 
of the City code, in addition to upgrades to other codes (i.e. life safety and handicap 
access).  
The correspondence available in the SHPO files, and the DSRs from this time 
period indicate two activities: 
1. Several studies by professional consultants were under way to assess the strength 
of the buildings in the complex, and to identify the detailed needs of repair. A 
new architectural consultant was brought in and the report indicated that the 
objective was to find a more feasible alternative for the repair and reuse of the 
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gymnasium in 135 Van Ness Ave. The available DSRs show approval of 
payments for professional studies. 
2. Letters show that SFUSD prepared a bond issue proposal in 1993 to cover 
several costs related to school construction and upgrades. The bond issue was 
approved in 1994.  The bond included estimated costs for several school projects, 
including a School of The Arts (SOTA). SOTA already existed in a building that 
was no longer able to satisfy the educational needs of the growing number of 
students. 
According to a letter from the attorney (A Letter from Barkley, Attorney at law, 
to Interested Parties, Section 106 Process. Dec 14, 1996), the idea of using the complex 
for SOTA was first raised publicly in 1990 by a local artist in an awards ceremony 
honoring her. She and her husband were also actively involved in teaching arts in San 
Francisco and with the SFUSD. There was a general support for the idea, as shown by 
the public hearing about it later in 1998. People felt that that is the best location for 
SOTA because of its proximity to many art centers such as the Opera House and Davis 
Symphony Hall (among other buildings). SFUSD studies indicated that FEMA funding 
alone could not cover the cost, so they presented the bond issue to cover the construction 
and renovation of seven schools, among which was SOTA. SFUSD allocated around $10 
million towards SOTA, anticipating that they would be obtaining funds from FEMA for 
the damage repairs in 135 Van Ness Ave. and 170 Fell St.. Thus the total SOTA cost 
was expected to be around $23 M. 
According to the draft Environmental Impact Report (SFUSD,1997), SOTA 
already existed in another building, which was needed as an elementary school for that 
neighborhood. Thus, supporters for the idea of relocating SOTA were not only parents of 
the students who attended SOTA and needed a new improved facility, but also parents of 
children who could attend the new school once SOTA was moved. 
In November 1994, many architectural firms submitted responses for the Request 
For Proposals, which specified renovation of 170 Fell St. and 135 Van Ness Ave. as the 
new SOTA. In the same period, SFUSD had meetings with FEMA and SHPO and 
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pointed out that they no longer want to demolish 170 Fell St. but they would be 
renovating the complex to become a K-12 school for the arts. As such, the new proposal 
would be an Improved Project under FEMA regulations. The funding would be used to 
improve the status of buildings and not only to repair them. However, FEMA would 
only cover 75% of the estimated costs of repair and SFUSD should cover the rest.  This 
meeting happened after SFUSD made many arrangements for the new SOTA.  
3. School of the Arts 
a. Before Section 106 (1994-1996) 
The project architect was chosen in March 1995, and work started on the 
schematics for SOTA. SFUSD also hired an Arts Education consultant, who in their 
earliest meetings, and before the studies for the building were completed, declared that 
achieving the SOTA vision would not be possible unless the building at 170 Fell St. was 
demolished (Gordon Chong + Associates, December 14, 1995).  
According to SFUSD, the architects started working on the project in March 
1995, and by June 1995 it was clear to them that the SOTA program, as envisioned by 
SFUSD, would not fit into the spaces of the existing complex. However, historic 
preservationists and architects argue that this finding resulted because the program was  
based on the assumption that there would be a new building.  
The proposed SOTA program had two phases. Phase I: renovation of 135 Van 
Ness Ave., and Phase II: developing a program for the Fell St. site. It is noteworthy that 
even the proposal indicates the intention of not renovating the Fell St. building. 
According to their attorney, SFUSD was not comfortable with having a vacant damaged 
building on the same site with an operating school, so they decided that demolishing the 
Fell St. building would be better than keeping it for later use (A. Barkley, Letter to 
Interested Parties, Section 106 Process. December 14, 1996). 
In July 1995, SFUSD officially notified the State Office of Emergency Services 
(OES) of their intent to demolish 170 Fell St. by June-Sept 1996 and applied for an 
Alternate Project. In September of 1995 the Board of SFUSD passed a resolution to 
demolish 170 Fell St. (A. Barkley, Letter to Interested Parties, Section 106 Process. 
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December 14, 1996). This was taking place without any coordination or consultation 
with the SHPO about the matter, unlike the first stage, in which the SHPO was being 
informed of the intent and progress of the project. 
In September of 1995, the 170 Fell St. building was occupied by homeless 
groups. This action was part of an activists’ protest supporting the homeless in San 
Francisco. Their objective was to draw attention to the availability of space for solving 
the housing problem. 
By the end of 1995, a state bond provided SFUSD with more funding for the 
SOTA.  Meeting minutes of the time for SFUSD’s consultants indicate they were taking 
into account that FEMA funding regulations had changed after the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake, and that the new bond money could help in covering cost because FEMA 
coverage might be less than anticipated. 
Based on the letters and minutes, it seems to have been the culture of SFUSD’s 
institution to make decisions alone. They later pointed out that they needed approval 
only from the State Architect, not the City (SFUSD, 2000). SFUSD justified the 
demolition decision by proposing that they wanted the school design to be program 
driven, not forced it into an existing space. To further indicate SFUSD’s confidence in 
their decision, they authorized the architect to proceed with a design for a new building 
at 170 Fell St. in Sept. 1995 (A. Barkley, Letter to Interested Parties, Section 106 
Process. December 14, 1996), before there was any approval for such a project by 
FEMA and before the Section 106 consultation on the proposed project was initiated. In 
December 6, 1995, the SHPO sent a letter to SFUSD reminding them that there were 
historically significant buildings under their stewardship, but this letter does not seem to 
have had an effect on SFUSD’s plans.  
Meanwhile, the Arts Education consultant conducted intensive focus groups with 
teachers, students, parents, and arts providers to develop an arts education plan for 
SOTA. The meeting minutes indicate that the consultant on several occasions in 1995 
and 1996 said that for the SOTA vision to succeed, 170 Fell St. had to be demolished.  
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The architect worked with a historic preservation consultant on plans for 
rehabilitating 135 Van Ness Ave., taking into account the Standards, the SHBC, and 
other issues of preservation. 135 Van Ness Ave. did not seem to pose problems to 
SFUSD. That may be a result of having less damage, and, consequently greater 
functionality after the earthquake. The argument SFUSD presented was that the program 
could not fit into the existing complex as they had large spaces that needed to be 
constructed anew. Thus, demolishing 170 Fell St. was not necessarily due to the building 
itself, but rather to the fact that one of the two buildings had to be demolished to make 
room for the large spaces they needed. Since 170 Fell St. was more damaged, and 
requires extensive seismic strengthening, it was chosen to be demolished.  
By mid-1996, the program and schematic designs were ready, after which 
SFUSD determined that an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) was required under the 
California Environmental Equality Act (CEQA)14. Also, SFUSD instructed the architect 
to “investigate alternatives” for demolition of the 170 Fell St. building, as required for 
the EIR. A few months later they informed SHPO that 170 Fell St. could not be 
economically rehabilitated as a school and that they were trying to investigate if the 
building could be economically rehabilitated for any other use.  
The alternative costs of the project were mentioned in a letter from SFUSD’s 
historic preservation consultant to the EIR consultant. The cost estimates for different 
options were:  use as offices: $10.8 million, use as a school $13.7 million, replacement 
of the building: $10.8 to $12 million (Page & Turnbull, October 1996a).  So the cost 
difference in the work on 170 Fell St. was $ 1-3 million, which could not be compared to 
the cost now, estimated to be about $100 M (Irons, letter to OES, 2003). This is an 
important indicator of how project delays result in cost increases. 
 
b. 1996-mid-1998  Section 106  
Once SFUSD formally submitted their SOTA proposal to FEMA in November 
1996, the Section 106 process formally started with the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation (ACHP), San Francisco Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board (LPAB), 
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OES, FEMA, SHPO, SFUSD, and Heritage. The meetings included many deliberations 
on the options available to SFUSD to save the buildings. Yet, it was soon obvious that 
the solutions being presented by the attending professionals were not adopted by 
SFUSD. The district had a strong conviction that SOTA would not be successful if the 
170 Fell St. building was reused. The consultation reached a dead end by the end of the 
1996 as no agreement was made about the building.  
The proposed project at that point was: demolition of 170 Fell St., construction of 
a new building to replace 170 Fell St. of the same floor area, and the adaptive reuse of 
135 Van Ness Ave., which includes the Academic, Gymnasium, and Library wings. In 
addition, the project would rehabilitate the 135 Van Ness Ave. Auditorium wing, also 
known as Nourse Auditorium.  
The Historic Structure Report (Page & Turnbull, 1996a) points out that 170 Fell 
St. is a City of San Francisco Landmark, in addition to being part of the Civic Center 
National Historic District. It clarifies that removal of the 170 Fell St building would have 
a detrimental effect on the landmark status of the complex and that its architectural 
integrity would be affected, thus the eligibility of the complex for the National Register 
of Historic Places would be changed. Still, SFUSD was convinced that 170 Fell St. 
building was not of significance. 
During the consultation process, in December 1996, the San Francisco Mayor 
tried to intervene. A memo in the SHPO’s office (December 16, 1996) documents a 
phone call from the Mayor’s office saying that the Mayor wants the SOTA project to 
happen, “historic preservationists should not stop it”, and their requirements are 
“unreasonable”. The individual who received the call explained the process. Apparently, 
the Mayor’s office was not aware of the Section 106 requirement of the federal law. This 
incident is interesting, as it not only indicates political effects on the recovery process 
and the preservation of historic buildings after disasters, but also the lack of knowledge 
among decision makers of the importance of cultural heritage and the laws and 
regulations that are set for managing it. Also, it shows the important role Section 106 has 
in the protection of cultural heritage. 
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Memos in the SHPO’s office indicate that during the consultation process, there 
were many suggestions on how the suggested SOTA program could fit into the existing 
buildings. The sessions were active in the sense that professionals provided sketches for 
SFUSD’s consultants suggesting solutions for the issues preventing the reuse of 170 Fell 
St. Also, preservationists provided a lot of compromise in the preservation of the interior 
spaces in order to allow for maximum accommodation of the new spaces and save the 
building. Interestingly, the suggestions of the preservationists were taken by the 
consultants for further development. The consultant’s approach was to remove columns 
from spaces that needed large area, thus increasing the cost of the new proposal. The 
preservationists, however, stated that the proposal could be done at less expense. Among 
the main issues was the program itself, which the preservationists criticized15 and 
SFUSD upheld as encompassing of their vision for SOTA. 
In April 1997, FEMA approved the project pending completion of environmental 
and Section 106 historic review. The initial total estimated cost of SOTA was $40 M, 
anticipating $10 million  from FEMA for 170 Fell St. (for demolition and replacement 
building), $2+ million from FEMA for 135 Van Ness Ave. repair, and $24-27 million 
from school bonds approved by voters in 1994-1996. FEMA approved the DSR cost and 
established a 75% FEMA funding cap, as required for an Alternate Project. 
By the end of 1997, the draft EIR was published for public comment (SFUSD, 
1997). It suggested 1998 as the year to start demolition and construction work, to be 
finished in 2000 with a budget of $46 million. It identified funding sources as FEMA 
(for the amount of $14 million), and bond issues for $32 million. This was not supported 
by the SHPO who commented that the Section 106 process was not finished yet and 
FEMA might still not approve that project.  
The draft EIR attracted comments form the SHPO and preservationists. There 
were many concerns over what the draft implied. Comments were accepted from Dec. 1, 
1997 to Jan. 19, 1998, and there were public hearings in February of 1998 about the draft 
report. The main comments accused SFUSD of inflating the costs for the option that 
preserved the 170 Fell St. building, intentionally not mentioning the significance of that 
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building, not appreciating the cultural or historic aspects of the building, assuming the 
amount of FEMA funds to be granted, not taking Section 106 seriously, and using the 
EIR to justify the demolition decision. The draft EIR was accused of being not accurate, 
complete or objective, among many other comments on architectural and planning 
aspects (SFUSD, 2000).  
Other comments came from the public who were worried about the school itself. 
Many parents were talking about the need for SOTA and urged SFUSD to work these 
problems out and get the project underway. However, the EIR and the responses SFUSD 
provided to the comments presented the issue with incomplete information. An image 
for the proposed project showed that the project would work if 170 Fell St. was 
demolished. This put the preservationists into a defensive mode in one of the meetings, 
and they had to clarify the importance of historic preservation. 
4. Revised Improved Project mid 1998-1999 
It was clear that the consultation process was stalled. In 1998, FEMA advised 
SFUSD to submit another request for a Revised Improved Project. SFUSD was planning 
to buy and relocate to a new building. The proposal was to earmark the money allocated 
to relocate SFUSD staff to a new building for the SOTA, while FEMA funds would be 
used for the move to the new office building. The project was approved in a letter dated 
Sept. 27, 1999. A total of $15+ million was approved for the complex.  
SFUSD applied for the Revised Improved Project at the end of 1998, and the 
decision on the project was only finalized in March 2000 when the Section 106 process 
was complete. 
During that time, a new elected board came to SFUSD and the approach to the 
project completely changed. They provided presentations in public hearings to the 
LPAB, which clarified the earmark of the FEMA money for SOTA, that the 170 Fell St. 
building would be mothballed awaiting funds to fully rehabilitate it, and that they would 
not demolish 170 Fell St. as long as it could “feasibly” be repaired. 
This phase ends with the signing of the PA. According to the Section 106 PA, 
SFUSD had two years to develop an alternative for the use of the buildings, would 
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provide public hearings and presentations before the LPAB, and allow for interested 
groups and individuals to comment.  
In 2000, SFUSD made their final resolution about the EIR. The resolution 
adopted an option that keeps 170 Fell St. and allows for adding a new two-story building 
on the site to accommodate any spaces that could not fit in any of the existing buildings. 
On the basis that they did not have sufficient funding, the renovation of the complex was 
planned to be implemented in three phases, starting with 135 Van Ness Ave., then the 
auditorium, (with or without the two story building), and finally 170 Fell St. (with or 
without the two story bldg). According to the chosen option; 135 Van Ness Ave. would 
be rehabilitated, 170 Fell St. would be strengthened, and a new two-story building would 
be constructed between 170 Fell St. and the auditorium. 170 Fell St. would remain 
“mothballed”16 until SFUSD obtained funds to renovate it. Also, indicating the new 
attitude of the new board, the new resolution acknowledges the historical significance of 
170 Fell St.  
This time is tinted by confusion over what happened to the SOTA project. A 
letter from Eureka (Eureka Valley Trails & Art Network, letter to FEMA, April 19, 
1999.), an art foundation in San Francisco headed by the same artist who suggested the 
project, was sent to FEMA and to all parties involved in the consultation process. They 
said that FEMA money was supposed to go for SOTA, and that that was the resolution 
that the former SFUSD board made. They also said that the new board should respect the 
earlier plan by keeping the money and using it for SOTA. Later, there were several 
presentations for the public held at LPAB that explained the new plan. The minutes of 
the last meeting of the SOTA task force (August 10, 1999), states that the SOTA project 
would start in two years, that for two years the buildings would be used by SFUSD to 
save funds on rent, and that SOTA would stay in its current place for three years. By the 
end of the three years, the complex on Van Ness Ave. and Fell St. would be ready for 
them to move in.  
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The PA was implemented in January 2000 and provided SFUSD two years to 
develop a plan and provide public presentations on their intentions regarding the 
complex’s future. However, they did not follow through on this commitment. 
5. 2001-2003 Deterioration by neglect 
After the PA was signed, little was done on the project. Available letters indicate 
that early in 2001, about 95% of the SOTA plans were done. On the other hand, towards 
the end of 2001, the homeless, again, broke into the building. For a time SFUSD was 
without a Facilities Manager, which left the project without attention. 
In December 2001, there was an informational presentation about the complex 
for LPAB (LPAB, December 19, 2001).  Some of the public pointed out that it was 
wrong to use the SOTA money for a new office building for SFUSD, as that meant the 
administrators are more important than the children.  LPAB members were trying to 
understand where the project stood. The new Facilities Manager was not sure of the 
details and was under the impression that all funds were spent. He was not aware of the 
special bank account for the project which still had the money. However, members of 
LPAB were frustrated about being told different things in the past by other SFUSD 
representatives. They pointed out that they were given assurance that SOTA would 
happen and that Fell St. building would be rehabilitated, neither of which had happened.  
The presentation is important in that it reveals many issues. LPAB was told 
different things by various SFUSD staff and but had no jurisdiction over the outcome. 
LPAB expressed concern about the accountability of former employees who presented 
information that was not true and about SFUSD for leaving the buildings to deteriorate. 
The public attending the meeting, especially parents of students, also expressed anger 
and frustration over the project’s turnout. 
In February of 2002, SHPO sent a letter to FEMA pointing out that SFUSD was 
compromising the building’s historic integrity through neglect, that SFUSD did not do 
what was required by the PA, and that it was obvious that the repairs of the buildings 
would not be cost-effective anymore. It seemed that that was the intention of SFUSD. 
The SHPO pointed out in a memo in 2002: “there is a mountain of evidence in the public 
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record that indicates that the SFUSD’s desire to demolish this building accounts for the 
history of neglect”. As such, maintaining a historic property could not be successful by 
postponing action (mothballing), especially if the buildings were mothballed while they 
were damaged. 
The required mothballing covered protection from pests, proper ventilation, 
securing the building, and removing hazardous materials from the building (i.e. 
asbestos). The SHPO’s letter led FEMA to follow up on the project, leading SFUSD to 
start the required procedures. Mothballing was not performed until November 2002. 
Since SFUSD was not in conformance with the PA, FEMA could have cancelled it and 
required SFUSD to repay the $15+ million they were given. However, memos show that 
FEMA, SHPO, and OES were aware that SFUSD could not pay back the funds. Thus, 
they pushed SFUSD to comply with the requirements of the PA: mainly mothballing and 
the public presentations. In December 2002, SFUSD was given until Feb 2003 to 
complete all these tasks. However, SFUSD still had no concrete plan for the future of the 
buildings. 
The final documents related to the building indicate that SFUSD finished the 
tasks required by the PA in 2003, but later than the initial agreement. A visit to the site 
showed that the 170 Fell St. Building was still mothballed and that 135 Van Ness Ave. 
Building was being used as offices. There are no indications of progress on the SOTA 
project. 
Variables Affecting the Recovery 
Context 
1. The context’s main effects were: 
a. Regulations and laws:  Requirements of Section 106 and CEQA made a 
difference in the project outcome. 
b. Local educational needs: Needs of schools and students for more space 
and a specialized arts school. This set SFUSD’s priorities. 
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c. Political support. SFUSD had the support of the Mayor, and that might 
have had an effect on their attitude towards Section 106 consultation. 
d. Administrative hierarchy: SFUSD is not accountable to the local 
government.  
Players  
1. Owner’s internal issues: 
a. Instability of staff. Director of facilities kept changing, which delayed the 
project and created confusion. 
b. Change of leadership. The change of the board led to a more flexible 
approach. 
2. Attitude: 
a. Early position on demolition reveals attitude about the historic building:  
Even before the final documents and studies for SOTA were done, parties 
in the professional group claimed that for SOTA to succeed, 170 Fell St. 
had to be demolished.  
b. Compliance with PA. The SFUSD was not in compliance and allowed the 
building to deteriorate. 
c. Public participation is just a formality:  SFUSD did not take it seriously in 
their own meetings or in the Section 106 meetings. “Resolution will be 
approved after a public hearing” appears many times in their letters. 
Public hearings and meetings are just paperwork they have to go through. 
Section 106 was considered a political problem, not a process for 
developing better alternatives. 
d. Lack of compromise or cooperation from owner, even after historic 
preservationists provided compromise on the adaptation of interior 
spaces. SFUSD insisted that they had a specific vision for the SOTA. 
e. Perception of buildings’ ability to accommodate the new functions. 
SFUSD was not demolishing the gymnasium or auditorium even though 
they were severely damaged, and even though they might be hard to 
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reconfigure to accommodate a new function. There was a perception that 
a new building had to be built, and thus a building had to be removed. 
The attorney’s letter (Dec 1996) referred to this in passing. 
3. Stewardship: A public agency that is a steward of a complex eligible for the 
National Register does not understand what that implies, as being entrusted with 
cultural property of future generations.  
Process  
1. Complications of applications and process:  
a. FEMA initially pushed for building replacement funding (i.e. demolition), 
as requested by FEMA program, because restoration appeared to be more 
expensive than replacement. FEMA would not approve funding for any 
retrofitting stating that local code does not require it. 
b. Red tag understood as a demolition recommendation.  
c. Application process needs specialized people to manage it. 
2. Lack of early consultation with SHPO: in 1995 the board of SFUSD, after a 
public hearing, decided to demolish 170 Fell St. without consulting with 
SHPO.  
3. Perceptions of values. The complex has aesthetic, historic, cultural, educational, 
functional, residential, and civic values. But there was no process for 
communicating the values among all stakeholders effectively. The homeless 
were one group that tried to indicate the value of the building to them, 
without having voice in the process. Parents were also frustrated for the lack 
of power over the outcome and LPAB voiced their concern several times. 
4. Deferring repairs: mothballing led to postponing needed repairs and now the cost 
is much higher. 
5. Project management: 
a. Too much change of consultants. Consultants were replaced many times 
during the project sometimes doing the same work. 
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b. Late decision: The decision about what to do with the building came only 
in late 1995. 
6. Effect of professional services:  
a. The program was developed based on preconceived assumptions that 
affected the development of the entire project.  
b. The perception that some of the consultants had of the viability of 
keeping the building may have affected SFUSD’s decisions. 
7. Significance of building: The significance of the 170 Fell St. building remained 
contested until the very last EIR meeting. 
8. Insufficient funding: SFUSD needed bonds to cover expenses, thus they issued 
bonds based on cost estimates and got them approved. However, the owner 
still lacked funding. 
Building 
1. Serious damage. 
2. Strengthening and code upgrades requirements increased cost. 
3. Needed to modify building spaces to adopt the new function 
4. The type of intended occupation, schools, has special code requirements. 
5. Location of building, determined it as best suitable for a school of the arts.  
Historic Character and Integrity of Fabric 
There were many times during the progress of the project where issues related to 
maintaining the historic character or integrity appeared. However, the issue soon became 
about the maintenance of the cultural resource itself. 
During the early years of the project, no issues surfaced in the correspondences 
despite the ongoing work of repairing the buildings. The consultant’s letters indicated an 
understanding of the importance of the integrity of fabric. It may be due to the limited 
effect of the planned repairs as no major rehabilitation work was being done. 
Also, it was constructive that the SHPO provided guidance early in the project. 
Letters of consent about repair work referenced important codes and standards. Thus, 
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although many perceive the problem to be that of ignorance of required codes and 
standards, the problem may be the unwillingness to follow such codes and standards. 
One suggested explanation would be that owners are used to negotiating required city 
codes and thus they expected that negotiating standards related to historic buildings 
would also work. This indicates the importance of the organizational culture of SFUSD. 
And it also explains why, in one early meeting for planning the SOTA project, the 
project team anticipated that the demolition of 170 Fell St. would not be easy and 
referred to it as “a political problem”. 
The issues that were raised were in relation to the following: 
1. Strengthening requirements. SFUSD had proposed shear walls but was asked 
to investigate an alternate theme as it would have an effect on the historic 
character of interior gymnasium spaces. 
2. Demolition of 170 Fell St. This was related to:  
- Initial indifference to the importance of historic buildings. In one of the 
earliest meetings, the art director responsible for developing an art 
education plan for SOTA stated that the objective is “to create a center for 
the arts education for the entire district, and the 170 Fell building (i.e. a 
new building) is essential to this ultimate purpose. The effort to demolish 
170 Fell, therefore, impacts the ultimate vision directly and its resolution 
may mitigate the success of the project”. This idea was introduced by the 
art consultant and thus created a perception that if 170 Fell St. remained, 
the project would not succeed. Also, in one of the early Section 106 
meetings, one of the consultants referred to the use of historic buildings for 
schools as a form of “child abuse”, which was not well received by the 
attendees (memo, SHPO, December 20, 1996). 
- Perception of significance. SFUSD disputed the significance of 170 Fell 
St. several times. Their understanding was based on the application for the 
National Register of Historic Places. They point out that under the 
Description section of 170 Fell St.: “It is curious that such a talented 
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architect as Reid did not redesign the older structure, incorporating it more 
gracefully in the new complex. But a search through the School District’s 
archives uncovered no information to the contrary. Instead, the new 
complex, in spite of its value as part of the “Golden Age” of San Francisco 
school construction, provided clumsy and unattractive connections to the 
older building, which are lacking in skill, grace, or respectful articulation 
or even sympathetic materials or colors” (Irons, 2002: 3). This indicates 
how early assessments of significance are considered by some professionals 
to be the final assessments. Such an assessment does not mean that 170 Fell 
St. is not important. It is still significant as part of the development of the 
site, as part of the school, and as an example of its own age. 
In 1981, the San Francisco LPAB designated the building a Landmark 
rated 2 in the 1976 Department of Public Works Architectural Inventory 
scale. SFUSD presents the information focusing on how little is mentioned of 
the 170 Fell St. St building. They also mention that on the application for the 
National Register of Historic Places, designation of the entire site “was 
sought to provide the Landmarks Board with an opportunity to review 
designs for a replacement structure for the older building, thus assuring its 
compatibility with the newer building” (Irons, 2002: 3).     
But SFUSD fail to mention that Reid, Jr. was the one responsible for 
moving 170 Fell St. to its present location, that he designed the facade of the 
building for its present site, and later became the architect for 135 Van Ness 
Ave. (G. Bland Platt, comment, SFUSD, 2000: 7-7). SFUSD’s rejection of 
the building’s significance is apparent also as the EIR does not mention that 
170 Fell St. is significant, while it mentions that 135 Van Ness Ave. is a City 
Landmark. This indicates how SFUSD could not see the cultural or historic 
value of the complex. On the other hand, the public, who had interest in the 
educational value of the complex, could not voice that concern through the 
Section 106 process. It is only through the EIR public hearings that that value 
   
 
  109
 
could be identified. It can be argued that SFUSD, as a public entity, 
represents the parent of the students in Section 106.  This indicates that 
sometimes such assumptions are not true.  
According to the PA (2000), which was signed and approved by 
SFUSD, the buildings were collectively listed as San Francisco City 
Landmark No. 140, and were both determined eligible for the National 
Register and listed as “contributory” to  the City of San Francisco Civic 
Center National Historic District. And the area for Potential Effects, for the 
purpose of the EIR, is the entire District. Yet,  SFUSD continued to affirm in 
their presentations, letters, and reports, that 170 Fell St. is not significant in 
spite of the fact that their historic preservation consultant pointed out in their 
Historic Structure Report that the building’s demolition would affect the 
value of the entire complex and that it is highly significant. 
This aspect is significant as it reflects how many professionals and 
owners do not understand that lists are not the final determinants on what is 
significant, and that heritage value is dynamic. Thus older reports that failed 
to identify the significance of a building do not revoke that significance. This 
also stresses the importance of having a new assessment with every study for 
an EIR or a Section 106 process, as it not only provide for new assessments, 
but also would identify new values for buildings.  
3.  SFUSD compromised the building’s historic integrity through neglect, which 
was significant in the last phase of the project. Repair of the buildings would 
not be cost-effective in time. As such, maintaining historic property may not 
be successful through postponing action (mothballing), especially if they are 
mothballed while damaged and not usable. Mothballing seems to be a 
bureaucratic solution for unresolved conflicts, which suggests that a conflict 
management approach is needed. 
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Public Participation 
Participation in this project was essential and made a difference in the outcome.  
Opportunities for participation were mainly through: 
1. Section 106 consultation, which provided the interested public an opportunity 
to participate in consultations on the project in an attempt to provide a 
solution that would be acceptable to all parties.  
2. EIR public hearings requirement. CEQA and NEPA require the preparation 
of an EIR, and for that report to be available for the public. It requires that the 
public be afforded a chance for making written and verbal comments and that 
those comment are included in the EIR. Initially, 45 days were provided; then 
it was extended to a 70 day review for the EIR, followed by a public hearing. 
People were also able to submit their comments in writing during the hearing. 
3. The involvement of the public through public hearings before the LPAB, 
which is a body with advisory status for the planning commission. Presenting 
a project before the LPAB allows for representatives of the public to 
comment and to provide recommendations about it.  
Thus, the participation process took place because of laws on three levels of 
government.  
The documents had different aspects of participation issues: 
1. Time of participation: All forms of participation took place after decisions 
were made. SHPO pointed out in their comments that SFUSD’s consultation with the 
SHPO (Section 106) should take place early in the planning stages so that there would be 
a wide range of alternatives open for consideration and that SFUSD did not seek such 
consultation early enough. SFUSD did not approach the 106 process as a consultation 
process that would help them reach a satisfactory solution for all parties. Instead, it 
approached the consultation with a specific decision already made and as a bureaucratic 
step towards getting FEMA funds.  What is important here is that SFUSD had control of 
the timing of participation after they developed the project. The participation here is that 
of comment making, not necessarily being part of the decision making.  
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2. Effectiveness of participation: The existing process provided interested parties 
an opportunity to make their concerns public and to halt the demolition of a cultural 
resource. The significance of this is even apparent after the Mayor tried to intervene. The 
Mayor’s attempt to halt the intervention of historic preservationists was only stopped 
because Section 106 is a federal requirement.  
When considering the effect of both the public hearings (for the ERI) and the 106 
consultations. EIR only required for public opinion to be presented; but the public had 
no power. Section 106 does not provide real power to the public or the SHPO, but it 
requires that options be investigated, the SHPO be given sufficient opportunity to 
comment on the project, and the public be involved. The dynamics of the consultation 
requires that Section 106 be complete before the funding is approved. 
The importance of Section 106 is better clarified when considering that SFUSD 
made it clear that the project does not fall under the authority of the LPAB, and that 
SFUSD made two presentations as a courtesy to LPAB17. Thus, the local government, as 
representative of the people had no power over SFUSD in that respect. And members of 
the LPAB, in their comments on the EIR, were shocked that this would happen in spite 
of the bond measures that were approved by the City and paid for by San Francisco 
citizens.   
Section 106 provides participation for the public who are interested in preserving 
the historic property. It’s a process that does not necessarily provide open participation. 
On the other hand, the EIR public hearings are open to the general public, and different 
points of views are expressed there. However, the effectiveness of any of these 
participatory elements is limited. It is subject to the context of participation. As shown in 
Table (9), all the participation opportunity provided the public with limited powers. The 
public had the power to comment, but not to be part of the decision-making process. 
This is more critical in the Section 106 process, which did not incorporate members of 
the public. Section 106 was mainly to allow for the preservation of the historic and 
cultural values of the buildings as they are identified by the historic preservation 
community. The value that he public had for the building, mainly as an educational 
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facility, is only documented in the public hearings fort the EIR. As such, Section 106 did 
not work as a public participation tool.  
 
Table 9 Levels of participation in the case study. 
 WHO HOW RESULT WHEN REGULATORY LEVEL 
EIR General public 
Public hearing 
to be part of 
final EIR 
Documentation 
of opinion 
After all 
project 
studies is 
done 
State and 
federal levels
Section 
106 
Parties interested 
or invited Consultation 
Development of 
new solution 
During 
project 
development 
Federal 
LPAB General public 
Presentation 
and public 
hearing 
Recommendation 
of LPAB to the 
planning 
commission: 
approval or not 
Just before 
Implementati
on (permits) 
Local 
SFUSD General public Public hearing 
Adoption of 
resolution by the 
board 
After studies 
are done Local 
 
 
3. Which public? The public hearings for the EIR showed many responses. Two 
main perspectives were presented: those who wanted SOTA to materialize and were 
confused because of the delays, and those who did not want any demolition to take 
place. These two values were present in most of the public hearings. The LPAB public 
hearings also identified the value of the building as part of the civic cultural heritage of 
the city and an important part of the urban fabric.  
Those interested in SOTA were mainly parents of students. Their concern was 
over the delay in the project. The information presented in the EIR was not accurate. The 
report failed to mention many points about the significance of the 170 Fell St. building. 
Also, it presented the project as if the historic preservation element was a hindrance for 
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its progress. This made historic preservationists defensive during one of the meetings as 
they had to explain why historic preservation is important. 
What is significant here is the fact that the public had no power to influence the 
outcome. They were given many promises in many public hearings, yet the project did 
not proceed. This concern was voiced during the last public hearings in 2003. This also 
applies to LPAB, who voiced concern over the progress of the project and sent letters to 
the SFUSD, but had no jurisdiction over the outcome. This is a result of the level of 
public participation provided, since it provided the public with a chance to voice their 
concerns only. The decision-making power was in the hands SFUSD mainly, but the 
funding process, through Section 106, provided temporary indirect powers for the 
historic preservation community, which helped save the 170 Fell St. building from 
demolition. Sine literature stresses the importance of having the public as partners in the 
decision making process. This outcome of the project led to isolating the building, which 
is part of the built heritage of San Francisco, from the people. This is not in accordance 
with principles of sustainability. 
Case Study 3: The Geary Theater 
Initially built as the Columbia Theater and Annex, the building permits date to 
1909, and the building was opened in 1910. It was built as a cultural center for San 
Francisco in the reconstruction period after the 1906 earthquake and fire. The building 
was constructed as one of the early theaters to replace the theaters lost in the fire. The 
name: Columbia, was taken from the original Columbia theater lost in the fire, which the 
new building was to replace as a state-of-the-art building. The owners, Gottlob and 
Marx, wanted to make it a showpiece of their operation. They organized performances 
for nationally and internationally acclaimed performers. In 1924 it was briefly renamed 
as the Wilkes and the Lurie, but in 1928 it became the Geary Theater. 
The building is significant because of the detailed elaborate architectural design 
and ornamentation both inside and outside, consistency of use and remarkable state of 
preservation (it had minimal changes over the years), and because of its role in the 
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service and development of the cultural and artistic life in San Francisco.  The Historic 
Structure Report points out that the Geary is not only significant because of the building, 
but also because of the American Conservatory Theater (ACT) as an important 
professional theater in San Francisco that fostered quality performances over time.  
ACT, the owner and manager, was founded in 1965 as a non-profit organization 
interested in theater and education. They provide nine plays each year (according to their 
application for a mitigation grant), and they are the only organization as such that is 
accredited for providing a Masters of Fine Arts degree. They have many other 
educational activities with different age groups in the Bay area. ACT bought the Geary 
Theater in 1975 yet they had been performing there since 1967.  
In 1975, five months after it was transferred to ACT ownership, the Geary was 
officially listed on the National Register of Historic Places. And in 1976 the Geary 
officially became a designated Landmark of the City of San Francisco. 
According to the historic report, the areas of significance are the Geary Street 
façade, the auditorium, and the main lobby. On the other hand, the annex is not 
considered significant and its only element of significance is the Mason Street façade. 
The building is assumed to have been added on at a later date to provide the much 
needed service spaces (Page and Turnbull, May 1992). 
It is noteworthy that according to a FEMA DSR, the Geary was constructed in 
1912 and is listed as appearing eligible for the National Register as part of an Historic 
District #4101-0675-0355. This differs from the Historic Structure Report. 
The Geary is a building of two parts: the theater and the annex. The theater is the 
main building and has a dumbbell shape. It is a steel frame structure that supports 
reinforced concrete floor and roof slabs. It has concrete exterior walls on the rear and the 
sides, in addition to the proscenium wall. The front wall that faces Geary Street is steel 
frame and unreinforced masonry infill, and it has cast-stone and terra cotta 
ornamentation.  
The building was constructed in the Neo-Classical style with Corinthian columns 
framing high arched windows on the front façade. Elaborate four-color terra cotta has 
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Baroque spiral columns around the windows, with images from classical Greek 
mythology symbolizing the origins of drama. The architects were Bliss and Faville, one 
of the prominent architectural firms in the city at the time of construction. 
The annex, which is attached to the stage part of the theater building, is 
rectangular in shape and almost half the height of the main theater building. Its function 
is mostly supportive as it is used to transport stage sets from the side street (Mason St.) 
and houses the rehearsal and dressings rooms. It has wood framed walls and roof with 
unreinforced brick masonry walls and is four stories in height (Page and Turnbull, May 
1992, 5-6). 
The Loma Prieta earthquake caused extensive damage. The most significant was 
in the theater where the plaster proscenium ceiling and the light grid fell on the seats and 
orchestra. Also, the mechanical penthouse fell through the roof, and there were cracks in 
the plaster and walls. The damage was sufficient to trigger the San Francisco code’s 
requirements, including seismic upgrade. The ACT was already planning to improve the 
theater, so all upgrades had to be implemented at once. 
The theater planned improvement to the amenities provided to patrons: 
restrooms, handicapped accessibility, additional lobbies, improved audio-visual systems, 
and electrical mechanical systems. The improvements also included backstage facilities 
to update the theatre’s technology. In the initial proposal, ACT had planned to demolish 
many parts inside the theater, mainly circulation spaces, to make the required changes; 
demolish the entire annex building’s interior to accommodate the upgrades in backstage; 
and strengthen the buildings. They planned to preserve the auditorium and the facades.  
Stages 
Pre-earthquake 
In late 1980, ACT prepared studies for the rehabilitation of the building.  The 
fact that the building is historic was taken into account and a preservation consultant was 
involved through the development of options.  
1. 1989-1991: Understanding the FEMA process 
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The main issues that were faced during this period were: understanding what was 
eligible for FEMA funding, what the roles of all players were, and how to go about the 
application for funding. There were complications in understanding eligibility of 
mitigation work for FEMA funding. 
According to a letter by ACT, they came into contact with FEMA in a public 
meeting held on November 13, 1989 for not-for-profit institutions. The meeting tackled 
what FEMA would consider eligible and FEMA announced that they covered costs for 
code-related work that resulted from repairs of the earthquake damage. Thus, ACT 
assumed that upgrade to the local code would be eligible.  In that letter ACT provided an 
outline of their estimated expenses. The cost distribution showed 23.83% emergency 
work and repair, 10.65% operating expenses resulting from the earthquake, and 54.70% 
for seismic stabilization required by San Francisco Building Code totaling $2,250,000, 
with the State of California/ACT share being $1,238,100 because FEMA covers 75% 
only. 
The owner was planning to amend the application and add expenses for 
mechanical and electrical work required by the San Francisco Building Code, as well as 
additional earthquake related operating expenses. That would bring the total cost of 
seismic stabilization to be 41.4% of all work. It is noteworthy that the other estimated 
code work (mechanical and electrical) was about 30% of the total cost. However, FEMA 
did not approve all these funds at the beginning. 
In 1990, ACT and FEMA were still debating the cost and eligibility of 
strengthening code requirements. FEMA stated that they only acknowledged state code 
and not local municipal code. This led ACT to ask Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi to 
intervene, and she addressed FEMA on that in a letter in which she pointed out that 
federal regulation states that seismic costs do qualify for reimbursement. Letters between 
FEMA, ACT, and Pelosi indicate that FEMA personnel were unconvinced at the time 
that upgrades to local code requirements were eligible. They said that the State Historic 
Building Code (SHBC) took precedence over the local municipal code. However, a 
newspaper clip (Hamlin, March 26, 1991) about the Geary Theater, FEMA director 
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stated that the local code was covered by FEMA and that since FEMA has not worked in 
an urban setting before its personnel were not aware of all applicable codes.   
In another political intervention, in 1990 the Mayor tried to follow up on the 
project thinking that it was the SHPO who was delaying it. His office called the 
California State Departments of Park and Recreation who clarified that the SHPO had no 
role in the disputes; the dispute over the scope of damage and repairs was with FEMA. 
There were issues about the damage assessment and eligibility of repairs and 
strengthening. ACT was not clear on the role of the SHPO and thought they needed 
SHPO approval for the funding. When ACT asked for help, the SHPO clarified that they 
were not part of this dispute between FEMA and ACT. This shows the confusion at the 
early stages, which did not help the project to proceed. 
2. 1991-1992: Starting the project 
In a letter of April 1991, the SHPO provided comments on the DSR for the 
Geary. The SHPO directed the owner’s attention to areas of possible future conflict. 
These included the need to use the SHBC as the prevailing code, the potential conflict 
between that code and Section 104 (f) of the City code, and the need to work with the 
local building officials so that there were no delays. Also, they were advised that there 
are certain requirements in the SHBC that they would need to take note of, such as the 
Historic Structure Report, which they would need to prepare. This approach from the 
SHPO helped prepare the owner and reduced later problems. The SHPO pointed out that 
these were issues that usually created project delays.  
A letter in June 1991 reflects that the owner had consultants working on the 
project and the architects were studying code related elements in the plans. The project 
was being developed and there were negotiations with the City, FEMA, and the SHPO 
about the code requirements. Issues of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
restoration of certain spaces were identified. The original date of design submittal was 
set for November 1991. 
The SHPO called the owner in July 1991 to stress again the possible conflicts 
between local and state codes, that they would need to provide a Historic Structures 
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Report, and that plans and specifications should be according to SHBC-especially 
regarding new additions and alterations. This clarifies that the owner did receive 
guidance about such issues which always creates delays.  
3. 1992-1993: Preparing the Project 
Consultants were studying the alternatives for the seismic strengthening. These 
alternatives were weighted in relation to their cost and effect on the historic character of 
the building. The plans were developed by architects, structural engineers, and a historic 
preservation consultant. A shear wall was suggested in the lobby at the plane between 
the lobbies and the auditorium. This addition was considered of significant effect on the 
historic character and required a Section 106 consultation. It seems that the owner did 
not expect the consultation to take place or to take time: their scheduled date of 
construction was missed as the project was going through the consultation. 
In a letter to the interested parties, the owner pointed out the challenge of 
building a theater audience in the age of TV and cinema. Also, they mentioned that the 
downtown area did not encourage people to come since there was no urban civic life in 
that area. Consequently, ACT was trying to attract and keep their patrons by providing 
attractive, comfortable harmonious public spaces, which they expected to provide by 
new patron amenities. Thus, ACT advised FEMA that they planned to upgrade the 
building with regards to updating stagecraft, patron amenities, fire safety, and 
handicapped access. The last two were driven by codes. They clarified that the addition 
of the suggested shear wall allowed for capturing space that could be used for much 
needed restroom facilities.   
The revised ground breaking schedule was for April 1992 (delayed from 1991), 
but the Section 106 consultation started in September 1992.  The consultation faced 
several issues as the owner was proposing a grand rehabilitation plan. Most interior 
spaces of the Geary Theater were affected by the changes and all spaces of the annex 
building were to change. The consultation aimed at reducing the effects of such changes 
on the historic character of the building. This required the owner to make some 
alterations to their plans, or provide more detailed plans for their proposal. An important 
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positive effect of the improvements is that they demolished the toilets behind the main 
facade’s windows, thus allowing for those windows to be open again, restoring the 
historic character. 
One aspect of delay was that the submitted drawings did not provide sufficient 
information on the proposed changes. ACT was asked to provide drawings for the 
consultation that clarified what they planned for specific spaces and materials. The 
drawings they submitted did not have annotations and thus FEMA was not able to 
provide any comments or decisions. This created delays later in the project, when the 
construction work started. 
As the design progressed, there were more submittals to SHPO and FEMA for 
approvals.  
The effects of the suggested changes were to be examined and SHPO identified 
more issues regarding the auditorium, annex, paneling, and other spaces. They asked the 
owner to provide clarifications. Also, the owner had a historic preservation consultant, 
which is frequently the case for such projects. This shows that owners usually have 
professional advice available on the effects of their proposed changes. 
4. 1994-1995: The MOA and Construction 
The Section 106 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the project was signed 
on February 14, 1994. Early in 1994, FEMA sent a reminder to the owner through OES 
that they had not responded to any of the comments on the plans, which they were 
required to do. This was a source of delay from the owner’s side as well. A month later 
the owner responded, and the SHPO had comments on the proposed work. Most of the 
issues were about finishing and maintaining historic materials in place, such as keeping 
original balustrades, medallions, and glazing. All that would not affect the theater’s work 
and should not have been an issue for the owner.  
The owner suggested an addition over the annex, which required sight-line 
studies. Such studies investigate the visibility of the addition from the streets and 
evaluate the visual impact on the historic character of the building. However, there were 
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delays in submitting some work to the SHPO and FEMA. The first floor plans were not 
submitted even after the project construction started.  
Some issues remained unresolved until the construction work started and the 
contractor had to address them on site. They included the lobby that the owner never 
submitted the plans and drawings for, the decorative plaster work in the theater and 
lobby that was still to be resolved, and the annex building additional floor that was still 
under study and negotiations. The latter issue was not critical (as it came later in the 
construction schedule), but the first floor elements could have been resolved earlier. 
They created pressure on the owner, as construction delays would increase cost. There 
were other changes that the SHPO approved, such as the demolition of the entire annex 
buildings except for its façade and the reconstruction of a new building behind that 
facade. This was approved on the grounds that the only significant aspect of the annex 
building was its façade. 
One problem that appeared after construction began was how to keep the façade 
of the annex building in place while constructing an entire building behind it. The 
proposal for that building did not address the details of realizing the plans. The 
contractor suggested three methods: 1- to demolish the façade then replicate it using new 
and used materials; 2- to remove it in reinforced sections, and rebuild it after the new 
structure was built; or 3- to shore the façade in place and construct behind it without 
removing it. While the third option might seem the best in terms of maintaining historic 
fabric, it has a negative safety aspect as it is hazardous during construction because that 
area is also the main access for the theater construction project. The second alternative 
was preferred by the SHPO representative18.  
In May 1994, a meeting was conducted to resolve remaining issues, which were 
the Mason St. façade and auditorium finishes. Most issues were resolved, and sight line 
studies required for the roof addition on the annex were requested to finalize the decision 
on the roof addition. In the meeting ACT pushed for finishing as soon as possible. 
However, the SHPO was clear about the requirements for the addition approval.  
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In June and July some issues were pressing. The question of how to handle the 
façade, the repairs of the lobby ornamental plaster, and the rooftop addition became 
issues mainly due to time criticality. These issues were being discussed as the project 
was running. That created delays, which, in turn, produced pressure on the owner to 
solve them. The owner tried to pressure the SHPO but the latter was clear on the 
required standards.  
In August 1994, tension escalated as ACT became frustrated about the rooftop 
addition. That addition was visible from all streets and was not homogenous with the 
existing brick building, since it was of concrete. ACT could not understand what the 
“effects on the historic character” meant. Later, budget constraints led ACT to decide not 
to construct that addition, yet they remained discontented with the SHPO’s position 
about it. Once that last issue was resolved, Section 106 was concluded in December 
1994 and work commenced as planned. The owner was informed that they should notify 
FEMA and the SHPO of any changes, and that FEMA would make visits to the site. 
The project was finished a few months afterwards, in 1995, one year after the 
original scheduled date of completion. 
Variables Affecting the Recovery 
Context 
1. Economic conditions: The ability to get the extra needed funding through 
donations and grants. 
2. Owner’s state of mind: The theater was closed until all strengthening and repair 
was done. Meanwhile, ACT was performing in many rented theaters around the 
city, thus they were pushing for a quick finish for all paper work. The extra 
expenses were a negative impact on ACT, incurred because they had to perform 
in many theaters.  
3. Political intervention: Congresswoman and Mayor’s support.  
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4. Perception of the recovery process: The owner’s initial schedule shows that they 
assumed less time needed for the Section 106 consultation and FEMA funding 
approvals and reimbursements.  
 
Players  
1. Owner’s position about historic buildings: The owner wanted to save the 
building, but they were not familiar with the required standards. Owner’s 
valuation of the building was mainly as it relates to the theater, it patrons, and 
theatrical performances. While they understood the historic value, they were not 
aware of the standards that relate to it.  
2. Trust in FEMA and other government organizations seem to be limited.  
3. Flexibility: the owner canceled the rooftop addition, and were flexible on other 
sources of complications in their design 
4. Perception of process: owners often provided logical explanations for what they 
wanted, but FEMA was interested in management of federal funds; even if the 
project made sense, that did not make it eligible for funding. 
5. Unfamiliar concepts: “adverse effect” or “visual effects”, were not understood by 
the owner.  
Process  
1. Funding:  
• Initial information: FEMA said in an initial meeting that they would fund 
work required by code, thus the owner demanded it. Initial information is 
critical as it sets the scene for decisions that follow and the owner loses 
their trust when rules change. 
• Not understanding the roles of different players. 
• Information flow: there were a few hindrances when some letters did not 
reach the owner through FEMA or OES in time or at all. 
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2. Construction and document preparation: 
• Team of owner consultants. Their knowledge of standards and process 
can either help or complicate matters. 
• Pre-construction detailed planning: The contractor faced some issues that 
were not investigated earlier or that needed SHPO approval. This 
increased cost and time during construction. 
 
3. Pre-identification of sources of complications:  
• Providing early information and warning of sources of conflict. 
• SHPO and FEMA awareness of sources of conflict was helpful. 
 
4. Following directions and procedures. Submitting what is needed. 
Building 
1. Degree of change anticipated. The more change, the more the SHPO will have to 
approve. 
2. Building occupancy type, which affects code requirements. Theaters, as public 
gathering spaces, have different seismic strengthening requirements. 
3. Previous building upgrades affect how much work is needed to upgrade now. In 
this building they had to remove all mechanical and electrical systems and 
conduct a complete rehabilitation. 
4. Previous plans for the buildings. ACT were planning a rehabilitation before the 
earthquake, so it happened during recovery. 
5. Details in the buildings: ornamental plaster, terra cotta details, any special details 
that will need special attention and care.  
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Historic Character and Integrity of Fabric 
The building faced many issues, as it is rich in ornament and detailing. The major 
issues were: 
• Effects on internal spaces character: 
1. Strengthening requirements: The added shear wall- resolved by creating larger 
openings to reduce the architectural effect of the wall on the auditorium. 
2. Upgrading of amenities: Demolition of many staircases, walls, rooms and 
restrooms, for either code requirements or improvements. This included demolition 
of ornamental plaster from one of the lobbies. The owner’s architect suggested 
replicating that plaster but the SHPO pointed out that that would be a fake solution.  
• Effects on external historic character: 
1. The Annex: Code requirement of SHBC and the Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) for strengthening led to demolition of the entire annex except for the facade. 
Also, ACT added a penthouse above the annex. The SHPO required that all the 
details of the front wall be kept, and that the additional floor be set back so that the 
penthouse was not too visible from the street. The issue was that the building is not 
historically significant and only the façade was of interest; this is critical as it results 
in “Façadism”, the focus on facades and neglect of the building fabric otherwise.  
2. The addition on the rooftop of the annex, which was an unmitigated endeavor 
as it would be visible from all sides. It was of glass and concrete while the building 
is brick and the side of the theater is painted concrete. 
• Details: 
1.  The plaster ornamentation in the lobby, which needed restoration.  
2. The balustrades, medallions, and other detailing. 
 
This project was a major rehabilitation, and this case poses interesting points. 
Lovie (2001), reviewed the heritage management actions in Granger Town, Newcastle 
Upon Tyne, United Kingdom, and he points out that the most difficult task for 
conservation in urban centers, other than preventing demolitions, is the adaptation of 
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historic buildings. He identifies two main approaches in this regard: 1) Façadism, which 
reduces the historic building to its facade and builds a new building behind it. This 
assumes that the value of the building is in its façade only and that is the sources of its 
historic character. 2) Seeking maximum reversibility, this attempts to construct all 
needed adaptations using methods and materials that could be removed later. This can 
lead to changes that compromise the integrity of the historic building while the 
adaptation lasts. And sometimes the work may not be as reversible as anticipated.  
This clearly identifies part of the issues that the Geary faced, as its annex was 
completely rebuilt except for the façade. A SHPO memo pointed out that they realized 
this later in the project. This happened mainly due to the fact that the annex was 
determined to be of less significance.  
This relates to the issue of value: how different spaces are valued in general, and 
especially after a disaster, when there are pressures for resuming functionality. That is 
strongly influenced by the use of the space and the context of the rehabilitation. As the 
owner wanted renovations, it is important that improved amenities and services are 
introduced and this includes service spaces. The strengthening of the building meant that 
most of it needed to be changed. And since the annex contained only spaces used for 
serving the main building it was not considered significant. A question that this creates 
is: what is the value for service spaces in historic buildings?  
Public Participation 
There was no serious public participation in this project. The consultation took 
place among FEMA, the SHPO, and ACT. The Foundation for the Architectural 
Heritage of San Francisco received copies of some correspondence. This suggests that 
public participation becomes essential when an issue is controversial, mainly if 
demolition is a possibility. In other situations there is no active participation in decision 
about historic buildings.  
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General Discussion of the Case Studies 
Variables Affecting the Recovery 
The variables affecting the recovery are under four categories (figure 11). 1) The 
building itself. 2) The process that identifies the type of communication and cooperation 
that takes place. 3) The players, each have their own relationship with the historic 
building, which is regulated through existing laws. 4) And the general context of the 
recovery, which will affect all the other variables. The arrows between the players are 
significant as they indicate the communication of values, beliefs and ideas, which is 
what the participatory process is for. However, the study indicates that such 
communication was not always efficient, thus it is shown in dashed lines. 
 
 
Figure 11 Model representing the variables that affect the recovery process. 
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Based on comparing the three projects, the following variables were identified:  
 
The Process 
• Initial Positions: 
Owner’s initial position. The initial position of the owners was different. 
Unlike the first two projects, the ACT knew that they want to repair the 
building and had no doubts about what they wanted to do. Their problem was 
that they were lost in the procedures and eligibility of suggested 
strengthening for a while. The SFRA wanted to demolish the Williams 
Building and were convinced that it would be feasible. On the other hand, 
SFUSD were not sure of what the future of the building should be. They 
initially decided to keep the building and repair it to its original function, 
however, they were told that FEMA would not support that, and FEMA 
pushed for its demolition. Having early specific plans for the building help 
reduce delays.  
Clarity of initial information from FEMA. FEMA initially pushed for the 
demolition of 170 Fell St., then changed their position. Also, they stated in a 
public hearing that strengthening will be covered then they withdrew that 
statement (for the Geary). Initial confusion about such elements wasted time 
as it set the owner in a certain mind set, and then expected them to change it.  
• “Dancing with FEMA”. This statement is borrowed from a similar 
expression that was used by one of the newspapers to describe the negotiation 
process of ACT with FEMA (Winn, February 18, 1991). It captures the spirit 
of the process as there was a lot of give and take, appeals, and changes. The 
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follow up on the process requires experience and all three projects had 
complex application processes and several appeals. The path to repairs, as 
such, is not a straight line and needs more processing time. This indicates a 
need for streamlining the process. 
• Early consultation with SHPO. This reduces surprises for the owner and 
makes a difference as it facilitates early preparedness for possible 
complications. This also indicates attitude towards the consultation process. 
• Clarity of the SHPO’s role. The SHPO was sometimes a representative of 
the historic preservation interest (Geary and Williams Buildings) and in other 
times an outside mediator (Fell St.). A party in a negotiation process cannot 
be both one of the negotiators and a mediator, as that would have negative 
effects on the negotiation process.  
• Project management. Choice of consultants, switching professionals, and 
delaying major decisions had a significant effect on the 170 Fell St. and the 
Williams projects. The Geary project, however, made less major changes 
throughout project development as they had most of the important decisions 
made early. This may be a result of their pre-earthquake plans and studies of 
the needs of the theater buildings, which supports the importance of pre-
incident planning. 
• Effectiveness of stakeholder participation. The buildings had different 
values to community groups. Not all values for stakeholders were addressed, 
which, as in the case of 170 Fell St., created conflict and supported an 
environment of rejection for the preservation of the buildings.  
• Misunderstanding of red tag. The red tag was misunderstood by owners. 
For both the Williams and Fell St. owners, it was used to support the 
argument for demolition. A point to be made is that all demolished buildings 
were red tagged. This had helped in constructing a meaning for the red tag for 
the public. It may be better if a red tag just leads to detailed evaluation, and if 
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a building is decided to be demolished, then a new tag is given to it (ex. 
black). That way, a red tag would not be associated with demolition.  
The Building 
• The level of needed Intervention. Complete rehabilitation for a building 
requires more time than simple repairs since there will be a detailed 
assessment of suggested work in relation to the Standards. 
• Location. The location of the buildings affected the decisions about them. 
The 170 Fell St. complex was determined as the best place for SOTA, based 
mainly on location. To become a school, the buildings code requirements 
were different from their code requirements had they been left as offices. The 
Geary theater location affected their decision to renovate to attract patrons to 
that part of the downtown. And the Williams Building was part of a 
redevelopment area.  
• Visibility. The visible buildings were in newspapers and followed up by the 
public. Both Geary and SFUSD were highly publicized. Also, landmarks 
were of importance, as they generated income through tourism. Some 
respondents pointed out that the Opera House and War Memorial received 
early attention and were finished quickly mainly due to their importance as 
income generators for the city. However, this does not seem to be part of a 
conscious plan for addressing sites that are of relevance to tourism, which is 
surprising as San Francisco, and the Bay Area, are important tourism 
destinations. 
• Ornament and detailing played limited effect. For Geary, that needed a 
study of maintenance and restoration. It requires attention during construction 
and requires specialists for its repair.  
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 The Players 
Access to resources. Extra funding was needed. SFUSD did not have sufficient 
funding, ACT managed to collect several grants and donations over a six-year 
period, and the SFRA did not work on the project but left the repairs for an investor.  
Lack of understanding not lack of knowledge. SHPO and FEMA were 
providing information about the process and possible sources of complications. 
Sometimes the owners had problem understanding why such requirements had to be. 
Because of that there were a lot of attempts to negotiate and push for proposals that 
would not be accepted according to exiting standards, which complicated the 
recovery. 
Perceptions of significance. Both the Williams Building and Fell St. building 
had arguments about their historic significance early in the process. This may have 
an effect on the owner’s willingness to put the extra effort for maintaining its historic 
fabric or character.  
Perception of the consultation. The consultation was not considered a process 
for developing better solutions. Instead, for both public agencies, it was a procedural 
requirement, more like a “hoop’ to jump through. For the Geary, the process was 
about getting the SHPO’s approval.  
Trust between players. Lack of trust between players leads to conflict and lack 
of cooperation.  
Stewardship. Whether the owner understands their role as stewards of cultural 
property. This was missing in the case of 170 Fell St. building. 
Attitude: cooperation, flexibility, foresight, and compliance, were all elements 
that made a difference in the projects.  
Internal factors for owner  
• Stability of staff and leadership. This Created delays for Fell St. 
Building. The effect of the change of leadership and staff is clear in 
the progress of the project and the delays it faced. 
• Institutional culture: for SFUSD and SFRA, both agencies are used 
to doing things in a certain way. They have developed a method of 
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management that was independent and did not allow for 
accommodation of the change that came after disaster. Their 
processes supported individual decision-making in which 
participatory events were merely formalities.  
The Context 
• Historic preservation activism within the community. Local community 
having diligence and proactiveness made a difference in the outcome; two 
buildings were saved from demolition. 
• Political context. Political support led to politicians trying to intervene in the 
process, which happened in two projects. This may be related to the visibility of 
the project.  
Other disasters. Northridge lead to reduction of coverage, then 9/11 lead to de-
obligation of funds not used by 2001. 
Needs of the community. Education, economic, cultural, and development needs 
provide context for use of the buildings. The Geary delivered cultural needs, the Fell 
St. buildings were to provide for education, and the Williams was part of its area’s 
economic redevelopment.  
Regulatory context. Existing laws and regulations created the environment 
within which everything was taking place and it set the relationship between the 
players and the building, and between the players themselves.  
Technical context. This laid down the type of knowledge and technology 
available for the treatment of historic buildings. It is reflected in the available options 
for strengthening of exiting buildings or costs of conserving paint and historic 
materials. 
Social context. The 170 Fell St. building was occupied twice by homeless 
groups and the building had to be secured to prevent that from happening again. On 
the other hand, the Geary Theater was interested in upgrading heir amenities to be 
able to attract more patrons in a time when society is turning to other forms of 
cultural entertainment. 
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Historic Character and Integrity of Fabric 
As discussed above, these variables were cited by literature as challenging during 
the recovery period. Both of these variables were developed as part of the preservation 
process to facilitate making decisions about the built heritage, but they have come to be 
essential to its significance. In their study of heritage values in site management, La 
Torre et al. (2005) clarify that a site will have several values for different stakeholders, 
but its significance is the total importance of the site with respect to some of these values 
or all of them, sometimes in relation to comparable sites. However, current practices 
have come to relate the significance of place to the integrity of its fabric (c.f The 
Secretary of Interior Standards for the Rehabilitation of Historic Buildings). This is a 
result for an approach that focuses mainly on the historic or archaeological values of 
sites (de la Torre, 2005). For the historic preservation community, these variables are 
perceived to encompass the value and significance of the site, but for other stakeholders, 
the value of the site may be functional, developmental, or other. This difference of 
valuation becomes more important after disasters, because of the need to repair and 
restore functionality to buildings. Since the fabric of the building could be damaged, the 
perception of its significance might change.  
Lowenthal (2000) points out that stakeholders are variable: the individual, the 
family, the local community, an ethnic or religious group, a region, a state, or other. And 
influences on heritage preservation come through: ownership, power, participation, 
continuity and change. He contends that cultural heritage objects are not important for 
themselves but for the meanings that they have for the people, the values they represent, 
and the functions that they provide. Thus, the meaning, values, and use of the built 
heritage are significant decisions in the sustainability of that heritage for future 
generations. These decisions are by the government, elite groups, community 
population, academics, and/or business people. The value of heritage is different 
between different stakeholders, and is the reason behind why certain decisions are made. 
Decisions should be based on negotiations between stakeholders so that all viewpoints 
are incorporated. This is not only for maintaining a democratic process, but also for 
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maintaining the relationship between the community with that heritage. When one 
groups claims ownership of heritage, it severs the relationship of other groups with it, 
which is against the principles of sustainability. In its essence, historic preservation is a 
social activity, not merely a technical endeavor.  
Rhyne (June15, 1995) points out that we attempt mainly to preserve the physical. 
He states that at the heart of every preservation project is the question: “what are we 
trying to preserve?” then, immediately comes another question: “who will decide?” He 
points out that there are other values of importance, such as use, symbolic meaning, 
ritual purity, the process of production, and the process of change and rebirth itself.  
This leads to considerations of the many values that a building many have. The 
case study buildings had aesthetic, historic, functional, developmental, economic, civic, 
and many other values. These were values that are identifiable because of the 
documentation of the limited participation that took place. A section 106 consultation 
provide the chance for the owner, specific groups and historic preservationists to 
exchange ideas, and opens that consultation for the public by request (See Appendix A). 
And the public hearings for the EIR and the LPAB provided more chances for people to 
voice their concern. Based on the two breakings into the 170 Fell St. building, we can 
also deduce that other groups had other values. Still, the end product of the Section 106 
process in this context focused on one set of value- the historic values, as a result of the 
existing Standards. The process did not identify other values as worthy of representation 
in the PA. The Section 106 process has come to acknowledge values of indigenous 
peoples and that has become part of the consultation. The Programmatic Agreement 
(PA) focused only on protecting the historic/cultural values represented by the buildings. 
As such, the interests of the parents and students were not of concern to the process.  
However, the process has yet failed to see that buildings develop meanings over 
times, which are no less important than their historic meanings and uses. The point here 
is that we have no idea if these buildings have any special associations for the local 
community now, other than the historic meaning. And should new associations exist, the 
Standards would not acknowledge them unless they are related to the historic fabric. 
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Sustainable management of the built heritage requires maintaining the values of 
that heritage for future generations. Our perspective of heritage is shaped by our 
understanding of our present (Graham, Ashworth & Tunbridge, 2000). The choice of 
what to preserve and what is significant changes with time. Thus, any interpretation of 
heritage should take in to account that it is dynamic, and that the process of heritage 
identification should not only incorporate all stakeholders, but also the changes that may 
take place over time. This aspect indicates the importance of managing the built 
environment in a sensitive way. It may be that a building that is not significant now 
would be so for future generations. The existing process addresses this in regard to 
historic significance only. This is evident in the Fell St. Building case, in which the 
original National Register nomination form did not identify that building as significant, 
but later studies did. It is positive that the existing process for management of cultural 
heritage does not take previous evaluations of heritage as is; whenever a decision is 
needed, a new evaluation is done. This positive aspect existed in the new evaluation for 
170 Fell St. However, the changing meanings of historic buildings are not addressed. It 
is only the historic value that is relevant, and only in the presence of historic materials 
and fabrics. The argument presented here is that there is a focus on the “historic” only. 
The existing standards should embrace the preservation of the built heritage, as heritage. 
This means that the process should acknowledge that new meanings and associations are 
important and become part of what is being preserved. This also means that such 
associations should be sought, documented, and taken into consideration in acts of 
preservation.  
The sustainability of the built heritage depends on maintaining a relationship 
between that heritage and the people. The meaning assigned to heritage is intrinsically 
related to its use. Both of them shape each other. Thus, it is important that the function 
of heritage be something that all stakeholders are apart of. Graham et al. (2000) contend 
that it can be viewed as a representation, where meaning is given by how it is used, 
talked about, felt, and represented. What is the meaning of the Williams Building, 170 
Fell St., or other historic buildings to the inhabitants of the city of San Francisco? Are 
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these building preserved by the people, or by the cultural elite of the city? Does the 
process of their preservation help in educating the public of their value? These questions 
are important if the sustainability of that heritage is to be maintained. They are 
significant as disaster recovery is part of the history of the historic building and adds 
new meanings to it, which should also be preserved for future generations. 
Another important aspect of the recovery and preservation processes is how they 
function in the construction of meaning for places. The meaning of a building for a 
community is closely related to its use. The meaning of a place usually regulates and 
organizes the way it is used, but also its use will assign meaning to it. (Lowenthal, 1985; 
Graham et al., 2000; Giddings, 2000). This raises the question:  What is the meaning that 
the current standards and processes are giving to the built heritage? For example, what is 
the meaning of the complex on 170 Fell St. to the people of the city; especially after the 
SOTA project delay, and the many deliberations and arguments? The public hearing 
presentations constructed a new image for the building. It would be interesting to 
investigate how that had affected the meaning of that part of the built heritage for the 
community. One of the parents attending a public hearing in August, 2002 explained:  
“People talk about 170 Fell as being historic. I don’t know what the history is. How 
many people in this room know the history of 170 Fell? Three… ...But if we just keep 
delaying, delaying, delaying just because one building was built back in what, 1910 or 
something like that, we’re going to have a problem. And we’re not being fair to the kids” 
(SFUSD, 2000). This indicates the importance of education during the process of 
preservation. The consultations and public hearings could be better used to educate as 
well as to elicit meanings for a place. It is a two-way relationship that educates all parties 
of the values associated with the place, as well as being a negotiation process on the best 
way for its repair and reuse. 
The recovery process of historic buildings becomes part of the history of the 
building. This raises many questions: in what way is the existing process preserving 
heritage? Is it preserving the community’s relationship with it, is it isolating the people 
from it? What is being preserved, its meaning, its fabric, both? What will future 
   
 
  136
 
generations receive? An old building that did not mean much to the majority of the 
people, or a part of their built heritage that represents meanings to the majority of the 
people? The existing process have helped in saving many significant buildings, but it has 
also been functioning in a way that have negative impacts on historic buildings on the 
long term. The buildings become relevant to a small group, a cultural elite, and only the 
meanings and association identified by that group are significant. The preservation 
process, especially in post disaster situations, need to be more critical in its definition of 
significance and value.  
Lowenthal (2000) points out that the concept of integrity has become more 
valuable than other values. No matter how important the heritage is for art historians, 
scholars, or even the market force, its relationship to the public need to be preserved. He 
points out that damage and destruction should be seen as integral to heritage, as there is 
no physical mortality, destruction is part of the human life. Heritage management entails 
taking in to account change as part of heritage itself, as the heritage we have includes the 
changes made by our predecessors. 
Taking a closer look at the cultural value of the built heritage, and from an 
architectural point of view, it can be grouped into three main categories: 
1. Value of object: which comes from the significance of the design itself, the 
construction methods and approach that represent a technology of a certain time 
period. This is based on treating the building as a museum object and the 
preservationist is a curator. The object itself is the center of attention. This translates 
to a significance of the fabric itself and the original architectural systems. 
2. Value of experience:  this comes from the character of the place, its spaces, 
their proportions, the facades, their detailing and design. The experience can be 
within the building, or around the building. The significant experience can be in the 
urban space it creates, or the special interior spaces it provides. This translates to the 
significance of the historic character inside and outside the building. The inside 
character comes not only from the paintings, relief, detailing, or other special 
treatments, but also from the spaces and their relationship to each other wish provide 
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a specific experience in using the place. The experience may be valuable from the 
outside, as walking down some of San Francisco streets with their bay windows. It is 
the urban space created by the buildings that is significant.  
3. Value of meaning and associations (symbolic meaning). This comes from the 
association of the place with certain events or people. This has nothing to do with the 
object itself. It makes the building more of a symbol of an event or a notion and thus 
its value transcends the fabric itself. The fabric’s value is part of the object, but it is 
not all of it. 
The existing standards acknowledge all these values, but only in relation to 
historic fabric. There is emphasis on maintaining the historic building in fabric. The 
original fabric is what gives it value and thus loss of fabric leads to loss of value. This 
way of valuation of historic building has serious ramifications especially in post disaster 
situations. Earthquake damages parts of historic buildings leading to loss of significant 
fabric. Many building suffered that in Santa Cruz and Watsonville, CA after the Loma 
Prieta earthquake, thus it was decided that the building lost its value and many buildings 
were demolished (Wilson, 1991; Eadie, 1998).  
The challenge of disaster is in the fact that there may be major damages to the 
historic fabric. Does that mean that the damaged building has no cultural value 
anymore? Historic buildings are part of the heritage of the community and their value 
and meaning grow and change through time. Taking an example of the Harada House in 
Riverside, CA. the building is highly significant for its association with the Japanese 
American experience during World War II. The place has a high value due to its 
meaning and association. Should an earthquake damage that building and cause a 
significant loss of fabric, does that mean that it lost its value?  
The argument presented here is that existing preservation standards need to 
develop beyond the historic significance, with special consideration for post disaster 
situations. The damage caused by the earthquake is part of the life of the built heritage, 
and it would have its mark on the building’s fabric, and the building could continue to 
exist with repairs and new materials that can be documented for future generations 
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benefit. The value of the built heritage transcends the object (i.e. fabric and architectural 
systems), and is related to meanings and associations, and/or to the quality of the 
experience they provide through their interior spaces and the urban space they create.  
Unfortunately, we tend to preserve the built heritage by reducing its 
development. That built heritage would have had a normal life of changes before our 
determination of its significance. Such changes in the past we consider historic and part 
of the past development of the place. It is inconsistent to determine that past changes are 
part of the history of the building and only limited changes are allowed in the future, and 
then claim that building as part of community heritage. For a building to be part of 
heritage, it needs to continue to have meaning for the people, and continue to be used. 
Thus, mothballing is not a viable solution especially after disaster damage; it is a 
statement that the building can no longer serve the community. The use of the building 
will require changes and accommodations that are part of the continued development of 
the building through time. Such changes would happen through disaster damages, or 
through preparedness for disasters as in the case of retrofit.  
A point to be made here about the result of the 170 Fell St. mothballing was not 
helpful, but that result did not come because that building could not be used, it came as 
result of the owner not wanting to accept the usability of the building. That is more 
related to accountability than historic preservation. That new state for the building 
constructs a new meaning for it for the community. This would help the argument for 
demolishing it. As such, mothballing may not be sustainable in post-disaster recovery.  
Williams (2001) points out that economic values usually precede all other values 
for decision makers on the future of historic centers since economic activities are the 
base of development. However, preservation can provide economic benefits that can 
help such communities in their quest for development and revitalization. The challenges 
of revitalization that are present for all communities become more persistent after 
disasters.  
The exiting Section 106 process acknowledges cultural diversity; it attempts to 
incorporate viewpoints from Native American tribes and local groups and communities. 
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That is part of a larger goal. That of acknowledging the right of all community groups to 
heritage. King (2002) points out that conflict in cultural resources management does not 
have right/wrong answers, but it’s about finding balance between conflicting but 
legitimate human values. In the case of 170 Fell St., that balance was not found. 
However, the problem was not of conflicting values. At the surface, the delay of the 
project appears to be a result of conflict between functional values and historic values. 
But a closer look indicates that the buildings could have incorporated the function with 
modifications. The conflict was more human in nature. The legislative processes on 
federal, state, and local levels need to develop ways for avoiding such outcome, by 
addressing the variables that have led to it.  
Finally, the issues relating to historic character and integrity of fabric are related 
to the challenges of the disaster recovery period and the valuation of the built heritage. 
For future disaster recovery effort to be more sustainable the exiting processes need to 
develop to adopt a more critical approach to its value and significance. More 
importantly, the current standards need to change to incorporate the diverse values of 
heritage. 
Public Participation 
Balducci and Calvaresi (2005) point out that the objective of participation is to 
help in solving design problems when standard models are not helpful and there is a 
need for innovation based on knowledge that can generate new ideas and solutions. Thus 
it aims at “mobilizing all cognitive resources available and stimulating interaction 
between all stakeholders to solve a complex problem” (Balducci and Calvaresi, 2005). 
Within the context of disaster recovery, a community is faced with a challenging context 
and new problems, where their regular models would not necessarily work. As such, 
participation becomes more critical in disaster recovery if solutions are going to address 
the needs of all community groups. It is important, though, to stress that participation is 
a process not an outcome (Al-Nammari, 2003), thus successful management of the 
process leads to identifying the different perspectives surrounding an issues, the 
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available resources for handling it, possible sources of conflict, areas of common 
ground, and ways of finding appropriate solutions. It is a process that “facilitates self-
reliance and produces involvement to develop a sense of ownership of the developed 
plans or policies”. Further more, “the communication channels set up between the 
various actors involved will probably remain in place as permanent (social) capital for 
future initiative” (Balducci and Calvaresi, 2005, 244). For historic buildings, 
participation is significant as a tool for identifying different values related to them and 
thus helps incorporate all community groups. 
There is a strong participatory element in Section 106, especially after its 
modification in 2001. The section encourages public input, but within the framework of 
predefined significance. King (2000) argues that the Section not responsive of problems 
facing real people. He points out that Section 106 is intended to provide historic 
preservation a fare share in planning. Programmatic Agreements and Memorandums of 
Understanding are often developed and signed with people who do not necessarily 
follow it. The content of the PA would be agreeable to the SHPO and ACHP, but the 
other side would not really understand the full ramifications. This is mainly due Section 
106 being viewed “as a hoop to be jumped though, rather than as a creative exercise in 
problem solving” (King, 2000,53). This statement embodies the attitude that most 
owners had of the Section 106 process. It was about getting the consent of the SHPO on 
predetermined plans for the building, not about finding the best way to achieving their 
goals while respecting the special value of the historic or cultural resource.   
King points out that for the owners of projects awaiting federal funding, the 
section 106 process only complicates matters and they go through he process “to make 
the SHPO happy” by doing HABS documentations or sign agreements they don’t fully 
understand. He believes that section 106 has become too much a procedural aspect and 
less of a tool for maintaining cultural heritage, in its broad definition. He points out that 
a change is needed. He provides several suggestions in which the process is less 
controlled by red tape, and the reference point is not the National Register. Nonetheless, 
his suggestions do not focus on section 106 as a participation tool (King, 2000). 
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However, participation is a very important part of the process. The section is 
helpful in protecting heritage, but it needs to be developed to support sustainability of 
preservation, governance, recovery, and development. 
The section 106 process has two main limitations: 1) is selectively participatory 
and 2) its timing limits its effect. Its objective is to protect cultural heritage by allowing a 
chance for considering effects of planed actions on cultural heritage. Thus, by design, it 
comes after plans had been developed. It provides a chance for the SHPO to comment on 
the effects of a project on cultural property. In this case study, the historic buildings are 
part of an urban area, and the process took main two paths: 
1. Active participation of historic preservationists. As in the case of  the 170 
Fell St. building, and the Williams Building. The public participated in the 
form of an NGO interested in the outcome, and many individuals who are 
interested in the outcome where also allowed the chance to be part of the 
consultation.  
2. No active participation. This was the case of Geary in which only the SHPO 
was involved.  
King (2000) points out that the public is rarely invited to be part of the 
consultation unless an agreement between the SHPO and the applicant (owner) was not 
reached. This explains why the public was not as closely involved in the Geary theater 
project as in the 170 Fell St project. It was only when there was a conflict over the future 
of the building that the public was actively involved. This means that the main interest is 
saving the cultural heritage from complete loss.  
However, there is another section of the public that was not part of the 
consultation, which is those who were interested in making the SOTA happen. Not all 
concerned parties are part of the consultation. The result is that the section work to 
support historic preservation, not to provide participation. This has two sides: 
On the one side, it is positive that historic preservation has a chance for being 
considered. Usually heritage preservation does not get sufficient consideration after 
disasters and many cultural resources are lost. 
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On the other hand, sustainability also requires the participation of the community 
so that the final arrangement would incorporate the interests of all community groups. 
This was not the case. The consultation in 170 Fell managed to prevent demolition, but it 
failed the parents of the children who wanted the school to happen. This should not 
mean that the demolition should have happened, it means that the PA should have taken 
into account the needs of such groups as well, not only the needs of heritage 
preservation. This of course removes the Section 106 from its current position as a tool 
for protecting heritage only. It means that there should be a way for addressing the needs 
of all groups within the process. 
Haus et al. (2005) point out that public participation ranges in many levels 
depending on authority, from the right to information and participation in council 
committees to public referenda in which the public has the final decision. The public has 
different powers depending on the form of participation. The way Section 106 is set 
works as a participation tool that is also a dispute resolution tool (King, 2000). Limiting 
the number of participants is recommended to facilitate consultation effectiveness. This 
is because the management approach depends on one-stop participation in which 
consultation take place, agreement is sought, and then the project proceeds. Changes are 
needed so that Section 106 is part of a broader process that facilitates interaction on 
several phases of the project development, among different groups, providing different 
levels of empowerment. This is somewhat addressed in the Section after the changes of 
2001, as public hearings are also possibilities. 
Figure (12) represents the typical phases of a project. For the case studies, all 
participation took place in phase B, which is about selecting an option and developing it. 
However, Phase A, which is more critical as it is the phase when the strategic decisions 
are made does not have public involvement. Section 106 does not require for 
consultation at that early stage, but it is up to the owner to take advantage of that. This is 
something that the SHPO commented on in the response to the SOTA EIR, that the 
project was fully developed before the owner started consulting with the SHPO. 
Required participation takes place after the important decisions have been made. One of 
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the respondents pointed out to the importance of having the public part of the early 
stages of decision-making, not after the decision is made, as that can help in directing 
attention to important issues early in the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Participation and project stages, adapted from Al-Nammari, 2003. 
Initiation of project 
Setting goals and policy 
Investigation of options 
Selecting an option 
Development of project 
Construction documents
Bidding 
Citizen/ Community 
Participation 
Occupation 
Evaluation 
C
onstruction
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The figure explains that: 
1. Participation needs to take place at all stages of the development of the 
project. However, the form of participation does not need to be the same. In 
other words, the level of power given to the public can change according to 
the phase of project development, so that the negative implications of too 
much participation could be managed. 
2. Stages A and B, can be done through public hearings and consultations. 
Provided that there is management for the consultation and hearing that 
would work out with the owner an option that accommodate all parties. They 
should have a minimal public right to information and input especially in 
relation to setting goals and investigation of options. 
3. Stage C is more technical. Provision for public involvement can be through 
elected bodies, such as the planning commission and the LPAb. This stage 
should be based on options developed with public input and should focus on 
technical aspects. 
4. The cultural management process does not have provision for stage D. which 
is critical for developing the management of cultural heritage. Should allow 
for input of evaluation and feedback that is taken into consideration. 
On the other hand, Haus et al. (2005) point out the paradox in increasing 
participation. Too much community involvement can jeopardize the interest of groups 
that are not sufficiently represented, make short-term needs take precedence over long-
term strategies, and can result with an elite group having more influence on the outcome. 
Literature contains many suggestions on how the participation process for the local 
community can avoid the pitfalls of democratic processes, such as the majority 
overwhelming the minority (c.f Evans, Joas, Sundback and Theobald, 2005; Hague and 
Jenkins, 2005). Thus the participation process should gain public input, provide avenue 
for negotiations, and allow for citizen partnerships, while avoiding the previous pitfalls. 
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Thus, the community should decide the level of public participation in each 
phase. The levels would vary from the right of access to information, to public hearings, 
and consultation and roundtables.  
Klok and Denters (2005) discuss several limitations of participation. The 
selective involvement of some actors, the unequal position of actors as some may have 
more skills or other resources, lack of transparency in the process as a result to pre-
meeting decisions, inconclusive results when consensus is not reached, open conflict, 
which is a result of interaction that lead to furthering disagreements, and the increased 
power of public officials who are key players. The processes above illustrate some of 
these negatives in 170 Fell St. and the Williams Buildings. A suggestion to overcome 
such limitations can be through developing leadership. Leadership and participation are 
complimentary and can work together for public benefit (cf. Haus, et al. 2005). 
Success of “consensus building” strategies is cited in literature. Such strategies 
are face-to-face groups of key stakeholders of public agencies, local government and 
interest groups (Balducci and Calvaresi, 2005). It was shown that such process is 
effective in developing better plans and building long-term effects on social, intellectual, 
and political capital. That process can lead to developing trust, networks of 
communications, agreed upon facts about the situation, mutual understandings, in 
addition to alliances between the groups. 
Geipel points out that citizen participation in disaster recovery may be ‘a 
troublesome, time-consuming, and an expensive game” (Geiple, 1991). Yet not doing it 
leads to complication with the reconstruction effort, he points out public aversion to new 
housing and failure to address their needs. Successful implementation of policies and 
strategies requires public input. 
Since the process of recovery for historic buildings is an overlay of all related 
regulations and laws on different levels of government, it is important to investigate 
where these regulations are leading. The regulatory context that works well in normative 
conditions may be creating hindrances in recovery effort. Should a project that is 
recovering from a disaster be handled similarly? Or should there be regulations to 
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encourage betterment? This is something that the local governments should consider. 
During the data collection for this paper several contacts in the Planning Department 
were asked about an earthquake recovery plan for the City, which they said does not 
exist. The lack of a plan means that the city is reactive in its approach to recovery.  
More importantly, there should be a recovery plan for historic buildings. The 
process of recovery for such buildings, the players involved, and the buildings 
themselves can all be addressed in pre-disaster planning. As pointed in the analysis 
above, many of the variables can be changed or improved, if addressed in a pre-prepared 
recovery plan. Efforts for earthquake preparedness need to go beyond the structural 
strengthening of buildings and address the other variables if future earthquake recovery 
is to be improved.  
Literature indicates that the maintenance of historic centers after earthquakes and 
disasters is highly dependant on the community’s perception of their value (Geipel, 
1991; Geva and Al-Nammari, 2002). Nonetheless, the recovery period is challenging for 
cultural property and the sustainability of the built heritage can be compromised when 
many demolitions take place. This happens for many reasons based on the economic 
challenges facing the community at the time and the perception of economic validity of 
preservation, among other reasons (Blair-Tyler and Kristiansson, 1999). Yet, demolition 
is not the only threat affecting the built heritage. The San Francisco cases demonstrate 
that pre-disaster laws have limitations when addressing a post disaster situation, which 
can lead to delays in the process. In many cases, certain compromises are necessary. The 
community members might need to hasten recovery and repair of their buildings, but 
that would not be critical if the issues were addressed in advance.
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
1) Did the recovery of historic buildings require more time than non-historic 
buildings? If so, what were the historic buildings that required more time?  
a. Time required for recovery of historic buildings is longer than time 
required for recovery of non-historic buildings.   
The study has shown that historic buildings do take longer time to 
finish their funding process and attain reimbursements. Since this is a major 
process for public buildings (figure 2) it is an important indicator for 
finishing the recovery process.  
b. Time of recovery for buildings, both historic and non-historic, will 
vary according to the importance of their functions to restoring 
normal life back in the city. 
1. Emergency Functions, such as fire stations and health 
care, will be the first to recover.  
2. Art facilities such as museums and theaters will be 
among the last. 
The results have shown that these hypotheses were partly correct. 
Emergency buildings recovered early, but health care facilities were among 
the buildings that faced delays.  Museums and art facilities were delayed.  
In response for the first question, the research has shown that public 
historic buildings face delays, but their recovery is not equivalent to the 
recovery of non-historic buildings. The recovery of historic buildings is 
different as they are cultural resources. Still, the functions that face delays are 
critical (like health care and residential), so identifying the sources of delays 
is important.  
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2) For buildings that faced delays, what are the variables that affected the 
recovery? What were the dynamics of the process? 
a. The variables affecting the process will be mainly related to the 
historic status of the building. 
The investigation has shown that the building is one of several 
variables affecting recovery. There are more variables affecting the recovery 
that are related to the context, the process, and the players involved. So the 
status of the building is not the sole reason for the delays.  
The results of investigating the first two questions show that the recovery of 
public historic buildings is affected by their function in addition to the level of damage 
and cost. This has been shown by both the statistical and qualitative analysis. The 
context of recovery, the process as identified by the existing regulations, the players 
involved, and the building itself are all important variables in either increasing or 
decreasing time needs.  Such variables will be in effect in different ways over the long-
term and their effects change through the phases of the project.  
The recovery of historic buildings requires a long term vision. Such vision should 
be developed ahead of a disaster. Plans for the long-term use of public buildings can be 
developed by facilities managers and such plans can help in making post-disaster 
decisions easier. For the most part, the absence of such vision was what had delayed the 
recovery of the chosen case studies. Such delays should not be necessarily a negative 
indicator and should not be compared to delays in regular repairs. A delay in a project 
that results in extending the useful life of the building and maintains its value for the 
community is a positive.  
This brings to mind what King (2004) called “preservation by disaster”. The 
civic center was completely renovated after the earthquake: This is a long-term benefit 
that is better than doing immediate repairs that retain a negative status quo. The 
approach was to optimize the benefit from the funding, and the option of Improved 
Project is positive in that regard.  
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Thus, not all delays are negative. There is positive delay, such as delays that lead 
to betterment of the quality of life and optimization of the built heritage’s role in the 
community’s life. These goals are beyond the regular functions of the recovery stage and 
cannot be compared to regular repairs of damages. 
Nevertheless, the extent of delay is important too. A question that is posed would 
be, could such delays be reduced in ways that would not prevent the positive outcomes? 
The correlation table above (table 4) has shown that delay will increase cost, thus 
reducing delays is a needed goal. This reduction, however, should be based on targeting 
the variables that increased the time needs without compromising the stewardship of the 
built heritage.   
For all buildings, the study indicates that certain building functions need to be 
addressed before the disaster event so that their recovery time is reduced, such as 
residential buildings, offices, and cultural facilities. Also, owners should take into 
account that certain buildings have a complex recovery process, such as health care 
facilities and places of public gatherings, mainly due to special code requirements. So 
pre-incident planning should address such buildings, assess their current status, address 
code needs, and anticipate sources of complications. Also, plans should address existing 
FEMA processes, eligibility, and reimbursement requirements, so that owners do not 
take a long time after the earthquake trying to understand issues that are standard FEMA 
procedure. This can be done by facilities managers in public organizations and NGOs. 
As contended by Perry and Lindell (2003), it is the process of planning that makes a 
difference. So actions done during pre-incident planning for recovery would reduce the 
confusion that takes place after the incident and help prepare the decision makers for the 
process. Also, as shown by the Geary theater example, pre-incident studies of the needs 
of the building help in clarifying what should be done after the incident. In both delayed 
cases, the owner was unsure of the use of the building and that added to the delays.  
There are several sources of delays for buildings. Most of the variables are due to 
the context, recovery process, and players. Thus, significant change can happen if such 
variables are addressed.  
   
 
  150
 
 
3) How did the key issues of sustainable recovery for historic buildings play in 
the recovery period, specifically in regard to historic character and 
community participation? And how can the recovery of historic buildings be 
more sustainable? 
a. Maintaining historic character and public participation are two 
principles that are built in the existing laws and process and need 
improvement. 
Both historic character and community participation are built into the existing 
procedures that regulate the management of public-owned heritage, but there are several 
factors that still need improvements. Such policies have come to use historic character 
and integrity of fabric as the basis of valuation for heritage. Historic character and the 
integrity of fabric are both factors that help in making decisions about the built heritage, 
but must also encompass the value of heritage.  
Values of historic buildings are challenged strongly during recovery. The period 
of recovery is stressed, as there is a strong push in the direction of economic and 
functional values, mainly due to the circumstance itself. As such, decisions about 
historic buildings should not be reactive in nature, and should try to maintain the 
significance of the place for all groups. As cultural resources, this requires special 
arrangement for the recovery phase that allows for valuation of historic buildings that is 
not based on the physical integrity of the building or the severity of damage.  
Regulations and laws establish the environment within which the recovery takes 
place. Such regulations and laws are essential in the process and need to be developed to 
support sustainable recovery, heritage management, and governance, in order to develop 
sustainable cities.  Governments, through legislation, law, regulations, and procedures, 
create an environment that can support sustainability. The context establishes how the 
relationship between groups will proceed and is essential in determining the process and 
out come. The legislative, economic, social, political, and cultural environment 
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surrounding the building and the players define many of the variables that will affect the 
recovery. 
Thus, the existing policies need improvements in order to preserve the value of 
the built heritage for future generations. This is essential during disaster recovery as the 
value of the built heritage may be contested. Using only the integrity of fabric and 
historic character to assess whether the damaged historic building is worth keeping will 
lead to the loss of important heritage resources. Also, the process is focused on one set 
of values: historic. The process needs to be developed so that it encompasses the values 
that other groups in the society have in a critical way, so that historic buildings are still 
preserved without isolating the community from them. As Lowenthal points out: “a 
heritage disjoined from ongoing life cannot enlist popular support” (Lowenthal, 2000, 
22).  
Change after disaster is inevitable. Disasters can elicit improvements but can also 
generate negative reactions, such as demolitions or changes that significantly affect the 
value of historic buildings. There will be a strong tide of repairs and changes, and 
owners will take advantage of the repair phase to make changes that otherwise would not 
have happened, this includes positive and negative changes. Regulations help regulate 
such changes. Careful management of options can lead to improvements in the urban 
context. 
In the recovery period, there is a hidden conflict potential due to the different 
values and priorities that each group have. Such differences can develop into conflict if 
not addressed early in the process (Al-Nammari, 2005). Participatory processes that 
encourage face-to-face deliberations would be a good way for addressing such issues if 
accompanied by conflict resolution approaches, but the choice of method depends on the 
scope of work and level of empowerment (Bass et al., 1995).  
The few case studies above have negative outcomes on trust between parties and 
social solidarity between community groups. The local government and public agencies 
need to revaluate the process of recovery for their own buildings and attempt to identify 
better management approaches. The two homeless breakings into 170 Fell St., for 
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example, do not seem to be important for the public agencies involved in the 
deliberations. But they are important as indicators of social capital in the city and are 
symbolic in terms of the statement they make. 
The sustainability of the recovery cannot be judged based on a limited number of 
cases. Generalizing from case studies should be done carefully, as case studies are 
“generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin, 
2003, 10). Also, since there have not been similar investigations, the ability to cross-
compare is limited. However, learning from the dynamics of the process is important, 
and mainly, from the principles and processes that are presented. Unfortunately, the lack 
of data has created that limitation. The results of the analysis should be interpreted 
within that limitation. The selected cases are all cases that faced delays. Thus they do not 
necessarily represent the usual recovery process. However, they do represent a situation 
that did happen and could happen again. More research is needed to identify ways for 
limiting such complications from happening, which will save time and money for the 
public, and would improve the sustainability of the process of recovery. The cases 
indicate shortcomings in the existing process, which need to be addressed.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study provides the following main conclusions: 
   1. The need for pre-incident planning 
Owners of public buildings should address historic buildings under their 
stewardship ahead of disaster by developing pre-incident plans for their 
buildings. This could help in reducing the initial confusion over eligibility and 
process. Also, it can help the owner anticipate what upgrades may be needed if 
the building was significantly damaged, help in developing alternatives ahead of 
time, and avoid the delays resulting from confusion over the required code, 
requirements of the city, or CEQA and Section 106. Such plans could be done on 
periodic basis, as plans that assess the current status, regardless of whether a 
disaster is eminent. Such plans can help in general facility management for 
historic buildings even if no disaster took place, as it provides vision for the 
management and incorporates stakeholders in the evaluation of the status of the 
building.  
Long-term recovery requires pre-disaster cooperation between involved 
groups to build communication lines, common strategy, and trust. Important 
issues relating to the future of the historic building and the anticipated process of 
recovery could be discussed. This should be done as a part of a pre-disaster 
preparedness. 
Some variables may not be easy to address, such as the attitude of the 
players. These variables require leadership training and conflict resolution 
approach.   
2. Addressing certain functions through preparedness 
Certain functions need to be addressed to reduce disaster time and cost. 
Residential and cultural buildings should be addressed in particular, for both 
historic and non-historic buildings. Owners of such buildings should develop 
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recovery plans that identify the problems that such buildings have, their level of 
maintenance, needed action for code upgrades, areas of needed improvements, 
future plans for the buildings, and any special treatments needed. Plans should 
include the Historic Structure Report and identification of significance of the 
building. Such plans should be developed in coordination with the stakeholders 
who will be participating in the recovery phase, and so, should be able to identify 
the different values that different groups have for the buildings. This dose not 
mean that similar studies will not be needed after a disaster; as such studies 
should always be updated. It should help the participating groups identify areas 
of agreement and disagreement and thus reduce future conflict. Such plans are 
not only helpful for disaster recovery but also helpful to the up-keep of historic 
buildings and their continued maintenance.  
Different acts of structural and non-structural mitigation are needed. 
Buildings of large area would have high levels of damage, even if built with 
reinforced concrete. Specific care needs to be given to public buildings that have 
special equipment, furniture, or instruments. Such contents should be braced or 
fixed in ways that reduce their damage and hazard. The analysis showed that 
damage levels increase based on the content of the building, especially for 
hospitals, office buildings, and infrastructure facilities. Since the recovery time is 
affected by damage level, historic status, and building function, city managers 
can address these buildings ahead of time to reduce the time needed to recovery.  
3. Developing regulations 
The process of recovery for public buildings is an overlay of regulations 
on state, local, and federal levels. The overlay may result in complication, 
overlap, conflict of requirements (especially in codes), or lack of sufficient 
participation. The existing laws and regulations need to be developed to take into 
account such complications. The local government is responsible, in its disaster 
preparedness efforts, to identify such complications or gaps and develop within 
their own regulations and ordinances elements or processes that address them in 
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a way that best suits the conditions of the community. A goal in such plans 
should be maintaining a participatory approach that goes beyond being a 
formality of operation. 
4. FEMA 
As the funding source, needs to address the complexity of the process and 
the clarity of the requirements. Since the Loma Prieta earthquake, the process has 
been changed and simplified in some aspects. However, the recovery process for 
historic buildings takes longer time; issues facing historic buildings need to be 
addressed specifically. This requires further research on recovery of historic 
buildings.  
FEMA policies regarding the management of recovery funding for the 
built heritage does not take any consideration to the special character of such 
buildings, other than Section 106 requirements. The importance of historic 
buildings for the sustainable recovery of disaster affected areas is great, 
especially in places where heritage tourism can help the local community in 
recovery. Special programs for the preparedness and recovery of historic 
buildings should be developed, not only to encourage a better way for managing 
them, but also to facilitate the preservation of such heritage. Such policies should 
work on reducing the vulnerability of the built heritage, and reducing the time 
and cost associated with its recovery.  
5. Professional preparation and education 
Professionals can become part of the problem when they lack sufficient 
knowledge of relevant laws, standards, or the value of historic buildings. 
Professionals provide owners with their perceptions of feasibility and thus, affect 
the owner’s position. Architects, engineers, and other consultants need education 
on historic preservation, disaster management and recovery, and Section 106 
process and related laws. These issues can be addressed in continued education 
credits and in architectural and professional preparation in schools in general. 
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6. Heritage management 
The Secretary of Interior Standards and Section 106 need further 
development so that they support the sustainable management of the built 
heritage. This means adopting a comprehensive approach in understanding the 
value of historic buildings. An approach that extends beyond the physical 
integrity. It also requires a process that not only addresses values of history, but 
also the values of all stakeholders. An essential goal should be avoiding the 
alienation of the general public. This requires a more critical approach to 
preservation, in which it is seen as a management of the community’s heritage, 
not just buildings of historic importance. This change of paradigm should 
probably start by approaching historic buildings as built heritage.  
It is important that the preservation process is perceived as part of the 
continued history of heritage. The outcome of that process and the process itself 
are important too. There is a need for a change of perspective, not to approach 
the built heritage as if it had stopped in time, or as if its only significant history 
has passed. Acts on the building are part of its continued history. Thus, its 
meaning as heritage is shaped by how decisions are made, who is making them, 
and what relationship the community has to them.  
Assessing significance should take into account that damage is part of the 
life of the built heritage. Thus, the process should avoid the current focus only on 
the historic and artistic values of buildings and provide for other valuation 
systems.  This requires advancing preservation as a community-led activity, not 
as an sphere for architects, historians and the cultural elite. For that to happen, 
concerns of the community should be taken into consideration and not brushed 
aside.  
The importance of historic buildings is not understood by all owners or 
the general public. This leads to creating tension about decisions to preserve it. 
The existing process has not been educational; decisions have been taken 
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separate from public involvement. Current preservation processes should have an 
educational element and should not be considered only regulatory steps.  
 Owners and stewards of public historic buildings should be required to 
 plan for disaster recovery by addressing:  
 a. The status of the building and its needs. 
 b. If the owner has multiple buildings (like a city or a university), they 
         should address them as a group as well, to develop a   
                 comprehensive approach. 
 c. The needs of the buildings so that they remain functional after disaster. 
 d. Any code upgrades that could be required or needed. 
 e. Any improvements that the owner may need. 
 f. Any existing faults in the building that may lead to increasing damage. 
 g. Up keeping maintenance level. 
 h. Addressing the possibility of mitigation on any level, structural or 
      other. Furniture and other contents need to be addressed as well. 
 i. Identify the significance of the building, and any special treatments that 
      it may need to maintain its integrity after a disaster. 
 j. Develop a Historic Structure Report. 
 k. Identify possible stakeholders, and invite their participation in  
      developing the report and recovery plans.  
 l. Identify the different values the building may have for different groups. 
 m. Identify sources for emergency funds. 
 n. Investigate the existing application process for FEMA, and the     
                requirements of the application process and reimbursement. 
7. Developing the effectiveness of participation 
Each of the different stages of a project should allow for some type of 
public input (consultation, public hearing, roundtables, presentations, or else), as 
described in figure (12). The process should incorporate different types of 
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participation at different stages so that the public is awarded different powers of 
affecting the outcome throughout the progress of the project.  
Stakeholders and the general public should be part of the initial stages of 
the development of the project and be encouraged to provide their opinion on the 
outcome, which should address the interests of all groups. Consensus about the 
outcome of the project should be sought.  
8. Section 106 
The Section is important in post disaster situations and makes a difference 
in saving the built heritage, however, it needs to be broader. It was initially 
developed to facilitate taking into consideration effects of planning decisions on 
historic properties. It has gradually developed to be more effective as a 
participation tool, especially after the modifications of 1999. However, there is a 
need for more changes in the process. 
The SHPO should not have two roles (i.e. as mediator and as 
stakeholder). It may be better to have the SHPO as a mediator only.  This is to 
improve the consultation process as a conflict resolution process. 
The process should acknowledge the validity of other values that 
community groups have for historic buildings and address concerns of all 
community groups in developing the MOA or PA. 
Enhance the participatory opportunities that exist so far by allowing input 
in the early stages of project development. 
There is a need to add a step in the section 106 process. Evaluation after 
the project is done is needed and should be done with stakeholder involvement.  
9. Recovery management 
FEMA’s relationship with the owners, especially local jurisdictions, 
needs development. That may be done through pre-earthquake cooperation in 
planning for disaster response and recovery. Many respondents from public 
agencies lacked trust in FEMA. 
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Moving FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security had negative 
outcomes on the relation to cities and local jurisdictions. Some of the respondents 
complained of the hardships of obtaining papers in and out from FEMA after that 
merger, since bureaucratic processes became more complex due to security. This 
leads in the opposite direction if better relationships with local jurisdiction are to 
be built. 
The tagging system needs development so that the meaning of the red tag 
is changed. As suggested above, once a building is to be demolished, a new tag 
should be given to it.  This avoids the many misunderstandings of the red tag, 
which would happen again in future disasters.  
Cities need to invest time in preparation for recovery plans. None of the 
respondents in the City of San Francisco heard of a recovery plan before. This is 
understandable as recovery plans are more complex and require cooperation 
between many agencies and departments, however, such preparation would help 
all agencies involved during the recovery phase. 
The recovery of historic and heritage buildings in a city like San 
Francisco is important for tourism. Yet, none of the processes indicated 
awareness of the effects of decisions on tourism in the city. Tourism is 
considered, indirectly, through the repair of certain important landmarks and 
tourism destinations like the Embarcadero, many of the historic piers, the 
waterfront, the Civic Center, and many of the park structures. Yet, such repairs 
were not part of a plan, and no tourism studies were done on the city level. 
Buildings that are not monumental or visible, like historic residences, hotels, or 
other facilities, may not be directly important as tourism attraction per se, but 
they are important as contributors to the creation of the character of the city. 
Future recovery should take into consideration effects of decision on tourism, 
especially in cities hat are tourism destinations, like San Francisco or New 
Orleans. 
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10. Future research recommendations 
• There are several variables that affect the recovery of historic buildings. 
Improving the sustainability of the recovery requires further investigation 
into each of the variables, especially for facilities such as historic health 
care buildings, residential buildings and infrastructures.  
• More investigation is needed on other variables that may affect the 
recovery time of historic buildings, which were not investigated in this 
inquiry. Variables like ownership, geographic location, design, shape, and 
height have not yet been explored systematically. Also, the relationship of 
time to cost, and the elements that increase cost require investigation 
especially since disaster costs keep escalating. 
• Facilitating disaster recovery should take into account economic 
ramifications of disasters. An important role that historic buildings play is 
the creation of environments that are attractive to tourists. The 
implications of damage of historic buildings on tourism has not been 
investigated in this research and future research should address effects of 
disaster on heritage tourism, and how current policies address that. 
• General issues of sustainability need further investigation. The social 
sustainability of the process, its effect on the quality of life of the 
inhabitants of the buildings and the neighborhoods, its effect on the 
economic development of the community, the environmental issues of 
recovery, the relationship between governmental departments, the 
coordination between different departments on the same level and on the 
three different levels (federal, state, local), and the sustainability of 
governance are in need of further research. 
• The study indicates that the current preservation laws and regulations 
have limitations in terms of sustainable heritage management. More 
research is needed to identify ways of making the process more 
sustainable for cultural heritage. Research on the value of historic 
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buildings after disasters and the significance of damaged buildings is 
needed.  
• Mitigation is a challenge for managers of historic buildings. For public 
buildings, the challenge is not that of incentives, but of cost. The solution 
sought so far has been that of trying to develop the code requirements and 
technologies involved. Cost need to be reduced through ways of indirect 
incentives through encouraging a supportive market. There is a need to 
study the elements of retrofit cost and ways of reducing it. 
• Further research needs to develop the findings in a broader perspective. 
Developing comparative studies on the long-term recovery of historic 
buildings in other contexts need to be done. However, taking in to 
account the changes that are taking place in FEMA, the fact that it has 
come to be part of the Department of Homeland Security, and that its is 
no longer subject to the Freedom of Information Act, such studies my not 
be easy. The best approach would be for the local governments and 
agencies to develop better file storage systems in which old files can be 
retrieved. The study of long-term recovery requires better ways for data 
storage and retrieval, which is not existent.   
• Public participation is a critical aspect of both recovery and preservation. 
As mentioned above, too much or too little of public participation can 
have negative effects. More research is needed to investigate ways of 
effectively engaging public groups in the process, the limitations and 
opportunities of public participation during disaster recovery.  
• Inquiry in historic preservation rarely uses statistical approaches. This 
study has used a rigorous approach to find out trends in the recovery of 
historic buildings. A benefit of this approach is that it allows for the 
investigation of a large number of cases and thus develops understanding 
on a larger scale. This encourages utilizing such methods in future studies 
of historic buildings, towards identifying general trends that can help 
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develop policies related to the management of the built heritage. It is 
recommended that more researcher investigate methods of applying 
statistical methods in historic preservation discourse and academic 
research. 
11. Implications of this research 
• Practical 
This research has implications on different public policy areas that relate 
to disaster management, historic preservation, and sustainability. It calls 
for improvements of policies towards addressing historic buildings 
separately by specific participatory requirements, planning for recovery 
of historic buildings specifically, on city level, addressing certain 
functions that would otherwise require more time or cost. Also, this 
research has implications in reevaluating current policies toward 
participation in disaster management and in heritage management.  
In addition to that, this research calls for a change of current policies 
towards historic buildings, so that they are managed as heritage. Also, the 
recovery of historic buildings would have effects on tourism; such an 
aspect was not addressed explicitly in local recovery effort. This requires 
development of  recovery plans, which is lacking.  
• Historic preservation process 
This research would encourage the development of the current approach 
towards the evaluation of significance and identifying more to cultural 
value than the historic fabric and character. 
Also, changes on the role of SHPO in the process, as a mediator only, and 
identification of bias within the process as it exists now thus developing 
Section 106 towards becoming a tool for heritage management by 
incorporating the different values it has. 
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Disaster preparedness is lacking for the built heritage. This research 
points out to the significance of developing plans for reducing the cost 
and time needed for recovery.  
• Recovery 
The findings of this research should help in other disasters by alerting 
public agencies and local governments to the areas of potential conflict 
and the buildings that would expect delays. Thus, this research could be 
helpful in many disaster situations, as the variables identified are mostly 
not disaster specific. Taking into account recent disasters, like Katrina, 
the recovery of the historic resources in New Orleans can be improved if 
the variables identified by this research were taken into account. 
The sustainable recoveries of cities require taking into account the role 
historic buildings play in attracting tourism. The importance of the 
regular non-landmark buildings is often neglected and interviews with 
some respondents revealed that ramifications of damage to historic 
buildings is not always understood by decision-makers, especially when 
the historic building is not monumental. The importance of the regular 
building in creating a tourism destination, and the effects a disaster could 
have upon that are not fully understood. This research direct attention to 
the importance of the built heritage not only for cultural continuity but 
also for sustainable development through tourism.  
FEMA role should be developed beyond being a source of funding and 
the policies that govern relationship between players need to be 
developed so that communication and cooperation are improved, 
specifically between public agencies, local governments, and FEMA.  
Participation is essential for successful recovery. Current local policies 
need to develop better ways for public participation in which such 
participation is effective. This is of significance for public agencies that 
usually function independently from local government. 
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• Education 
This study used statistical methods in historic building studies, which is 
relatively new in the approach to historic preservation. This should 
provide a beginning towards more investigation of ways to utilize 
quantitative approaches in historical studies and in the management of the 
built heritage as well.  
This dissertation incorporated two fields that are usually investigated 
separately. The findings of the research create an avenue for both sides 
for investigations, thus addressing historic preservation by disaster 
management and vise versa.  
Importance of education for architects and planner about recovery, and 
historic preservation is emphasized, and the findings of this research 
should help bridge part of the knowledge gap that exists between the two 
fields. 
• Theoretical 
This research helps to link historic preservation, sustainability, and 
disaster management, thus encouraging future research in that area.  
This investigation encourages the development of historic preservation 
theory towards heritage management and sustainability.  
An important implication of this research is that develops the theory of 
sustainability as link between disasters and historic buildings. 
Finally, improving the sustainability of the recovery requires changes in 
the existing policies, which would affect the context of the recovery and 
its process. It also requires better preparedness, which can be facilitated 
through prior planning. Such planning can take into account the variables 
identified above and investigate them on a building-by-building basis, 
thus it should be done by stewards and owners. Certain functions will 
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expect further challenges and they need to be targeted for pre-disaster 
planning.  
 
In conclusion, this study has investigated issues that affect the sustainability of 
the built heritage after disaster. The findings can be transformed to other contexts, as 
many of the issues are not based on the disaster type.  The filed of disaster management 
of historic buildings need to be investigated as more of the built heritage is affected by 
disaster every year. The improvement of the sustainability of recovery and of heritage 
management requires more investigation. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Since this paper is multi-disciplinary in nature, many terms are common in both 
Disaster Management and Historic Preservation literature. The choice of this word came 
as it has less confusion than other words used in preservation literature, such as 
reconstruction or restoration. All references to Historic Preservation terms (i.e. 
restoration, rehabilitation) are done in their general meaning, as that is the meaning they 
had in the correspondences.  
2 ICOMOS uses the term "Conservation" not "Preservation", but for maintaining 
consistency the term of Preservation will be used as it is the term used in the USA. 
3  Integrity of fabric is a state in which the original historic building materials, location, 
feelings, and systems remain intact. Any act that changes them, adds to them, or 
damages them is considered damage to the integrity of the historic fabric. The original 
materials and systems of the building are important as historic documents that should not 
be falsified (Fielden, 1987; Look, Wong and Augustus, 1997; ICOMOS, 1999;). 
4 Applied Technology Council (ATC) developed standards for post-earthquake 
evaluation of buildings (ATC-20), which provides guidelines and step by step 
procedures for professionals involved in post-earthquake inspections. The guidelines 
contain instructions on where to look for damage and how to rate the safety significance 
of damage. The ATC 20 guidelines identify three phases of safety evaluation procedures: 
1) Rapid evaluation done to define safe and unsafe buildings, it is done within 10-20 
minutes and is aimed at providing preliminary assessment it labels the buildings as 
Inspected (apparently OK), Limited Entry (Questionable), and Unsafe (obviously 
unsafe). 2) the second level of evaluation, the Detailed Evaluation, needs 1-4 hours, 
consisting of a thorough visual examination of the structure inside and outside. It 
identified three types of buildings: safe for use but may need repairs, Limited Entry 
(Questionable ), or unsafe (must be repaired or removed). The final evaluation is done 
by a structural engineering consultant retained by the owner.  This inspection will result 
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in one of two designations for the building: 1) Inspected, but will need repairs. 2) 
Unsafe, needs repairs or removal. This evaluation is the most thorough and is done 
without time limits. Each of the three evaluations will post placards on the buildings: 
green, yellow, or red. The placards are intended to identify if further evaluation is 
needed and if the buildings is safe enough for regular use or if it may require structural 
repairs before use (ATC-20-1, 1989).   
5 The term project and worksite are used interchangeably. 
6 Alternate Project: “is any permanent restoration project where the applicant chooses to 
abandon the facility and its function rather than make disaster repairs The applicant may 
use any federal share funds, limited to the approved federal estimates to complete the 
eligible scope of work, at another facility” (FEMA 323 :33) 
7 The comments section usually contained information that project approval is pending 
Section 106 completion, requires historic review, needs Historic Structure Report, or has 
reference about the SHPO. There was no direct identification of historic projects per se. 
8 All Univariate analysis models were developed with the help of Adrash Joshi, Graduate 
student in the Statistics Department. 
9 Most of the analysis was presented in Al-Nammari, 2005. 
10 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, amended in 
2000, require the federal government to assist local and state government when a federal 
disaster is declared. This assistance is provided through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA 2005) 
11 Alternate Project: A status for a project in which the applicant uses FEMA funds for 
another project (s), thus abandoning the damaged facility. The funding would be based 
on the repair cost estimates for the damaged facility. These funds can be used for another 
facility upon FEMA approval. However, there is a 10% reduction of coverage in this 
project status, and the new project would still go through environmental reviews (FEMA 
323). 
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12 FEMA regulations require that if the repair cost for a building is 50% of the cost of 
replacing it, then replacing cost is what FEMA would provide. 
13 Improved Project: FEMA funds usually covers only repair costs, but the applicant may 
chose to make additional improvements to the facility.  In this case the costs would be 
hard to track as improvements and repairs are done at the same time. Funding would be 
limited to the approved scope of repairs only, based on cost estimates. The project still 
goes through the historic and environmental reviews (FEMA323, 1999). 
14 The National Environmental Quality Act (NEPA) also requires an environmental 
review once a specific proposal was submitted to FEMA for funding.  
15 SOTA program was developed for 1200 students of painting, dance, sculpture, and 
other visual and performing arts. Among the critique of the program was that it requires 
all visual arts classrooms to be of 16 ft. height, it provides for a library for students that 
is 420 sq. ft while the faculty of 70 have a lounge of 1320 ft. sq., that the visual arts halls 
can accommodate 510 students at the same time, and that it required a studio with a loft 
inside it for perspective studies (D. Bahlman, letter to SHPO, February 3, 1998). 
16 Mothballing has specific procedures that would close the building but keep it for 
future use through regular basic maintenance (cf. Park, 1993). 
17 Section 1010 of the San Francisco Planning Code indicates that the Planning 
Commission has no authority over certain public agencies, SFUSD is one of them. 
SFUSD is a state agency that has powers to tax, to issue bonds, to condemn property and 
to manage its own property. The board of the SFUSD are elected by voters and not 
appointed. Public School Districts are considered separate State agencies and operate as 
separate jurisdictions from the cities in which they are located (SFUSD, 2000: 7-5, 7-6). 
18 The SHPO used consultant representatives on some project to follow up the work. The 
SHPO representative was available on site to follow up the developments on site. This 
strategy works for reducing the work load on the main office and allowing for more 
follow up on site thus solving issues as they appear. 
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APPENDIX A  
SECTION 106 
 
Section 106 (16 U.S.C. 470f) National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 as amended 
through 1992 (Public Law 102-575) 
“The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a 
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any 
Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking 
shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking 
or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of 
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or 
eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any such Federal agency 
shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under Title II of 
this Act a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.” 
 
The section identifies that: 
1. If an action is a federal undertaking (i.e.any project that is owned by the 
federal government, funded by federally assisted loans or grants, or requiring 
federal permit or license). 
2. Then the federal agency of jurisdiction is responsible.  
3. Before approval of the expenditure of any funds. 
4. To take into account the effects of the undertaking on any district, site, 
building, structure, or object that is eligible for the National Register.  
5. To afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation a reasonable 
opportunity to comment. 
 
This means that FEMA would be responsible to make sure that any project 
receiving FEMA assistance would not have adverse effects on any historic district, site, 
building, structure, or object. The historic properties included in this section are 
properties included in the National Register of Historic Places or that meet the criteria 
for the National Register 
The regulations explaining the Section 106 (36 CFR Part 800) were updated in 
2001, and required more public involvement. The older regulations were similar in the 
main structure of the process (FEMA, 2001; King 2000). 
Section 106 main steps: 
1. The federal agency determines  
a. Whether it has an undertaking that could adversely affect historic 
properties. 
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b. Identify the appropriate State Historic Preservation Officer/Tribal 
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO/THPO). 
c. Plan to involve the public, and identify specific potential consulting 
parties.  
2. The federal agency, in consultation with SHPO/THPO, identifies historic 
properties in the area of potential effects. If the agency finds that no historic 
properties are present or affected, then it would provide documentation of 
that to the SHPO/THPO and proceeds with its undertaking, unless there was 
an objection within 30 days. If there was an adverse effect, then the agency 
should assess possible adverse effects. 
3. The federal agency, in consultation with the SHPO/THPO, makes an 
assessment of the adverse effects on the identified historic properties. This is 
based on criteria found in the regulations explaining the Section 106 (36 CFR 
Part 800). If it was found that there will be no adverse effect, the agency 
proceeds with the undertaking and any agreed-upon conditions, or else the 
agency would have to initiate the consultation process. The consultation 
process is intended to seek ways to avoid, minimize, or mitigate the adverse 
effects. 
4. The consultation is done in participation of SHPO/THPO and any other 
interested parties. The regulations provide a list of groups that must be 
included: ACHP, SHPO/THPO, Indian tribes when the undertaking occurs or 
affects historic properties, on their tribal lands, Indian tribes and Native 
Hawaiian organizations, Representatives of local governments, Applicants 
for Federal assistance, permits, licenses and other approvals, Additional 
consulting parties, The general public. The consultation is described as” is a 
dynamic, good-faith process of seeking, discussing, and considering the 
views of other participants and, where feasible, seeking agreement with them 
regarding matters arising in the Section 106 process” (ACHP, 2002).  
5. Consultation usually results in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which 
outlines agreed-upon measures that the agency will take to avoid, minimize, 
or mitigate the adverse effects. If agreement was not found, the ACHP would 
be invited in the process. “If consultation proves unproductive, the agency or 
the SHPO/THPO, or ACHP itself, may terminate consultation. If a SHPO 
terminates consultation, the agency and ACHP may conclude an MOA 
without SHPO involvement. However, if a THPO terminates consultation and 
the undertaking is on or affecting historic properties on tribal lands, ACHP 
must provide its comments. The agency must submit appropriate 
documentation to ACHP and request ACHP's written comments. The agency 
head must take into account ACHP's written comments in deciding how to 
proceed.” (ACHP, 2002). 
 
 The ACHP provide specific notes on how the public would be involved: 
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“Public involvement is a critical aspect of the Section 106 process. Section 
800.2(d) contains a standard that Federal agencies must adhere to as they go through 
the Section 106 process.  
The type of public involvement will depend upon various factors, including but 
not limited to, the nature and complexity of the undertaking, the potential impact, the 
historic property, and the likely interest of the public in historic preservation issues.  
Confidentiality concerns include those specified in Section 304 of the Act and 
legitimate concerns about proprietary information, business plans, and privacy of 
property owners.  
Section 800.2(d)(2) sets a notice and public information standard. The public 
must be notified, with sufficient information to allow meaningful comments, so that they 
can express their views during the various stages and decision-making points of the 
Section 106 process.  
It is intended that Federal agencies have flexibility in how they involve the 
public, including the use of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other 
agency planning processes, as long as opportunities for such public involvement are 
adequate and consistent with subpart A of the regulations. Section 800.2(d)(3) provides 
reminders of this flexibility” (ACHP, 2002). 
  
 
APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE PAGE FROM THE CHRONOLOGICAL MATRIX 
 
       Date From To About Comments 
Letter August 13, 1993 ACT SHPO Asking for SHPO concurrence, as per their recordation according to MOA  agreement  
Letter August 13, 1993 ACT SHPO Letter signed between SHPO and ACT regarding agreement on documentation.  
Letter September 9, 1993 ACT SHPO Asking for SHPO concurrence, as they want to start demolitions with a few weeks. There was a Letter on August 13,1993 asking for concurrence.  
Letter September 29, 1993 SHPO FEMA Comments on the 90% drawing identifying the auditorium, paneling, annex, and other issues as important.  
Letter February 8, 1994 FEMA OES Asking for ACT reply to comments on the 90% construction documents, presented in October. 
Important: FEMA contacting 
act through OES. Reminding 
them to reply. 
Plans 
submitted for 
review 
February 16, 1994   Comments, includes request fir sight line study, missing 1st floor plans  
Letter February 16, 1994 ACT OES Enclosed letter from Gensler as reply to Roy Kite's letter of Nov. 12, 1993. Concerns from FEMA.  
Letter March 8, 1994 SHPO FEMA Letter indicating that plans for first floor not received plans. Also, issues with glass, balustrades, panels, canopy, sightline studies,...  
memo March 8, 1994 Steade Hans 
Re. Letter of Feb 15, 1994 to ACT from Gensler, which includes replies to FEMA letter of 
Aug. 5, 1993. this is not a restoration project, more rehabilitation. Regrettably the first 
floor plans were not submitted. 
 
Letter April 6, 1994 ACT OES Reply to March 8th , 1994 letter from SHPO to FEMA, responding to SHPO letter with letter from architect.  
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meeting May 2, 1994 
ACT, SHPO, 
OES, FEMA, 
Gensler 
 Requested that they have story poles be constructed to represent the roof top addition to the annex of the Geary theater. 
Meeting to resolve outstanding 
questions 
meeting May 2, 1994 FEMA All Meeting re: resolution of issues under MOA, mason street façade and auditorium finishes.  
Letter May 31, 1994 Gensler ACT Story poles erected  
Letter May 31, 1994 ACT SHPO we did the story poles and photographed them. Enclosing letter from Gensler (architect), and photograph.  
Meeting June 14, 1994 
SHPO, ACT, 
Cahill, 
Gensler, OES, 
 Misunderstanding on need for letter for façade  
memo June 15, 1994 Steade Hans About ACT meeting. Lobby plaster identified as problem. SHPO had approved plans not knowing that the façade will be saved. Problem how.  
Letter June 27, 1994 ACT FEMA ACT awaiting response from SHPO on two issues the rooftop and façade still not heard from SHPO 
Seems that construction work 
is in progress and they want 
quick resolution. 
memo July 5, 1994 Peterson Steade Issues raised in the June 14th meeting, plaster, façade treatment  
memo July 7, 1994 Steade Hans 
Peterson report of July 5th on June 14 meeting. Plaster issue, mason street façade, roof 
top visually and architectural objectable? Comments work on the lobby was never 
approved by SHPO, and work is commencing. Problem that new and old not 
distinguished. 
When did Peterson become 
SHPO rep? 
Letter July 7, 1994 Cahill (contractor) act 
Façade options. FEMA will not fund anything to do with this façade b/c it was not 
damaged by the quake. FEMA had approved a lump sum to seismic retrofit to code for 
the annex, which will be completely demolished and replaced with a new structure-
concrete-. Architect design retain the facade and restores it. no details on how that will be 
done. Facade of poor quality-umb and conc. 
FEMA had approved seismic 
retrofit, when? 
Letter July 8, 1994 ACT SHPO 
Façade options: to demolish and reconstruct, to keep in place and shore, or to 
reconstruct after removal. ACT prefers to reconstruct after removal ( option 3). Also, 
SOHA decided that the conc. Slab above ground floor lobby ceiling will not have to be 
removed- so the majority of the historic ceiling will be preserved. July 7th letter 
Contrary to previous 
understanding of needing a 
letter about it 
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APPENDIX C 
SAMPLE FROM THE SINGLE-PROJECT-ANALYSIS MATRIX 
 
Dat
e
Kind From To Tim
e
Historic Character Participation People Building Process Cont
ext
Notes
6/6
/19
90
Lett
er
Foster 
Eng.
SHP
O
 Exterior facade will be 
restored to pre 
earthquake conditions 
and historically 
significant interiors 
finish maintained. 
Removal of chimney 
and parapet and 
emergency stabilization 
will not prevent 
(preclude) 
reconstruction of the 
facade to pre-earthquake 
appearance. 
(maintaining of historic 
character not a problem)
 Professional 
initiating contact 
with SHPO early 
in the process. 
Significance 
understood: one of 
the oldest high school 
buildings in the city 
and its movement to 
its current locations " 
is certainly an 
engineering 
achieving of the 
highest order”. 
Stabilization action 
needed immediately 
as building is badly 
damage. The SFUSD 
intends to do that. 
Need to remove 
chimney and 
parapets. Hollow clay 
tiles, and stabilize the 
corners.
This is first referral to 
SHPO. Jan 1990. the 
consultant is 
initiating contact, un 
like other 
consultants, and 
confirming that they 
will respect the 
Standards and SHB 
Code, and understand 
the significance of 
the building. 
 This is first 
referral to 
SHPO. Jan 
1990. The 
consultant is 
initiating 
contact, un 
like other 
consultants, 
and 
confirming 
that they will 
respect the 
Standards 
and SHB 
Code, and 
understand 
the 
significance 
of the 
building.
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6/2
1/1
990
Lett
er
Foster 
Engine
ering
SHP
O
 They planned to do as 
much in0situe repair as 
possible to save historic 
fabric, but some parts 
are severely damaged 
and need to be 
reconstructed.
Had a presentation 
for the SF City 
Planning 
Department, 
preliminary 
review, to the 
Architectural 
Review 
Committee (ARC) 
reporting to the 
Landmarks 
Review Board, 
they are under the 
Planning 
Department and 
are an advisory 
committee that has 
to review all 
alteration work on 
Landmarks and 
architecturally 
significant 
buildings within 
the city. 
consultant 
coordinating with 
SHPO on their 
plans
They initially were 
planning to 
reconstruct all brick 
work, but FEMA 
required full 
examination for the 
brickwork and 
exterior facade 
(building material 
testing and field 
observation) which 
showed that some 
sections do not need 
reconstruction but 
can be repaired, 
strengthened, and 
anchored in-situ.
Application for 
Planning 
Department? they did 
not know they did 
not need a C of A. 
They are 
coordinating with 
SHPO early.
 They are 
presenting to 
the planning 
department 
as if they 
have to. 
They did not 
know at the 
time that 
they did not 
need any 
approval 
from the 
planning 
Department. 
SFUSD 
decided that 
they do not 
need 
approvals 
later.
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9/1/
199
5
meet
ing 
min
utes 
SOT
A
profess
ionals 
and 
consult
ants 
involve
d in  
SOTA
 Plan
s in 
1995 
to 
dem
olish 
170 
Fell 
St.. 
saving the trim in case 
the building not 
demolished
Planning for 170 
Fell demolition, 
before section 106 
starting. " the 
inevitable politics 
associated with the 
demolition of 170 
fell from historic 
preservationists, 
etc." 
  Planning for 170 Fell 
demolition, before 
section 106 starting.
170 
Fell 
buil
ding 
curr
ently 
occu
pied 
by 
the 
hom
eless
.
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APPENDIX D 
COMPARISON MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
170 Fell St. 
Geary 
Theater 
The 
Williams 
Notes 
Players       
Owner's internal 
factors 
Stability of staff  Delayed progress No indication No information  
 
Change of 
leadership 
 
Change of project 
with change of 
leadership 
~ ~  
Perception of 
Significance 
  
Historic 
Significance not 
clear, other values 
not addressed 
Significance clear 
Historic 
Significance not 
clear initially 
 
Perception of the 
consultation 
  
The consultation is 
a “hoop” to go 
through. 
Consultation is to 
please the SHPO 
and approval 
Consultation is a 
procedural 
requirement- a 
hoop. 
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Attitude Attitude 
Towards the 
historic building 
No appreciation for 
the historic building 
Fostered the 
building but did not 
understand the 
Standards 
Did not appreciate 
it and it was 
ignored before the 
earthquake 
 
 Cooperation Owner cooperating No cooperation Cooperative 
Cooperative at the 
end 
 
 Compliance 
Owner compliance 
with deadlines, 
agreements 
Compliance issues Compliant Mostly compliant  
Institutional 
culture 
 
Process:  "will be 
approved after the 
public hearing" 
Made decisions 
alone 
N/A 
Made decisions 
alone 
Both agencies are 
used to doing 
things their way. 
They have 
developed a 
method of 
management that 
supported 
individual decision-
making and they 
seem to be used to 
having things their 
way. 
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Knowledge  Of standards 
Informed of 
standards 
Informed Informed 
This should not be 
an issue. They 
have consultants 
and FEMA and 
SHPO provided 
advice of possible 
sources of 
problems. 
  
Section 10 6 
process 
Consultant 
available 
Consultant 
available 
Consultant 
available 
No understanding 
of the objective. 
  FEMA process 
Confused over 
alternatives 
Confused over 
roles and eligibility 
Confused over 
codes 
 
Authority 
Power and 
authority of owner 
 
Had jurisdiction to 
do what they 
wanted 
No, had to attain 
approvals from city 
Had power and 
authority to 
eminent domain as 
a separate public 
agency 
Both public 
organizations that 
had jurisdiction. 
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Trust Between all parties  No trust No trust No trust 
Believing that 
FEMA can should 
approve funds for 
strengthening, that 
the SHPO is 
complicating the 
process, or that the 
owner is not 
transparent on 
goals. 
Stewardship 
Owner 
understands their 
responsibility 
 No Yes Not clear  
Process       
Initial Position 
Owner Uncertainty 
of what to do 
 Not sure of use Repair Demolish  
 FEMA position  
Pushed for 
demolition 
Deny strengthening 
coverage 
Repair cracks  
FEMA process 
Complication of 
applications and 
approvals "dancing 
with FEMA" 
 Complicated  Complicated Complicated Cost more 
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Participation 
effectiveness 
Not all 
stakeholders were 
part of the 
decisions 
 
Values of parents 
not addressed, 
may be other 
groups too. 
Not apparent 
Values of groups 
affected by the 
development 
project not clear 
 
Early 
Consultation 
Early consultation 
with SHPO 
 
Delayed 
consultation 
Early consultation Early consultation  
Clarity of the 
SHPO’s Role 
  
SHPO is a 
mediator 
SHPO overseeing 
the adoption of the 
Standards 
SHPO overseeing 
the adoption of the 
Standards 
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Project 
Management 
 
Late decisions 
about what to do 
Delay 
Knew what they 
wanted 
Delayed 
Both public 
agencies had 
delays in making 
final decision on 
what to do. For fell, 
complete change 
of mind, for 
Williams, needed 
temporary work 
until final decision 
was made. In a 
way they knew 
what they wanted. 
Final action 
delayed.  Alternate 
project status in 
both. Money went 
somewhere else 
until final decision 
is made. 
  
Change of 
consultants 
Too much change 
of consultants 
Minor change- 
delay simple 
N/A  
  
Deferring repairs 
(mothballing) 
Mothballing No 
Delay in 
preservation work 
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Professionals 
Involved 
Consultant pushing 
for demolition 
Some 
professionals not 
understanding 
standards 
Professionals 
disagreement 
about what is 
needed 
Professionals have 
an impact on the 
development of the 
project. 
Misunderstanding 
of red tag 
  Yes Yes Yes 
To demolish, 
unusable building. 
Building       
Intervention 
needed 
Earthquake 
damage level 
 Highly damaged Damaged Damaged Damage relative 
 Strengthening  Needed Needed Needed 
All needed 
strengthening. All 
faced cost problem 
due to 
strengthening. 
 Codes  Required Required 
Not required 
initially, but 
became required 
due to 
strengthening 
 
 Maintenance  Ignored Well maintained Ignored 
Building was not 
well maintained 
before earthquake 
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 Rehabilitation 
Major 
improvements 
needed 
Needed Needed Needed 
Needed extensive 
rehabilitation 
 Reconstruction Rebuilding parts Parts Parts No  
Ornament and 
details 
  Details Many details Little detail 
The detailing level 
was high in Geary 
only. Fell St. had 
little details in brick. 
So did Williams. 
Location   Suitable for SOTA 
Affected 
importance of 
renovation 
Economically 
significant 
 
Visibility   Visible Visible 
Visible but not as 
much 
The visible 
buildings were in 
newspapers and 
followed up by 
public 
Context       
Political Political support  Yes Yes Unclear 
Politicians trying to 
interfere. Mayor 
always trying to 
push the project. 
201
 
   
Other disasters 
Leads to changes 
in process and 
funding 
 Northridge no effect 
PA changes/ no 
Section 106 
 
Preservation 
Activism 
Diligence Activists follow-up 
Activists affected 
outcome 
no public 
involvement 
Activism help 
prevent demolition 
 
 Proactiveness 
activists 
suggestions 
Provided helpful 
solutions 
~ no information  
Community  
needs 
Social Needs of schools yes  no  
 cultural Theater challenges yes yes no  
 economic 
availability of 
donations/ need 
revitalization for 
area 
no yes yes 
Geary and Williams 
had economic 
benefits, thus were 
important to area 
and owner. The fell 
had no direct 
economic benefit. 
Maybe that why 
owner able to just 
leave it. 
regulatory Section 106  Yes Yes Yes  
 CEQA  Yes Yes Yes  202
 
  
 
 
203
Technical context 
Methods for 
strengthening, 
assessing strength 
of building, or 
repairing it 
 Yes Yes Yes  
Social context   
Homeless and 
education. 
Patron needs Not apparent  
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